This book is based on the author’s Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, which was supervised by Rosamond McKitterick and submitted in 2014. The author, Ingrid Rembold, is now a Junior Research Fellow at Hertford College, Oxford, but following her Ph.D. submission, she obtained postdoctoral funding from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) to carry out research at the Georg August University, Göttingen. It is important to mention this because it is clear that Rembold’s work has benefited immensely from her postdoctoral studies; in contrast with other English publications in the field, her book shows not only an awareness but a profound and critical grasp of relevant research published in German, with which she is fully up to date. The bibliography alone (pp. 245–73) is ample proof of the author’s intensive engagement with the literature, as are her thorough footnotes, which number nearly a thousand. Indeed, sometimes one can have too much of a good thing; this reviewer feels that it was not really necessary, for example, for the author to list so many of Hedwig Röckelein’s publications in footnote 123, only to repeat them all again in the bibliography (pp. 268–9).

The author correctly notes at the beginning of the study that ‘Saxony represents an important test case for the nature of Christianization and Christian reform in the early medieval world’ (p. 3). This is the reason, of course, why so many historians have been interested in this topic and why it is almost impossible to keep abreast of all the relevant literature. Hence Rembold— and the reader—is aware of the need for a new perspective: ‘With a fresh reading of a wide range of Latin and Old Saxon sources, [this book] explores the manner in which Saxony was incorporated into the Carolingian political order and the Christian ecclesia’ (p. 4). In contrast to most studies to date,
she argues that ‘the brutality of the Saxon wars did not preclude acceptance of Christianity and Carolingian rule’ (p. 4). Elegantly bringing together political and ecclesiastical strands, she presents us with ‘a case study of social transformation’ (p. 4). In a comprehensive introduction (which in part refers to another publication by the author, cf. p. 28, n. 100), she sets out why the process ‘by which Saxony was incorporated into the Carolingian Empire and the Christian church following its violent conquest by Charlemagne’ (p. 36) requires a re-evaluation. And in attempting this ambitious goal, Rembold fully succeeds.

Part 1, ‘Politics of Conquest’, covers the Saxon wars (pp. 39–84) and the Stellinga uprising (pp. 85–140). Chronologically speaking, therefore, it actually goes beyond the time of the mission itself. But through a close reading of the sources, Rembold is able to argue convincingly that the uprising ‘was not the return to pagan observance’ that many have believed, especially as ‘Stellinga’s goals were more modest than has previously been supposed, [and] so too were their effects less pronounced’ (p. 139). Among these effects were clear signs that ‘Saxon society became increasingly stratified, and literary sources betray a much clearer demarcation of the orders of Saxony’ (p. 140).

Part 2, ‘Conversion and Christianization’, takes the form of a detailed source analysis addressing the topics ‘Founders and Patrons’ (pp. 143–87) and ‘Religion and Society’ (pp. 188–242). Rembold carefully traces the impressive creation of the Saxon dioceses (which are listed and mapped on Map 2, p. x), an achievement which is unlikely to have been solely due to the wishes of Carolingian and Frankish rulers: ‘These structures are the result of gradual development, made possible above all by local support’ (p. 186). Rightly, Rembold debunks the view that the introduction of Christianity and the establishment of its institutions was a violent act of colonialism; this may have been the case when the mission first began, but does not explain, she thinks, the efforts made to embed the Christian faith and the structures of its church among the Saxon people. Even if Saxon authors claimed otherwise, Rembold argues that Carolingian rulers did not play a leading role in developing Saxon ecclesiastical institutions, although not everyone is likely to agree. The important point, according to Rembold, is that ‘Saxon religious institutions were not . . . the product of some top-down strategy. Rather, they developed
gradually and drew primarily upon local support, both in the form of donations and of tithes’ (p. 187). It is therefore only logical that in Part 2, the author addresses ‘Religion and Society’ as two sides of the same coin. Given that by comparison with Carolingian Christianity, Saxon Christianity could be idiosyncratic in some of its practices, the author hopes to show the significance of local Christian identities, leading to the conclusion that one might expect: ‘Saxon Christianity was both different and the same. It was simultaneously a micro-Christendom and a beacon of Christian universalism’ (p. 242).

Overall, Rembold’s study shows that the usual explanation focused on a ‘top-down’ Christianization is inadequate. Instead, she wants ‘to highlight the potential for similar diversity within Carolingian Christianity and the structures that underpinned it’ (243). Thus the Stellinga revolt, for example, was not, according to Rembold, genuinely anti-Carolingian, but should rather be seen as an expression of regionalism within the imperial political order. The author sums up: ‘Power was not delegated through institutions and officials to be applied uniformly across the length and breadth of the empire; rather, governance was predicated upon extant power relations and local networks, and rulers relied upon local elites, and vice versa, for the routine exercise of their power. The resultant picture of Carolingian governance is one of regional diversity writ large’ (p. 243).

At all events, Rembold’s study is sure to play an important role in future discussions about Saxons in the Carolingian world.

LUTZ E. VON PADBERG was Professor of Medieval History at the University of Paderborn. His main research interests are European history in the early Middle Ages, in particular, the Christianization of Europe. His many publications include Die Inszenierung religiöser Konfrontationen: Theorie und Praxis der Missionspredigt im frühen Mittelalter (2003) and Christianisierung im Mittelalter (2006).
The tercentenary of the outbreak of the Thirty Years War has prompted a flood of new publications, media coverage, conferences, and exhibitions. University libraries were certainly not short on books about the war but, as Georg Schmidt rightly points out, the old clichés have proved surprisingly persistent and remain deeply embedded in the popular memory of this conflict. Chief among these is that the war represented the lowest point in German history between the Reformation and unification in 1871. He seeks to correct this through two books; one is a substantial new general history of the war, while the other is an updated version of his short textbook which first appeared in 1995. Unlike several of the competing books published in 2018, Schmidt’s major new study is not simply a work of synthesis, but a clear statement of his own interpretation of the war’s causes and consequences. It builds on arguments already partly rehearsed in earlier versions of the textbook, the latest edition of which serves as an admirably clear and succinct summary of his interpretation and scholarship on the war more generally.

Central to this interpretation is Schmidt’s conception of the Holy Roman Empire as the first German nation-state, which he has articulated in other works since the early 1990s, most notably in his Geschichte des Alten Reiches: Staat und Nation in der Frühen Neuzeit (1999). The Peace of Augsburg of 1555, the deficiencies of which are often blamed for causing the war, is regarded by Schmidt as stabilizing the imperial constitution and integrating the north German imperial Estates (Reichsständen) more closely within the Empire. The result was what he terms the ‘Complementary Empire-State’ in which the imperial Estates shared key powers with the emperor. The political balance was expressed in the language of ‘German liberties’ and the constitutional order increasingly became the focus for what Schmidt interprets as a ‘German’ national identity.

This approach tends to treat the Austrian Habsburg monarchy, the Burgundian lands, and imperial (northern) Italy as already separate from the mass of smaller imperial Estates represented in the key
institutions like the Reichstag and the imperial Circles (*Reichskreise*). While this is problematic when considering the Empire’s history more broadly, it does add analytical clarity to Schmidt’s characterization of the war as a distinct Central European conflict and not a general European war. Here he is arguing against the mainstream Anglophone scholarship, which has tended to follow Geoffrey Parker’s line and see the Thirty Years War as part of a wider struggle over Spanish claims to continental hegemony.

He is also dissenting from the majority view among German historians, and voiced elsewhere by others like Sir John Elliott, that the war began in the Empire and expanded outwards in concentric circles to become a European war. This ‘European war school’ suggests that the Empire’s problems either rapidly lost importance once the Spanish–Dutch war resumed in 1621, or that events in the Empire were largely determined by external actors, making it ‘a European war fought in Germany’ as Johannes Arndt and others have claimed. Schmidt restores agency to the Empire’s political leadership, as well as assigning them responsibility for the horrendous conflict which ensued. This is a bold step in the current political climate, given the drift implicit in the ‘European war school’ back towards the older conservative nationalist characterization of the Thirty Years War as a national disaster inflicted on an innocent Germany by evil foreigners.

*Die Reiter der Apokalypse* is divided into three parts. The first explores the war’s origins as a constitutional conflict which escaped control and which centred on a struggle between German freedom and Habsburg monarchical authority. As Schmidt rightly argues, external intervention was determined by this, not the other way round, since each foreign power joining the conflict did so either to support or oppose the Habsburgs. He strikes a middle course between those, like Axel Gotthard and Geoffrey Parker, who see the war as inevitable, and those, like Johannes Burkhardt, who argue there was a real chance that a serious conflict could have been avoided. Schmidt remains reserved towards the current history of mentalities, which has grown steadily since the linguistic turn in the 1990s and the subsequent surge in new cultural history. When applied to the Thirty Years War, this approach argues that the impact of Humanism, science, the Reformation, and responses to climate change and various

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1 Johannes Arndt, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg, 1618–1648* (Ditzingen, 2009), 12.
political and economic problems combined to make war inevitable by creating a climate of fear. This view has now largely displaced the earlier structuralist explanation of the war’s causes, based on a ‘General Crisis’ caused either by a change in mode of production from feudalism to capitalism, or a political shift related to the fragmentation of Spanish Habsburg hegemony. Schmidt disputes claims that ‘mass psychosis’ caused the war and prolonged it by reigniting it after each peace attempt. There was, indeed, a general sense of anxiety, but not everyone accepted fate passively and there were still those who called for a peaceful resolution of the problems. However, he does argue that ‘crisis management’ failed repeatedly, because each party felt convinced that God and justice were on their side and hoped that a show of force would compel their opponents to back down.

The book’s second part tackles the question of why the war lasted thirty years. This develops the argument about repeated failures to defuse, or at least contain, a succession of crises. Presentation of the material is fairly conventional, following the customary chronological structure adopted to explain the war, though Schmidt varies this a little as he enters the 1630s, and he dissociates the different phases from their usual linkage with the successive intervention of Denmark, Sweden, and France. More might have been said about how the methods used to fund the war made its termination harder to achieve. The discussion also suffers from the usual compression of events after the Peace of Prague in 1635, which are covered in just 86 pages, compared to the 492 devoted to narrating the first half of the war. The text does draw on the rich range of contemporary personal testimonies, such as the soldier’s diary presumed to have been written by Peter Hagendorf, but these do not feature as prominently as in some of the other recent books on the war.

The final part deals with the Congress of Westphalia and evaluates the peace settlement in line with the book’s argument that this was a ‘German’ war. Schmidt stresses that the religious clauses of the settlement successfully defused confessional tension and contributed to the post-war stability of the Empire. This was far from being a ‘national’ humiliation but, on the contrary, pointed towards modernity, especially in how the treaty enshrined a great variety of individual and corporate liberties within the imperial constitution. The war’s demographic, social, economic, and cultural consequences are covered only briefly, with more attention paid to its commemoration.
and place in subsequent German national identity. Overall, Schmidt balances a general synthesis of recent research with his own, distinctive interpretation, and achieves his goal of providing an accessible, lucid account of what was an extremely complex conflict.

PETER H. WILSON is Chichele Professor of the History of War at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of All Souls College. His recent books include Lützen (2018); Der Dreißigjährige Krieg: Eine europäische Tragödie (2017); and The Holy Roman Empire: A Thousand Years of Europe’s History (2016). He is currently directing the ‘European Fiscal–Military System c.1530–1870 Project’ funded by the European Research Council.
This book is a highly ambitious, complex, challenging, and genuine attempt at engaging with interdisciplinary developments within the investigation of the ‘history of ignorance(s) in late medieval and early modern times’. Cornel Zwierlein proposes this approach as an alternative to the more traditional ‘empire and science’ historiography, focused on ‘the infrastructure, aims and impacts of knowledge accumulation’. Zwierlein’s volume aims instead to ‘shift the focus to the other side of knowledge—its absence—and therefore to the enduring relationship between ignorance and knowledge’ (all p. 1). This is a project which Cornel Zwierlein has been pursuing for some time. In this volume he develops his analysis through an interesting comparative discussion of the intellectual discourses on ‘ignorance’ in England/Britain and France, and on how these fostered and interacted with actual political strategies and actions on the ground.

The stated goal of the volume is to see how ‘these imperial actors cope with the multiple forms of ignorance within the four epistemic fields of politics and economics, religion, general knowledge and history of the Levant region, and science’ (pp. 1–2). The argument is then developed in four corresponding sections tracing developments in France and England between the mid seventeenth and mid eighteenth century, a period when Zwierlein argues there was a substantial change of approach towards confronting ‘ignorance’.

The first section, dedicated to political economy, especially on the French side of the narrative displays a remarkable level of erudition, and a very careful reading of the contemporary intellectual debates on these issues. Still, it is not particularly convincing in analytical terms as it meanders and does not properly contextualize some of the arguments developed. It is probably just a reflection of the present renaissance of early modern Mediterranean history, which makes it hard to keep up with the literature, that some crucial recent studies are ignored in this analysis. This is a shame, as taking them into account would have strengthened the volume and avoided some outdated generalizations on the organization of English trade in the Levant.

Zwierlein’s development of the ‘history of ignorance’ interpretative framework is a kind of approach that necessarily limits the scope
to governmental/institutional upper echelons (p. 198), which is perfectly fine, and fully in line with the final goal of the volume of presenting the French and English/British empires as agents of institutional action towards ‘ignorance’. However, this type of analysis by its own nature does not allow an investigation of those ‘everyday cognitive processing phenomena’ (p. 83) which are stated as the aim of this section’s attempt to trace the birth and development of the concept of ‘national’. Furthermore, the nuanced and detailed analysis of the genealogy of legal arguments going back to the Middle Ages, and the way authorities shaped the development of the medieval and early modern debate on *dominium maris* should delineate, in his wording, how ‘those different textual interpretations and semantics served to nationalize the concept of sea use and shipping itself’ (p. 101). But here the argument is not developed in a convincing manner, in part due to the frequently convoluted writing style, and in part because the topic is in itself massive and has generated an equivalently daunting literature which is not fully taken into account here.

A good example is the section on Venice. The legal discussion of the Venetian maritime empire is followed only through the eyes of the ‘civilists’ (e.g. p. 98). Moreover, the author does not engage with the literature on Venice (including Filippo De Vivo’s sharp synthesis of Venice and the Adriatic1) and thus ignores how the peculiarities of its constitution and legal framework shaped its imperial form. Another good example of this negligence is Frederic Lane’s discussion of ‘protection costs’,2 which would have better supported both Zwierlein’s general discussion of transaction costs at the beginning of the first section (p. 36), and his considerations on the interconnectedness of maritime and naval issues, a strong topos within French historiography, which only now is emerging in relation to the study of England (pp. 103–4).

The sections which follow are all substantially stronger. The one on ‘religion’ convincingly connects theological debates in the West with those in the East, arguing both for the importance of biases of observation in the evaluation of their reporting, and also for their impact on focusing observers’ and scholars’ interests, and in some

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cases fostering policy development and sharing communications across different national channels (p. 127). Particularly interesting are those pages dedicated to the French consular network’s activities in protecting Catholicism in the Levant, and their role in reflecting and embodying religious and political disputes at home. Here the comparison with their English equivalent works particularly well, and Zwierlein’s distinctive analytical perspective provides real insights especially within the religious–political sphere, where the author highlights the strong connection of the French consular network with the Crown, whilst religious divisions in England shaped consular activities in a rather different way (p. 179).

Equally stimulating is the section on ‘history’, which is particularly well suited to allow the argument on retracing the history of ignorance to emerge powerfully from Zwierlein’s retracing of the large chronological gaps in French and English narratives of the Levant. This section, and the nature of the evidence here analysed, also allows him properly to highlight the ‘divide between the practical culture of the consular network . . . and the academic culture of Orientalists’ (p. 198), in this way effectively discussing that ‘everyday cognitive processing’ which was somewhat missing in the first section. Here the author’s argument of the impact of administrative practices on the ‘perception and production of “History”’ (p. 233) is strong and convincing, although ideally these developments within the Anglo-French worlds would have been contextualized within the general contemporary changes in the production of ‘histories’, a Eurasian cultural phenomenon throughout the entire early modern period, which has produced a wealth of stimulating studies precisely on the engagement of bureaucrats and intellectuals with the production of new histories in both Christian and Muslim countries.

It is most fitting that the concluding section is the one dedicated to ‘science’, where Zwierlein’s approach was originally conceived, and the spectre of Thomas Kuhn looms large. As the author himself acknowledges, the methodological structure of the book ‘resembles a universalising of an approach more common within the narrower field of “empire and science”’ (p. 255). Here the analysis is developed through effective use of case studies, especially the riveting narrative of the search for the ‘petrified city’ and its connection with the development of cartography. In the concluding chapters, the non-linear way in which a scientific approach slowly develops is effectively con-
veyed, as Zwierlein openly confronts the ‘disturbing co-presence of highly efficient Enlightenment instrumental science with a comparative speculative method that endeavoured to bring unwritten history to light from the traditions and collective memory of “the people”’ (p. 304).

Throughout the text there is an attempt at categorizing neatly both fields of ignorance/knowledge and governmental attitudes—regarding the latter, for example, on protectionism/‘free trade’—which betrays a very contemporary view, whilst in the concluding chapter the view is much more nuanced, and one wonders whether the conclusion would not have been better positioned as an introduction instead. Here, directly confronting the limits of the system theory he employed in the text (p. 300) strengthens the author’s argument. Bringing together the different strands of his analysis, Zwierlein builds a convincing argument on how ‘(non-) knowledge was processed and how it was the European demand for scientific knowledge and curiosities that created the story rather than the other way around—that it was the European encounter with the story that created a demand for further investigation’ (p. 305). It is to be hoped that this will stimulate a debate to delineate further the boundaries of the ‘knowledge/non-knowledge/nescience’ distinctions here developed, and which are certainly worthy of continuing investigation.

MARIA FUSARO is Professor of Early Modern History at the University of Exeter. Her research and teaching interests lie in the social and economic history, interpreted in its broadest sense, of early modern Europe. She has focused on commercial networks and the role they played in the early phases of globalization; on the economic, social, and cultural analysis of late medieval and early modern empires; and on the early modern development of legal institutions supporting trade. Among her publications are English Merchants in the Ionian Island: The Currants Trade in the XVIth and XVIIth Centuries (2001) and Political Economies of Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean: The Decline of Venice and the Rise of England 1450–1700 (2015).

By focusing on the era in which the modern idea of nationalism emerged as a way of establishing the preferred political, cultural, and social order for society, Shane Nagle demonstrates that across different European societies, the most important constituent of nationalism has been a specific understanding of the nation’s historical past. Analysing Ireland and Germany, two largely unconnected societies in which the past has been peculiarly contemporary in politics and where the meaning of the nation has been highly contested, this work examines the narratives of origins, religion, territory, and race. All of the investigated historians were actively engaged in the politics of their respective countries and all were in some way influenced by the reality of confessionalized society during this period. These historians made conscious efforts towards authenticity, or at least authority, to establish definitive interpretations of national history. The historians investigated in this work include for Ireland Thomas D’Arcy McGee (1825–69), Thomas Davis (1814–45), John Mitchel (1815–75), A. M. Sullivan (1830–84), Standish O’Grady (1846–1928), W. E. H. Lecky (1838–1903), Eoin MacNeill (1867–1945), and Alice Stopford Green (1847–1929); and for Germany Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886), Heinrich von Sybel (1829–91), Felix Dahn (1834–1912), Gustav Freytag (1816–95), Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–96), and Johannes Haller (1865–1947).

Nagle emphasizes that a national historical narrative inevitably commences with a story of origins. The challenge in the representation of origins for historians is how to depict historical periods generally thought to be distinguished by disunity and dynastic and ethno-religious conflict, as the foundation of a coherent national historical narrative. In German and Irish national historiography, narratives of origins were located in these foundational epochs in which the nation had failed to secure its own unity, resulting in inevitable defeat and catastrophe both immediately and over the course of centuries. As Nagle points out, the views held by these historians of the nation’s origins were linked with those of the significance of the nation’s geographic nature: Irish insularity and Germany as *Mittel-europa* (Central Europe) had determined each nation’s political and
cultural history from its origins. Generally it can be said that in both contexts, the cultural achievements and mission of the early medieval nation were positively emphasized; medieval kings and princes and early modern heroes were seen as being constitutive of the nation’s historical character.

Historians in both countries considered the significance of religion in the nation’s political and cultural history. In Germany, according to Nagle, the historical role of Protestantism appeared to offer an ideal and graspable foundation for modern German culture and state power. It had formed the intellectual foundation and core for the German significance of Prussia, formed the foundation for the modern Kultur nation, and had given expression to a distinctively German form of religiosity and Christianity.

In Ireland, in Nagle’s opinion, it was advantageous for both Catholic and Protestant historians to maintain the particularly Catholic character of the Irish nation. It was not so much the finer points of Catholic doctrine that made Catholic identity important to the historical narrative as the apparent ease with which Catholicism could be presented as a central part of the Irish nation’s resistance to persecution and one of the few, if not the only, truly continuous elements of Irish national life through history. In both Ireland and Germany the linking of confessional allegiance and the nation’s history was a means of establishing continuity of national character in the midst of a national past of frequent discontinuity, rupture, and disturbance. Yet, according to Nagle, the importance of the early modern era for the historical nationalization of religion meant that the national religious identity became closely associated with resistance to foreign aggression, defence of unity, and national revival after some period of decline or defeat, or simply endurance, of the nation.

In the course of the nineteenth century political language became saturated with racial idioms and distinctions, as did the language of nationalism. If nationalist historical narratives worked to define who was to be included within the nation, they also had the function of defining who and what was to be excluded. National communities inevitably define other groups as the negation of their own self-image, with history being a most powerful means of framing this definition. In both Ireland and Germany the demarcation of the national community vis-à-vis external others was entwined with internal
delineations against certain social, linguistic, cultural, or religious groups whose traditions and customs made them seem in some way alien to the core community. ‘Othering’ had as much to do with indirectly defining the national community as with what was not of that community. In Ireland the historical conception of race in relation to the nation was always caught between notions of an Irish originality and distinctiveness, and the reality of different ethno-cultural communities in Ireland. In Germany, during the course of the nineteenth century, originality came to be regarded in terms of continuity and purity, and an increasingly uneasy attitude towards foreign influences and cultural mixing. This explains the absence of the Jews as a theme in Irish national historical narrative: there was simply no minority community in the Irish context that carried the role of the Jews as in the German context.

Nagle finds in his study that the representation of Irish and German national histories has been, in many respects, quite similar in the period under consideration. Historians in both contexts have proceeded from a sense of their nation as possessing a fractured past, a belated or arrested development, a past of historical weakness vis-à-vis its powerful neighbours, the absence of a nation-state since the Middle Ages or even earlier, and manifesting serious religious and regional heterogeneities. The enterprise of nationalist history-writing in these two countries, as different as they and their historical experiences were, was nonetheless driven by parallel concerns and took parallel forms in discourse and narrative. As Nagle has shown in both contexts, the professionalization of national history-writing was closely linked with medieval historiography in particular, as the search for reliable, historically authentic primary sources upon which a national history could be built was directed towards the earliest period in which such sources could be found, the Middle Ages. In both contexts the relationship between scientific and amateur forms of national historiography was a complex one, but unscientific historiography maintained dominance in Ireland for far longer than in Germany. Or, to put it another way, professionalization came much later in Ireland, and this naturally influenced the way Irish history was written and influences historical writing to the present day. Revisionist controversy over Irish political history during the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period has framed the Irish historical debate and stayed captive to the dictates of ‘methodological nation-
This monograph mainly focuses on the historical writing of the nineteenth century, and only approximately a quarter of the book deals with the time period of 1900 to 1932. Only four of the fourteen investigated historians would have impacted on this time period. It would have been of great interest to read of a comparable female German historian, such as Clara Viebig (1860–1952), to contrast/compare with the case study of Alice Stopford Green. I believe that chapter five, the comparative and the transnational aspect of historical writing, is too brief in comparison to other chapters, which is a shame as it is a strong assessment of transnational historical connections and the account would give us a better idea of just how much we can speak of a common European path for the intellectual development of national thought in modern Europe. Despite the brevity of the chapter, I was pleased to find Leopold von Ranke and his transnational writing was mentioned but, more surprisingly, not at all in chapter four on race, descent, and national enmity in the nation’s history. This is something on which most international and, in particular, German scholarship usually references Ranke as a nationalist–monarchist historian.

The aim of producing a more or less hegemonic national historical narrative in Germany and Ireland is fraught with difficulty in four fundamentally important areas: establishing a narrative of origins that could historically mandate nation-statehood; overcoming the legacy of the confessional divide; integrating historicist race thinking and historical narratives of the nation; and historically mandating the territorial outline of the nation. Nagle has had to battle with scarce literature on comparative history. For this reason alone, credit must be given to him for presenting us with this book. His publication draws attention to cultural and intellectual links between the Irish and the Germans, and what this meant for how people in each society understood their national identity at a pivotal time for the development of the historical discipline in Europe. His investigation of a common form of nationalism in Europe’s writing of transnational history has given us new insights into the development of nationalism, defining nationhood as well as historiography. I believe that Nagle’s work will open new pathways in the approach of historical and international studies. His book will become an important standard work in
a field of historical study that is under-researched and under-published at present.

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The field of Indo-German entangled history is not new, but it is certainly an ever-growing one, opening perspectives that not only offer novel views of the histories of India and Germany but also expand the horizon of our understanding of global history. The long tradition of German Orientalism was institutionalized in Indology departments and still dominates the study of India in German universities. Scholarly interventions, however, most notably in the form of works by Joachim Oesterheld, Ravi Ahuja, Heike Liebau, Gerdien Jonker, and Kris Manjapra, have brought to light both elite and subaltern pasts of the entanglements of modern South Asians in German archives and histories.¹ Other scholars have also recovered the minor but crucial role played by German-speaking actors and ideas in South Asia.² Such actors include not just well-known missionaries, military actors, Orientalist scholars, businessmen, and professionals, but also lesser known individuals—German Jewish refugees, for example, fleeing from Hitler’s war-torn, fascist Germany to South Asia as a place of refuge.

Elite actors and networks consciously create documentation that is often institutionalized as archives and canonized as histories. These rich archival materials from India, Germany, and Britain inform this new book by Panikos Panayi, *The Germans in India: Elite European Migrants in the British Empire* (2017). Panayi highlights that his explo-


ration of Germans in India was conceived as an aspect of his larger work on prisoners of Britain. Thus Panayi’s entry into Indian archives and histories of Germans is contextualized within a global history of German movement and control in the age of imperialism and wars.

The book begins in 1815 with the burgeoning presence of Germans in the Basel Mission and concludes in 1920, a year which, according to the author, marked the ‘totality of the ethnic cleansing which took place at the end of First World War’ (pp. xiii–xiv). Paying attention to the global and transnational aspect of these histories allows us to appreciate Indo-German histories beyond nationalist frames and categories, prompting a reappraisal in relation to complex transnational connections and outcomes.

Moving beyond the analytical taxonomy of ‘nation’ would enable an appreciation of German-speaking actors within the wider South Asian context which is not possible within a narrow focus on pre-Partition India. It would allow us to include specific local identities and histories of Germans from specific states, something that Panayi notes in his insightful commentary on the dominant role played by Württemberg and Saxony in Basel and Leipzig German missionary histories (p. 59). However, a focus on micro histories should not be limited by national boundaries and should include the identities of German-speaking Swiss and Austro-Hungarians, among others, in colonial South Asia.

One of the key argument in this book is that while Germans were part of European communities, they retained their distinct German and religious identity (p. 30). Panayi maintains that this amalgamation of civic and religious identities marked and defined Germans during the First World War. Yet other scholarly works have highlighted that questions of class, social function, and services rendered to British imperialism were also material considerations. It is not surprising that colonial officials were willing to hire and appoint German-speaking actors, especially in the field of Oriental knowledge production, as they were qualified to provide useful services in

3 Panikos Panayi, Prisoners of Britain: German Civilian and Combatant Internees during the First World War (Manchester, 2012).
4 Harald Fischer-Tiné, Low and Licentious Europeans: Race, Class and White Subalternity in Colonial India (New Delhi, 2009).
the fields of Indian language learning and the translation of texts for
the colonial administration. Imperial rivalry in the interwar period
affected this policy, but communities of knowledge and interest con-
tinued to guide British policy towards German-speaking actors.

In six chapters Panayi weaves a complex narrative of the histories
of highly educated elite actors, most notably missionaries, travellers,
and scholars. He uses rich archival material gleaned from institu-
tional missionary and colonial state archives as well as personal
accounts left in the form of autobiographies, travel documents, mem-
oirs, and other ego documents (p. 66). These diverse sources allow
him to reconstruct myriad histories of ‘passages to India’, as the title
of chapter two has it. In this chapter, along with some wonderful
individual life trajectories, Panayi draws some important larger con-
clusions. First, he shows that proselytizers such as German mission-
aries were pioneering global actors who established sites of knowl-
dge production (p. 9). While Panayi acknowledges the religious
dimension of their role, he also highlights their individual agency (p.
52). Instead of regarding missionary histories as conversion narra-
tives, Panayi illustrates the role they played in secular knowledge
production in the fields of Oriental studies, ethnography, travel liter-
ature, and visual archives about India in Germany (pp. 147–62).

In chapter three Panayi reconstructs the connected domains of
everyday life histories, which were shaped by experiences of travel
and settlement, and issues with work, education, health, survival, and
death. Panayi offers a rare insight into how these everyday life expe-
riences and connections contributed to missionary knowledge and
shaped their practices, turning them into agriculturalists and indus-
trial innovators to address not just the spiritual but also material con-
cerns of their Indian subjects (p. 96). The nature of German communi-
ty formation and transformation are analysed in chapter four. Panayi
explores secular, religious, racial, and spatial aspects in the making of
the multi-ethnic but hierarchical German community (p. 138).

Intercultural encounters and attendant perceptions are analysed
in detail in chapter five. Panayi examines the interaction between
missionaries and converts without shrinking from discussing the
power dynamics and social boundaries that remained. This is an
important point that needs to be considered, and suggests limits to
transformation (p. 146). Entanglements did not mark the absence or
end of bias; ideologies of religion, race, and Orientalism continued to
shape interactions, as is most evident in the few marriages between Germans and Indians which Panayi contrasts with the ‘regularity of unions between Britons and Germans’ (p. 179). The main argument here, already flagged up in the book’s first chapter, is that Germans did not marry natives and remained separate elite European migrants in colonial South Asia under British imperialism.

These long-term histories, however, were suddenly severed by the consequences of the First World War, when Germans were reduced from their elite migrant status to being the enemies of the Raj. Far from being sought out by British imperial authorities for furthering its colonial enterprise, Germans became prisoners of the British empire. This history of disentanglement and subsequent re-entanglement is an important one, and is examined in chapters six and seven, which map the impact of the Great War by looking at prison and internment camps. Panayi’s mastery of the issue is on display here. He skilfully traces the discourse and practices of ‘Germanophobia’ that ensured that ‘[t]he Germans become German’ (pp. 187–90). From being useful ‘servants of the Raj’ in various fields, Germans now became the ‘enemy’ of the British Empire and lost their multiple identities. This was manifested in the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 and other legal and economic regulations and exclusions (pp. 193–200). It was also institutionalized in the internment camps, most notably at Ahmednagar, which produced a new form of community, the ‘prison camp society’ (p. 211). Panayi notices the ruptures caused by the First World War with the end of the German story in India (p. 219). He insightfully concludes that the end of existing entanglements also marked the beginning of new forms of entanglement.

Despite promising possibilities, Panayi concludes his account with the end of the First World War. This is rather disappointing. In the light of the temporal and archival framework of the book, and given Panayi’s interest and expertise in histories of civilian and combatant internees, it would have been a major advance if he had extended his study to the end of the Second World War. This would have opened the detailed archives about German Jewish internment camps, most notably, Purandhar camp, illuminating complex histories of German-speaking refugees who were incarcerated in these camps. Internment camps were sites of control and regulation, but they also inadvertently promoted connections and entanglements where the detainees often created new intellectual, political, and per-
sonal relations that found their way into their lives, memories, and work.

The intellectual and personal histories of German refugees and internment camps reveal a fascinating history of exile, suffering, and trauma that is simultaneously marked by resilience, survival, and creativity. It is here that the role of subaltern memories and archives can and should be brought into conversation with the current narrative, as the elites and subaltern were also put together in the internment camps. While marginal, subaltern actors play an important role. Although not enshrined in archives, they too shape histories in ways that need to be mapped when we are writing histories of entanglements and globalization. Indeed, subalterns are the first actors who migrate under the pulls and pressures of globalization as migrant labour and refugees. In fact, the rich archival material and Panayi’s meticulous research direct our attention to such possibilities. In conclusion, Panayi’s Germans in India is a valuable addition to our existing knowledge of connected Indo-German histories even as it suggests new avenues to explore.

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Endorsements by four established historians praise this book on Prusso-German state-building as setting new standards. The publisher’s blurb also makes ambitious claims, noting that by drawing on transnational comparisons with Italy, Switzerland, and the United States it challenges conventional views of German national unification; integrates regional, national, and world historiography; and encompasses a broad range of themes appealing to historians hitherto unfamiliar with Prussian history.

This revised Cambridge dissertation supervised by Brendan Simms, with Christopher Clark and Abigail Green acting as dissertation examiners (p. vii), deals primarily with the former Kingdom of Hanover as a province of Prussia after the annexation of 1866. As far as this core story is concerned, Heinzen has delved deeply into archival sources. Six chapters (pp. 27–295) treat five distinct areas: the military, the politics of memory, the press/print sector, primary education in schools, and women’s charities. The last chapter is a lengthy consideration of the attempts at territorial reform and the dissolution of Prussia in the republican era, from 1918 to 1932. Each chapter ends with a two-page summary. In his conclusion (pp. 296–302), Heinzen points out that, overall, developments in Prussia were not ‘anomalous’, and he argues that multiple historical continuities—right up to today’s Bundesländer—should be recognized, rather than seeing only the vanishing point of the Nazi dictatorship. This argument builds on ideas first put forward by Thomas Nipperdey in 1978, and can be said to belong to the revisionist strand in Anglo-American historical scholarship on Prussia and Germany.

To start at the beginning: the central idea that the German War of 1866 was an important factor in the state-building process in the fol-

1 The author has also presented his main findings in a German-language article: Jasper Heinzen, ‘Hannover als preußische Provinz im Kaiserreich: Ein Kampf gegenläufiger Traditionen in Niedersachsen?’, Jahrbuch für niedersächsische Landesgeschichte, 86 (2014), 49–70.

lowing decades is intriguing, albeit not entirely new. For some time it has been widely held that because four German kingdoms and a dozen smaller states sided with Austria, the battles of 1866 cannot be understood as a Prussian–Austrian War, but represented a German civil war. Moreover, both the legitimist Guelph movement and the efforts of the newly established Prussian administration to come to terms with the recently conquered Hanoverian lands are well known and have been researched by historians (Hans-Georg Aschoff, Dieter Brosius, Gerhard Schneider, and Ernst Schubert, among others) named by Heinzen in his bibliography.

Heinzen does, however, offer a sophisticated treatment of the five distinct areas mentioned above. In each case the initial conflict yielded to some form of accommodation with the Prussian government. In the military (ch. 1), the memories of Prussia’s Hanoverian regiments (Waterloo, Langensalza) were fused with old Prussian traditions and there were also allegiances outside the army (pp. 83–4). Rites of memory, such as war memorials or public ceremonies, remained contested, but the administration became increasingly lenient (ch. 2). Moreover, the main political competitor of the Guelphs, the bourgeois National Liberals, supported monuments celebrating German unity, as well as the construction of Hanover’s pompous new town hall. Around 1900 a separate regional identity as a lower Saxon Stammbaum was developed through the burgeoning historical associations and the Heimat movement. Basically, the Prussian state was left out. The idea of having two fatherlands—one small and regional, the other large and German—had been popular since before 1848. In 2004 Siegfried Weichlein demonstrated that in Bavaria and Saxony new communication devices, regional migration, and self-government (as well as primary schools and the monarchical cult) worked in favour of national integration.3

Turning to the print sector (ch. 3), Heinzen places Prussia between the more rigid Italian and the more lenient Swiss and American approaches. But he records many attempts to bribe journalists or editors to spread official view via news digests (for example, Provinzial-Correspondenz), and to use around 700 subsidized local libraries to educate newer generations of loyal Hohenzollern subjects. Because Heinzen stresses the counter-force represented by libraries estab-

3 Siegfried Weichlein, Nation und Region: Integrationsprozesse im Bismarckreich (Düsseldorf, 2004).
lished by Catholic or later Social Democratic associations and the Eigen-Sinn⁴ of readers, the message of this chapter is ambiguous. The question remains: how strict and how successful was the Berlin government in managing the mass media (pp. 161, 175)?

Looking at primary school education, in particular at textbooks (ch. 4), Heinzen relates an incident that occurred in 1868. When the Minister of Education decreed the use of only one basic textbook for the province, local school authorities did not comply and alternative Lesebücher had to be permitted. But because these depended on ministerial authorization, their authors took pains to discuss the Guelph era as little as possible, praising instead the rise of Prussia and its inherent German mission. Since the 1890s the idea of Heimat had played a role in the development of a partially symbiotic relationship between Hanoverian regional identity as the lower Saxon Stamn and the Prussian-led German nation-state. Heinzen notes that this development was promoted by reform-minded pedagogues, the localized approach to textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education, and (in typically convoluted style) ‘the growing readiness of the populace to integrate into their lives the cultural and practical resources placed at their disposal by mass education’ (p. 215).

The gendered aspect of state-building is examined in chapter 5 on the charity and philanthropy of women as practised by four religious orders/institutions. Again, the story after the Kulturkampf is one of gradually making peace with the Hohenzollern dynasty. They themselves tried to supplant the Guelph dynasty by patronizing diverse provincial institutions and making donations to them. Overall, women barely feature as confident actors with their own agenda. Rather, they appear as the object of governmental strategies whose acceptance of the Hohenzollern regime increased in proportion to how far they saw their deeply embedded conservative Christian values threatened by modernity.

The last chapter attributes post-war attempts to restore an independent Hanover—a petition of 600,000 signatures in 1918, the Welfenputsch in 1920, and the failed referendum of 1924—less to the traditional Guelph movement than to newer resentments. These

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⁴ For an English explanation of this term, which is used in a special sense, see Thomas Lindenberger, ‘Eigen-Sinn, Herrschaft und kein Widerstand’, Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 02.09.2014 <https://docupedia.de/zg/Lindenberger_eigensinn_v1_de_2014>, accessed 30 May 2018.
developed during the Great War and its aftermath when Berlin’s monarchical and later republican governments were viewed with anger in rural areas. Food shortages, unemployment, and economic crises all played a part when some defenders of Guelph legitimism, the völkisch Heimat movement, and adherents of right-wing Prussianism alike were attracted to the Nazi propaganda idea of Volksgemeinschaft after 1930. In terms of state-building, Heinzen sees Prussia as steering not a special, but a middle, path between the USA, Italy, and Switzerland up to 1932. At the same time, he asserts that Nazi violence and crimes were unparalleled (p. 295). Thus the study ends at the starting-point of all seminal Sonderweg historiography: how is it that Nazi barbarism was possible in Germany but in no other western country? The debate about this trajectory has been a fundamental feature of (West) German democratic development and the topic obviously remains unavoidable.

With regard to Heinzen’s findings, this reviewer would have liked to see a systematic and weighted enumeration of the main factors that contributed to the gradual decline of Guelph resistance and the partial reconciliation of Hanoverians with the Prussian regime. In this context one fundamental fact is underrated, namely, that the Hanoverian liberals, unlike the Guelph movement, accepted the dethroning of the Guelph dynasty with which they had been in conflict for decades. Prussia profited from this split in attitudes. Over time, the Berlin governments applied more de-escalation strategies towards the territories gained in 1866, and economic growth, habituation, and generational change further mitigated the relationship between the conqueror and the conquered. The basis for this is to be found, above all, in the shared experience of the victory of 1870–71. The Guelphs always wanted Hanover to be part of the German nation-state. After 1871, therefore, Hanoverians could harbour Guelph attachments or nostalgia and quasi ignore the Prussian state. A parallel development characterized the Rhineland. To this extent, Heinzen’s ex post facto appraisal is teleological; for although the turmoil and conflicts of decades were eventually smoothed over, the process remained incomplete and under changed circumstances the idea of—Hanoverian, Rhenish, or Hessian—independence could re-emerge.

Throughout the text there are reflections on analogous developments in Italy after 1861, Switzerland after the Sonderbundskrieg 1846–47, and the United States after the Civil War of 1861–65. To this
end, Heizen cites from a wide range of literature with a specific thematic focus and from some theoretical works. Indeed, the bibliography of contemporary and modern titles dealing with four countries—Prussia, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States—runs to 60 pages. There are many comparative passages but they are often too short to allow for a full comparison to be drawn. In some cases, Prussian uniqueness is admitted. Heizen lists the fervent anti-militarist criticism of the official cult of weapons (p. 67), the observation of an American visitor in 1914 that the obedience of the Prussian people to their king was a result of the rigid public education system (p. 209), and the hegemony of the state as a category above liberal individualism (pp. 286–7). Some historians have identified these long-term features as prerequisites for the Nazis’ rise to power and violent practices. The relative weight of post-1918 and short-term contingency factors remains open to discussion.

In general, Heizen stresses the similarity of post-civil war problems in Prussia, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States, but his contentions about the equality of approaches and of results do not always convince this reviewer. As this reviewer is unable to check all of these cases, the task is left to experts in each field. Several examples, though, suggest that a different interpretation is possible. Heizen himself recognizes that in all four countries under scrutiny patriotic pedagogy ‘displayed significant similarities, even if the specific content varied’ (p. 178). In this context he states that Swiss primary school textbooks stressed the rights, not the duties of Swiss citizens, and praised direct democracy. Also different was the American Progressives’ aim of educating pupils to form their own opinions rather than engage in flag fetishism. And in popular French textbooks the humanist spirit of France was personified not by kings and statesmen, but by conciliators, scientists, and philanthropists (pp. 197–8, 201, 208). These examples indicate that the crucial factor here is not the similarity of the problems, but the different solutions found. Also, on the basis of a few examples in the military field (Sedantag, Kriegervereine) (pp. 115–23), Heizen claims that Prussian memory rites were non-divisive, but this runs counter to the thrust of detailed scholarship on official memory rituals.5 Crucially, from the

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standpoint of this reviewer, the differences in the political systems of the four countries are neglected, yet it is precisely these differences that are important in arriving at a well-rounded judgement. Because of the author’s aim to get involved in theoretical controversies such as those on nationalism, space, and memory, factual developments are sometimes left too far in the background. One speculation seems exaggerated, namely, that ‘the language of race’ in the USA, Germany, and Italy after 1900 can be read as a rationalization of the trauma of civil war in mid century (p. 151).

This book is not an easy read. Many sentences are far too long and sometimes only a comma indicates that a new line of thought is being followed. Qualifications or explanations added at the end of a main clause tend to dilute the message. The argument often has a rather complicated structure and this, as well as the style, at times make it difficult for the reviewer to pin down definite statements. For informed readers, however, the book is inspiring and often offers distinctive interpretations. As already noted, this reviewer does not share all of Heinzen’s conclusions on the formation of Prussian statehood in a comparative perspective.

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A biography which includes a photograph of a young man in the uniform of the Hitler Youth in the summer of 1944, and another of the same man dressed up (differently) on his admission to the British House of Lords in 1993, in itself indicates that we are dealing with an exceptional life. The young man is plain Ralf Dahrendorf; the older man is a British subject, Baron Dahrendorf of Clare Market in the City of Westminster. How could such a transmogrification have occurred and how are we to interpret it today? Is it a shining example of a life lived ‘across borders’ to use the title chosen by Dahrendorf for his memoirs published in 2002?\(^1\) Or, more contentiously, in the world of Brexit, may a certain popular discontent with cross-border living unwittingly have played a small part in bringing questions of borders and identity back into the forefront of contemporary concerns?

Franziska Meifort, the author, does not address these questions directly but she is well aware that they are not far below the surface (indeed, in his repeated autobiographical attempts (one unpublished), in German and in English, Dahrendorf wrestled with them himself). His intellectual life did not exist in a vacuum but was constantly influenced by the people he met and the places where he met them. This is not a biography, therefore, which gives a narrative of Dahrendorf’s life on the one hand and then provides an exposition of his sociological and political writing on the other. Chapter by chapter, the two aspects of his life belong together.

The scholarship is admirable. In some final remarks, Meifort engagingly notes that it is unusual for what was written originally as a scholarly dissertation (for which she won the Wolf-Erich-Kellner-Gedächtnispreis in 2016) to be taken on by a publishing house with a broader public than an academic readership in mind. She therefore helpfully sets out her stall for this wider readership, drawing attention to the sources she has used—and the difficulties they present, particularly with regard to interpreting autobiographical writing—and the array of other studies which exist on particular periods and aspects of Dahrendorf’s career. Her list of relevant secondary litera-

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\(^1\) Ralf Dahrendorf, *Über Grenzen: Lebenserinnerungen* (Munich, 2002).
ture amounts to twenty-seven pages. There is a helpful timeline to guide the reader through the details of Dahrendorf’s locations and professional appointments. Meifort interviewed two of her subject’s former wives (he was married three times) and a small number of men in Britain and Germany who were alongside Dahrendorf in one context or another. She has read pertinent transcripts of interviews he gave but she has not sought out the observations of those who directly experienced him at the helm (at the LSE or St Antony’s, for example), who might have taken a more critical stance in relation to his stewardship.

She is not unaware, however, of the criticisms that may be made of biography as a genre, and acknowledges its demotion in the wake of the emphasis on social and structural history in mid twentieth century Germany (it proved more resilient in Britain). Now, however, she thinks we can move on from an either/or in these matters. She believes that it is possible to absorb wider social and structural insights into biography. The wider processes of cultural transfer can be seen most clearly when an individual is in focus.

Dahrendorf’s life, after all, was pre-eminently an individual one. That is to say, this book could not have had a subtitle such as ‘Biography of a Sociologist’, ‘Biography of a Politician’, or ‘Biography of a Public Intellectual’. He was all of these (and more), but if one were asked to say how he should be described ‘fundamentally’, it would be difficult to know how to answer. Meifort’s thesis title referred to him as a German–British intellectual ‘zwischen Wissenschaft, Politik und Öffentlichkeit’. ‘Between’ is the key word. The author’s extensive list of Dahrendorf’s published writings, from 1946 to 2013, does not resolve the matter. It is, of course, a list containing items which are very different in form, substance, and weight. And that was how Dahrendorf wanted it to be. Quite apart from any consideration of the individual merits of these writings, therefore, it is their author’s ability to write for different audiences which stands out—and, of course, his unrelenting energy in doing so.

Meifort’s task is to explain how all this came about. She starts with his parents and his schooling under National Socialism. Born in 1929 in Hamburg, Dahrendorf grew up in Berlin, in a socialist household in opposition to the regime; and then his father went to prison. Dahrendorf spoke of his father, a democrat who held the Fatherland, Law, and Socialism to be inseparable, as embodying all that was good
in German tradition, even though he himself opted for what he called a Western liberal tradition, and he himself had his own experience of imprisonment at the age of 16. The author threads her way carefully in interpreting what he experienced and how his early thoughts and ideas emerged. Later, he placed some different emphases in the different accounts he wrote.

After the war, his family returned to Hamburg. There, as had also been the case in Berlin after the end of the war, his father’s political activism and journalistic work brought him into contact with the British occupiers. Such contacts spun off on Ralf. As an 18 year old it brought him to Wilton Park in the UK to attend a ‘Re-education Camp’ and to meet the British on home ground. He studied at the University of Hamburg (grappling with Marx) and started on journalism. He fitted in a trip to the United States. Noel Annan, with whom he had become acquainted in Germany, got him into the London School of Economics (LSE), or so Annan said. It was at the LSE that Ralf encountered an English way of doing sociology in David Lockwood and T. H. Marshall. There was also Karl Popper. During the course of his two years at the LSE he learnt English fluently and, we read, absorbed English culture and found an English wife, Vera. His experiences, of course, cannot be rehearsed here in detail (nor can they be in relation to later chapters). The fundamental point is that a nexus of relationships, personal and intellectual, established at the LSE, framed Dahrendorf’s life, though with outcomes that could not have been accurately forecast.

The trajectory looked set. We follow the ‘Wunderkind der deutschen Soziologie’ (p. 57) on the path which took him to a professorship at the Academy of Social Enterprise (Akademie für Gemeinwirtschaft) in Hamburg. Prior to this appointment he spent time at the Centre for Advanced Study in the Behavioural Sciences at Stanford, a period that he described as a ‘paradise’. This brought with it a largely congenial encounter with the American Way of Life. The intellectual stripling was surrounded by great names, not least that of Milton Friedman. After Hamburg came Tübingen, a period of great productivity and no little controversy concerning the nature and methods of sociology. Then came a big shift. In the West Germany of the 1960s Dahrendorf wanted to make a direct and personal contribution to the deepening of its democracy, which also meant its liberalization (though the meaning and associations of the word ‘liberal’ were to be
endlessly problematic). His ambitions led to the foundation of the University of Constance and into involvement with the planning of higher education in Baden-Württemberg: neither case turned out to be straightforward. This in turn led him, not without reservations, into federal politics in the shape of the liberal FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei). Here, the intellectual was forced to confront ‘real’, experienced politicians on the one hand and the world of the student movement on the other (Dutschke v. Dahrendorf?), along with the world of the Foreign Office and Brussels (and the limitations placed on an intellectual by virtue of his office). Was this period a political flop? Meifort would not wish it to be seen in such simple terms. For Dahrendorf it was an experiment which had to be made.

Then came his ‘original and welcome appointment’ (p. 204) as Director of the LSE in 1974. Despite his deep love of the institution, kindled two decades earlier, it was not a straightforward position for him to fill. The LSE still harboured strong memories of the student activity of less than a decade earlier and the ensuing reactions. The relationships between the colleges which made up the University of London could be strained. Perhaps, above all, what was inescapably complicated was the question of what the Director’s job, in Dahrendorf’s eyes, was actually for. He was in a position which gave him entrée to the higher reaches of British government, but the Thatcher government was not necessarily inclined to listen to him. So there were disappointments as ambitious plans in some instances did not come to fruition. Another ambition was to see the LSE get ‘out and about’ in making contacts in the City, Fleet Street, and Whitehall. But minds in such matters did not always meet. The pursuit of excellence, by all parties, is easily proclaimed but never simply delivered.

It is perhaps particularly appropriate in a review in this Bulletin to dwell a little, in conclusion, on Dahrendorf’s ‘British years’, years which saw him become a British subject, receive a knighthood and, finally, a life peerage. What does this mean? What did he want it to mean? Until he took this step, and received these honours, he could still be thought of as a ‘German in exile’, one, it was sometimes rumoured, not altogether without substance, who one day might again be ‘called home’ to Germany to occupy some position of unimaginable importance. It was still the fact that he was an outsider that lent his contributions on radio and television, which were given great prominence, their special character and an aura of detached
authority. But as time passed, where was home? As early as 1977 he was writing to Noel Annan to say that he felt himself ‘almost frighteningly at home [in England] considering that it is after all not my home’ (p. 223). He came to feel that his decade at the LSE had been the luckiest in his life and had given him ‘more satisfaction and pleasure than any other position which I have held’ (p. 224).

In all of this was he not in serious danger of becoming more British than the British? He seemed not to speak English in the way most Germans spoke English. It might even be the case that he liked buttered crumpets for tea (as some supposed Englishmen invariably did). Meifort quotes the *Guardian* in 1978 suggesting that he was praising the British way of life in a way no Englishman would dare to. But if he was giving the British a boost (always supposing they needed one), he was also very busy writing about Britain for the serious German press. The position of cultural broker which he had come to assume had not been acquired by accident. A non-metropolitan reviewer may perhaps be forgiven, however, for noting how limited his direct experience actually was of the ‘Britain’ that he spoke about with such apparent authority. He was certainly in one sense crossing borders all his life, but the milieux in which he moved, wherever he was, tended to be very similar.

St Antony’s College in Oxford, of which Dahrendorf subsequently became Warden, was only founded in 1950 and had therefore not had time to accumulate much tradition. At St Antony’s, however, he found himself having to engage with tasks which he was rather inclined to feel were beneath him. Nevertheless, this gave him a decade of exposure to the wonders of a collegiate university, representing another step in his long march through hallowed British institutions. In the end, however, Germany did call to Dahrendorf again, partly no doubt through his third marriage to a German wife. It was in Germany that he died in 2009 at the age of 80, in Cologne.

In retrospect, in changed political circumstances, the kind of career which Dahrendorf had may now seem a one-off, a product of a particular set of circumstances, personal, social, and national. The great merit of this book, however, is that it allows us to see this public intellectual in the round.
KEITH ROBBINS was formerly Professor of Modern History at Glasgow University, Vice-Chancellor at Lampeter, and Senior Vice-Chancellor of the University of Wales. He has recently edited *The History of Oxford University Press, vol. iv: 1970 to 2004* (2017).
What if the Reformation had never happened? Could the Industrial Revolution have originated in Germany instead of the United Kingdom? What would the world look like without Hitler? These and other counter-factual scenarios are discussed in the book under review. Leading experts in their fields investigate the question of ‘what might have happened’ if history had turned out differently, presenting scenarios from early modern to contemporary times. Nevertheless, the title of the volume is somewhat misleading, since its contributors discuss implications not only for the regions that later became Germany but in a broader focus also for the whole of Europe, South America, the USA, and other parts of the globe. It is not possible to limit the Reformation or European integration to ‘Germany’ alone, and the authors do not try, instead presenting wider considerations where appropriate.

In their introduction, the editors highlight the value of counter-factual history. While others have attacked this approach for being speculative, unnecessary, and nostalgic, Christoph Nonn and Tobias Winnerling insist that it is a ‘corrective’ (p. 13) to historical research. Counter-factual history, they argue, offers at least two benefits: an evaluation of the impact, first, of coincidences and, second, of individuals or structures in history. Both perspectives, they believe, can contribute to a better understanding of historical scopes of action and can provide new insights into established interpretations of history and controversies among historians. Its potential for teaching in schools and universities is mentioned elsewhere (Johannes Dillinger touches on it in his essay, p. 37), but not in the introduction. This omission is astonishing: discussing counter-factual scenarios with students might well be the most effective application given that the problems raised are key topics in nearly every seminar or lecture. Moreover, the editors complain about the ignorance and even hostility mainstream history displays, but although they view counter-factual history as being ‘proscribed’ (p. 9), more than one of the essays

1 For the most recent account going in this direction see Richard J. Evans, Altered Pasts: Counterfactuals in History (Waltham, Mass., 2013).
in their book mentions counter-factual arguments put forward by other authors regarding their topic (for example, in early modern and modern economic history or twentieth-century political history). A more in-depth analysis of where the counter-factual approach might be perceived as acceptable, at least to some extent, would have been desirable.

The twelve essays present classic counter-factual scenarios, such as the assassination of powerful politicians, but also themes that are rarely considered in counter-factual investigations. Given the broad temporal and thematic range of the topics covered, it is not possible to report on every article extensively. Instead, it might be useful to discuss several aspects important for the book as a whole, such as the outcomes of the counter-factual scenarios presented, and the perspective, methodology, and limits of counter-factual history in turn.

In his essay on a world without the Reformation, Matthias Pohlig suggests that different confessions would not have emerged, but that instead the Catholic Church would have undergone moderate reforms. Also, the emergence of a mass public would have been delayed, and there would have been no division of state and religion within the Holy Roman Empire. However, Pohlig hesitates to predict that the Thirty Years War would not have happened.

The next essay, by Johannes Dillinger, considers several alternatives to Luther’s actual life and circumstances. Dillinger believes that the Reformation would have been possible with Zwingli as its leading figure instead of Luther, but that it would always have had its point of origin in the German countries, such as Switzerland for example. In addition, he sees no alternative as possible for the time around the 1520s, because in this period the Catholic Church was most vulnerable to reformist critiques.

Addressing the subject of the Thirty Years War, Tobias Winnerling argues that the conflict could have ended ten years earlier had the Swedish army been defeated at the battle of Wittstock in 1636. The Swedish government, as well as the Swedish Lord High Chancellor, were prepared to agree to a peace treaty in the event of such a defeat. Unfortunately, Winnerling stops there, devoting the whole essay to the question of whether the outlined scenario was actually likely, thus forgoing the opportunity to examine what its repercussions would have been. Except to note that a treaty in 1637 would have functioned as a precedent, making later peace agreements easi-
er, and that Spain might have used its troops engaged in German territories to deal with its internal problems, he regrettably offers no reflections on the potential impact of a shorter war on the second half of the seventeenth century.

Marian Füssel discusses the death of Prussian King Friedrich II in the Battle of Kunersdorf in 1759 and the delayed death of Empress Elizabeth of Russia as the ‘debacle’ (p. 89) of the House of Brandenburg. He finds that in these circumstances, an earlier peace treaty would probably have led to victory for Austria. Such an outcome would have had consequences for the international order, making it possible, but not inevitable, that Austria rather than Prussia could have been the leading player in the foundation of what would then have been a Greater German nation-state.

Michael C. Schneider offers the theory that there was enough encyclopaedic and tacit knowledge in continental Europe for industrialization to have originated in German countries. This holds true for important sectors such as the water economy or mining, based not least on the rapidly growing journal market which provided the necessary knowledge. Schneider concludes by stating that industrialization could have begun outside the United Kingdom, but that it was more likely to have started there, as Britain provided the most favourable context.

Dieter Langewiesche argues that the German Revolution of 1848 could have followed the example of Britain’s Glorious Revolution 160 years before. It would have been a ‘crowned revolution’ (p. 126) making Germany one of the most progressive nation-states of its time as a confederation of monarchical states with parliamentary systems. Highlighting the European dimension, he stresses that a successful German revolution would have required wars between Prussia and Denmark to gain Holstein, and between Prussia and Austria to force the Austrian Emperor to accept the solution of a Lesser Germany. Despite the fact that in this scenario a conflict with France does not play a role in the formation of Germany, Langewiesche believes that there would still have been a rivalry between the two countries for European hegemony, which might have led to the First World War anyway.

In his essay on Bismarck Christoph Nonn argues that he was less important than generally assumed. If he had really drowned in the Atlantic in August 1862, two alternatives existed for the post of
Minister President of Prussia, arch-conservative Edwin von Manteuffel and reforming conservative Robert von der Goltz. In Nonn’s view, both would have handled the internal conflicts and external confrontations in almost the same way as Bismarck, which leads him to the conclusion that Bismarck was not an indispensable figure.

Werner Plumpe describes a scenario in which the Weimar Republic was not doomed. The economic situation was severe during the finance and banking crisis in 1931, but if France and the USA, the only two players who were able to do so, had intervened and supported Austria and Germany, this might have resolved the situation and prevented the catastrophic economic outcome that led to the resignation of Chancellor Heinrich Brüning. Alternatively, Reich President Hindenburg had the power to continue his support of Brüning in May 1932 and allow him to benefit from the probable success of his economic policies. This could have prevented Hitler from becoming head of government and would have ensured that the economic upturn that in fact took place was ascribed to a democratic regime.

Wolfgang Schieder, in his take on attempts on Hitler’s life, concludes that his early death in the Munich Putsch in 1923 would have smashed the NSDAP, while other assassinations during his government would have transformed Hitler into a political martyr, only underpinning the claim to power of any National Socialist successor. If Georg Elser’s attempt on the lives of Hitler and other Nazi leaders at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich on 8 November 1939 had been successful, Schieder argues, the absent Hermann Göring would have become Reich President and Chancellor. Following a successful assassination by Stauffenberg on 20 July 1944, the conspirators would have installed a military dictatorship under Erich Hoepner (only because Erwin Rommel had been seriously wounded a few days before), which would have had to confront Hitler’s Diadochi. Göring, supported by Heinrich Himmler and Joseph Goebbels, would have triumphed in the end and continued the war.

Guido Thiemeyer thinks that the rejection of the Schuman Plan, which proposed the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), by one of the involved parliaments would not have meant the end of European integration. He believes the consequence would have been bilateral co-operation and that further European partners, such as Italy or Belgium, would later have asso-
ciated themselves with it. He sees a strong path dependence and is only unsure about the institutional structures of the ECSC, the European Commission, and the European Parliament.

In the following essay Wilfried Loth argues that German reunification would have been possible in the early 1950s if the West had accepted the Stalin Note suggesting the creation of a unified but non-aligned Germany. Loth believes that this could have led to peace treaty negotiations between the victorious powers and a then united Germany. The outcome would have been not the end, but a relaxation of the Cold War, because the resolution of the ‘German question’ would have allowed the USA and the Soviet Union to contain (‘Einhegung’, p. 238) their rivalry and enter disarmament talks. His vision is a non-aggression pact between the USA and the USSR, signed after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

In his second empirical essay, which closes the volume, Christoph Nonn discusses the possibility of a massacre in Leipzig in 1989 if the phone had been answered not by Egon Krenz but by Erich Honecker, and the latter had decided the next steps during the vital moments of the Monday demonstrations in the GDR on 9 October. He claims that Honecker was ready to take a hard line—with severe consequences. It would have meant hundreds of casualties among the demonstrators, and, pointing to the example of the fate of Romania’s socialist dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu, Nonn suggests that the deployment of military force would also have hastened the end of Honecker’s power because such an order would have erased the Socialist Unity Party’s authority entirely.

Regarding perspective, in the essays mentioned above, all authors share the understanding that counter-factual history must focus on implications for the short or medium term. It is telling that Pohlig mentions this explicitly (p. 36), yet deals with the longest perspective; all the other essays follow more or less the same line. None discusses consequences beyond a couple of decades, because such an attempt would become even more speculative. Despite this common ground, it is remarkable how diverse the field of counter-factual history is. What kind of history is its focus? There is no consistent answer in this volume, which makes it interesting to compare the essays. It is not easy to match them to categories, but three of the essays look at alternative courses of history for individuals (Dillinger, Nonn on Bismarck, Schieder), seven for events (Winnerling, Füssel, Langewiesche,
Plumpe, Thiemeyer, Loth, Nonn on Leipzig 1989), and two for processes (Pohlig, Schneider). These classifications are not as strict as they seem because they partly merge into each other, or are complicated in themselves since it is imperative to take whole constellations of supporters and opponents into account when discussing the historical role of individuals, as Dillinger emphasizes (pp. 49–58). While not all essays offer unfailingly surprising results, the most revealing come from different categories—Nonn’s demolition of Bismarck and Schneider’s history of industrial knowledge.

When it comes to methodology, the collection represents at least three different approaches. Some of the essays consider the altered conditions of a given history and others look into changed outcomes of actual developments. These are the two standard ways of doing counter-factual history and are equally accepted, and often combined. Langewiesche adds a new approach with a slightly different treatment of his topic, limiting the historian’s fantasy to the imagination of the protagonists of the day. This means that he does not accept any potential alteration to the historical truth, but only those alternatives which were discussed at the time, which he calls unrealized or ‘not exhausted’ alternatives (p. 122). In this way, it is not the historian who creates the counter-factual conception of history but the contemporary actors, which contributes to a reconstruction of inconclusive interpretations of the past. Such an approach is not only clever in fully reconstructing historical discourses and decision-making processes, but is distinguished by its closeness to the historical sources.

Regarding the limitations of counter-factual history, a simplistic cause-and-effect approach is frequently criticized. In the present volume, all of the authors are aware of this problem and argue cautiously, adducing comparable cases or related historical developments. Another problem remains. The volume demonstrates that counter-factual history seems to privilege the history of events and the history of great men. This is true for all contributions except Schneider’s essay, but there is hardly any reflection on this fact. What is missing is the application to further subjects such as the history of ideas, cultural history, or gender history. And this has consequences; not only does the volume attract negative attention through its non-inclusive, gendered language (most obviously in the introduction), but it also limits historical agency to great men and situations of
political decision-making. To include the history of ideas, cultural history, or gender history might be challenging because it is more difficult to identify concrete *Abweichungspunkte* (‘points of deviation’, Winnerling, p. 64) in the fields mentioned. But this goes for the history of religion or economic history as well, as Pohlig (pp. 21–2) and Schneider (p. 104) observe. Nevertheless, their essays show that a counter-factual historical approach is possible even in these more complicated circumstances, and if counter-factual history does not want to drop behind the current state of the art in a critical and plural historiography, it is important that it widens its scope in this regard.

Despite these reservations, this book is a thought-provoking read. Even if one does not accept all the counter-narratives offered, the intellectual richness of nearly all the essays justifies a recommendation anyway. None of the essays is a ‘provocation’ or has even a ‘latently aggressive’ character (p. 38), as Dillinger fears. At the very least, after reading the volume one knows better than before how convincing factual interpretations are, or where their limits lie. And this is not a marginal benefit.

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