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ARTISTIC ENCOUNTERS: BRITISH PERSPECTIVES ON BAVARIA AND SAXONY IN THE VORMÄRZ

HANNELORE PUTZ

In the nineteenth century the travel itineraries of British art lovers were generally oriented by objects, artists, museums, and collections. As a rule, their sight-seeing programmes were dictated by a canon which was changing constantly in response to new viewing habits, but also by a desire to deviate from these guidelines and discover something different. Travelling for art lovers was arduous as they had to seek out works of art and artists in many different places. Travellers had to decide which works were worth a visit, and which ones could not be incorporated into their itineraries. Italy (especially Venice, Florence, Rome, and Naples) was always their main goal, but by choosing particular routes, travellers were also making decisions about what they would visit on the way to and from Italy. Only once were art lovers able to admire a large number of the most significant works of European art at a single location. During the Napoleonic Wars, the Emperor of the French turned the Louvre into the main site for viewing European art. Napoleon was less interested in making life easier for art lovers than in demonstrating the superiority of a victorious France by bringing works of art from every newly conquered country to Paris.¹ Nonetheless, by bringing together important collections in this way, he provided an unprecedented opportunity for comparative viewing and experiencing. After the victory of the allied forces over Napoleon in 1815, these art works were returned to their original homes, and art lovers once again had to travel from place to place to view paintings, sculptures, and antiquities.

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).

¹ James J. Sheehan, *Geschichte der deutschen Kunstmuseen: Von der fürstlichen Kunstkammer zur modernen Sammlung* (Munich, 2002), 85–6.

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Since the middle of the eighteenth century opportunities for enjoying art had changed fundamentally. Private collections were frequently opened to the public,² but most importantly, conditions on the art market had altered. As the result of the secularization of ecclesiastical property and a difficult economic climate, works of art which had been in the possession of the church and secular owners flooded on to the art market. New collections, such as that of the Boisserée brothers, soon attracted lively public interest.³ And changes in authority, such as the transfer of Bavaria to the Palatinate branch of the Wittelsbach dynasty in 1777, meant that works of art were placed into a completely new context, making it possible to see them as if for the first time again. When the holdings of the Düsseldorf gallery were sent to Munich, Düsseldorf became less attractive to travelling art lovers, while Munich became much more interesting because of its acquisition of the Flemish masters and, later on, its gains from the secularizations of 1803.⁴ And, finally, excavations in Greece and Italy, especially in Rome, which were at first carried out privately – with or without a concession – brought large amounts of antiquities on to the art market and opened up new horizons for collectors.⁵

² See Bénédicte Savoy, 'Zum Öffentlichkeitscharakter deutscher Museen im 18. Jahrhundert', in ead. (ed.), *Tempel der Kunst: Die Geburt des öffentlichen Museums in Deutschland 1701–1815* (Mainz, 2006), 9–26.

³ See Eduard Firmenich-Richartz, *Sulpiz und Melchior Boisserée als Kunstsammler: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Romantik* (Jena, 1916); Peter Eikemeier, 'Die Erwerbungen altdeutscher und altniederländischer Gemälde', in Konrad Renger (ed.), *Ilm, welcher der Andacht Tempel baut . . .': Ludwig I. und die Alte Pinakothek* (Munich, 1986), 56–67; Uwe Heckmann, *Die Sammlung Boisserée: Konzeption und Rezeptionsgeschichte einer romantischen Kunstsammlung zwischen 1804 und 1827* (Munich, 2003).

⁴ While Sir Joshua Reynolds had seen the Flemish masters in Düsseldorf, pointing out that nobody could judge these painters without having seen the collections in Antwerp and Düsseldorf, Anna Jameson was able to view them in the context of the new collections in Munich. See Anna Jameson, *Visits and Sketches at Home and Abroad with Tales and Miscellanies now First Collected and a New Edition of the Diary of an Ennuyée*, 4 vols. (London, 1834), ii. 245–6.

⁵ See Jeremy Warren and Adriana Turpin (eds.), *Auctions, Agents and Dealers: The Mechanism of the Art Market 1660–1830* (Oxford, 2007); Alexander Meystrik and Peter Melichar, 'Editorial', *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften*, 17 (2006), 5–9.

For the British, unrestricted travel on the Continent had only become possible again after the fall of Napoleon. British travellers had largely been prevented from visiting the Musée Napoléon, and the coalition wars had hugely reduced travel to Germany. In her profound study of British travellers, Frauke Geyken established that their image of Germany only gradually improved over the course of the eighteenth century. The country had long been described as 'barbarian in the classical sense, uncultivated', and its inhabitants as phlegmatic and too fond of alcohol. Few princely courts and towns in the Old Reich were compulsory stops on the Grand Tour during the first half of the eighteenth century, and most of them lay on the way to Italy or France. British travellers frequently took the route from Aachen to Cologne, and then along the Rhine via Bonn, Mainz, Heidelberg, Mannheim, and Stuttgart towards Italy. Hanover's connection with the British royal house meant that a visit there was considered good form. Vienna, the Kaiser's residence, was worth a visit, Regensburg and a description of the Reichstag appear in many travellers' reports, Dresden gained significance under Augustus the Strong, and Munich, too, was often considered worth a stay. With the exception of Hamburg, with its many British residents,⁶ the northern part of the Reich had generally been seen as culturally and scenically uninteresting; Berlin was rarely visited.⁷ This did not really begin to change until the second half of the eighteenth century, when Berlin, for example, became more attractive under Frederick II. The overall picture which travellers had of Germany was that it was composed of many largely independent and almost sovereign residences and imperial towns.⁸

⁶ On Hamburg see Anne D. Petersen, *Die Engländer in Hamburg 1814 bis 1914: Ein Beitrag zur Hamburgischen Geschichte* (Hamburg, 1993).

⁷ See Frauke Geyken, ' "The German language is spoken in Saxony with the greatest purity" or English Images and Perceptions of Germany in the Eighteenth Century', in Joseph Canning and Hermann Wellenreuther (eds.), *Britain and Germany Compared: Nationality, Society and Nobility in the Eighteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2001), 45; Frauke Geyken, *Gentlemen auf Reisen: Das britische Deutschlandbild im 18. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main, 2002), 256.

⁸ *Ibid.* 253.

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During the nineteenth century, Germany became a 'highly respected cultural model',⁹ largely because its achievements in literature, music, and the fine arts made it more attractive. After 1816, British travellers increasingly visited the states of the German Confederation and wrote about them in travel reports and later also in newspaper articles. Led by their own interests, art lovers pointed to the changes that had taken place in the German art world since the eighteenth century, detailed existing conditions, and located what they had seen in a European context.

The article which follows here will start by asking about the position of the German Confederation's *Mittelstaaten* on the permanently changing European art map. The largest of these *Mittelstaaten*, Bavaria and Saxony, which will provide the focus of this article, made great efforts from the 1820s and 1830s to distinguish themselves in the fields of art and culture. The support of the state or monarch for art and culture was targeted first on historical research and the cultivation of a festive culture focused on the state and the monarchy, and thereafter on promoting the fine arts, museums, and the erection of monuments.¹⁰ All of these measures were dictated by an inward perspective and served, among other things, the state-building process.¹¹ The borders of the member states of the German Confederation were not fixed until 1816; Bavaria and Saxony faced almost diametrically opposed initial conditions in this respect. Bavaria, which was elevated into a kingdom in the wake of Napoleon, had expanded its territory considerably by comparison with the eighteenth century and now brought together Old Bavarians and New Bavarians,

⁹ Ibid. 57–60, 249 (quotation). Geyken observes that except during the War of the Spanish Succession, Germany had only slowly become more interesting for England since the Silesian Wars; see ead., 'English Images and Perceptions of Germany in the Eighteenth Century', 43–6.

¹⁰ See Abigail Green, *Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Cambridge, 2001), 98, who concentrates on Hanover, Saxony, and Württemberg. On the monarchical festive culture of Bavaria and Saxony see Simone Mergen, *Monarchiejubiläen im 19. Jahrhundert: Die Entdeckung des historischen Jubiläums für den monarchischen Kult in Sachsen und Bayern* (Leipzig, 2005); on the historical associations in the German Confederation see Gabriele B. Clemens, *Sanctus amor patriae: Eine vergleichende Studie zu deutschen und italienischen Geschichtsvereinen im 19. Jahrhundert* (Tübingen, 2004).

¹¹ On this see, in detail, Green, *Fatherlands*.

Catholics, Protestants, and Jews within its borders. Throughout the whole of the nineteenth century, the issue was the integration not only of New Bavarians, but also Old Bavarians; what was required was collective integration. Saxony, by contrast, which had also been elevated into a kingdom by Napoleon in 1806, suffered considerable territorial losses. Unlike Bavaria, Saxony did not manage to switch sides from Napoleon to the anti-Napoleonic alliance in time. As a result, in 1816 it was only half as big as Bavaria. The big issue facing Saxony, therefore, was to come to terms with these losses and shape what territory was left, along with its inhabitants, into one state. Beyond this, the monarch, his ministers, and top officials in both Bavaria and Saxony wanted to underpin the existing internal political order and to secure sovereignty and independence in the context of the German Confederation. Finally, the cultural measures outlined here also served, to different extents, to educate Bavarian and Saxon patriots.¹²

In the capital cities, however, a clear outwards-directed movement could also be discerned. Its aim was to strengthen the cultural profile of monarch and state in Europe. In Munich, therefore, foreign monarchs were regularly shown museums and artists' studios and workshops, mainly because Bavaria could not compete with the larger European states in staging extravagant military parades and social festivities.¹³ Efforts by the Bavarian crown prince and later king,

¹² In relation to painting see Frank Büttner, 'Bildung des Volkes durch Geschichte: Zu den Anfängen öffentlicher Geschichtsmalerei in Deutschland', in Ekkehard Mai (ed.), *Historienmalerei in Europa: Paradigmen in Form, Funktion und Ideologie* (Mainz, 1990), 77–94, 83–8; Frank Büttner, 'Bildungsideen und bildende Kunst in Deutschland um 1800', in Reinhart Koselleck (ed.), *Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert*, 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1985–92), ii. *Bildungsgüter und Bildungswissen* (1990), 259–85, at 263–9.

¹³ When rulers paid each other visits in the first half of the nineteenth century, fixed programmes were not, as a rule, laid down in advance; royal visitors tended to decide partly on the spot what they would like to visit. See Johannes Paulmann, *Pomp und Politik: Monarchenbegegnungen in Europa zwischen Ancien Régime und Erstem Weltkrieg* (Paderborn, 2000), 232. Taking the Russian Tsar Nicholas I's visit to Munich in 1838 as an example, we see that, mostly accompanied by Ludwig I, he visited the Glyptothek, St Bonifaz, the Allerheiligen-Hofkirche (All Saints' Court Church), and the Pinakothek, then the Porzellanmanufaktur (porcelain factory), the Glasmalereianstalt (stained glass establishment), and the Erzgießerei (foundry). Ludwig I showed his guest the Festsaalbau of the residence and the stained glass windows made

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Ludwig I, to position Bavaria on the transnational art market and within European artistic society by, for example, maintaining an art representative in Rome, at that time indisputably Europe's most important cultural centre, are further evidence of this.

Nonetheless, the question arises whether, and to what extent, the promotion of fine arts was perceived from the outside, especially by art historians, travellers, and artists. Only an investigation of this issue will provide information about the success or failure of attempts to gain a greater reputation as a sovereign state by promoting the arts. The following article will approach this question from two sides, taking Britain as an example. First it will look at reports by travelling British art lovers dating from the second half of the 1820s and the 1830s, that is, focusing on an early period of increased artistic profiling on the part of Bavaria and Saxony. They will be examined for evidence of how British travellers perceived the capital cities of Saxony and Bavaria, that is, Dresden and Munich respectively, and for what they say about the position that these two cities occupied on the European art map at this time. But the article is also interested in what these reports reveal about the status of Bavaria and Saxony within the German Confederation. It will ask whether Munich and Dresden were perceived as the capitals of sovereign states, or whether they were primarily located within the larger German context. Secondly, the article will look at artistic encounters and meetings between artists from Britain, Bavaria, and Saxony going beyond those generated by travelling. In the 1830s, the writer Anna Jameson made several references to exchanges between British artists and art historians and their counterparts in the German states: 'While the literary intercourse between England and Germany increases every day, and a mutual esteem and understanding is the natural consequence of

for the Maria-Hilf-Kirche in der Au on display in St Ludwig. The Tsar also sought out artists' studios, such as that of Peter Heß. For Nicholas I's visit, see Gerhard Grimm, 'Nikolaus I. von Rußland in Bayern im Jahre 1838', in Hermann Beyer-Thoma (ed.), *Bayern und Osteuropa: Aus der Geschichte der Beziehungen Bayerns, Frankens und Schwabens mit Rußland, der Ukraine und Weißrußland* (Wiesbaden, 2000), 351-74; Hannelore Putz, 'Rußland: Leo von Klenze in St. Petersburg', in Alois Schmid and Katharina Weigand (eds.), *Bayern – mitten in Europa: Vom Frühmittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2005), 339-54.

this approximation of mind, there is a singular and mutual ignorance in all matters appertaining to art, and consequently, a good deal of injustice and prejudice on both sides.¹⁴ Against this background, we will ask whether, and from when, Bavarian, Saxon, and British artists and art historians availed themselves of chances to work together. Our observations will make it possible to draw initial and careful conclusions about the respective cultural profiles of Bavaria and Saxony in the first half of the nineteenth century as seen from a British perspective.

Travelling Art Lovers and their Reports

As already mentioned, political events and forces at the beginning of the nineteenth century, coupled with a contemporaneous change in taste and viewing habits, resulted in strong modifications in some areas of the European art map. Art periodicals drew attention to the locations of art, travel literature reacted to changes in opportunities, and travelling art lovers, with some delay, reported on their experiences. Art historians, travellers with an interest in art, and diplomats stationed on the spot pin-pointed museums, art studios, and monuments on an imagined art map of the whole of Europe; they made connections, and by judging, classified comparatively. Going beyond this, they described the position of art in the countries they visited, thus becoming 'agents of the transfer of knowledge'.¹⁵

In the eighteenth century travel reports were the most popular reading material in Britain. The social and political elite was expected to travel and to capture its experiences in writing, but only from the second half of the eighteenth century did a growing interest in the

¹⁴ Jameson, *Visits and Sketches*, ii. 136.

¹⁵ Rudolf Muhs, 'Geisteswehen: Rahmenbedingungen des deutsch-britischen Kulturaustauschs im 19. Jahrhundert', in id., Johannes Paulmann, and Willibald Steinmetz (eds.), *Aneignung und Abwehr: Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19. Jahrhundert* (Bodenheim, 1998), 44–70. On British diplomats who operated as art collectors and agents in Italy, see Saho Matsumoto-Best, 'The Art of Diplomacy: British Diplomats and the Collection of Italian Renaissance Paintings, 1851–1917', in Markus Mösöslang and Torsten Riotte (eds.), *The Diplomats' World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy 1815–1914* (Oxford, 2008), 83–101.

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Reich produce more reports of this sort.¹⁶ After the downturn in the numbers of British travellers caused by the coalition wars, the 1820s witnessed a gradual return of enthusiasm for visiting the states of what was now the German Confederation.¹⁷ Consequently there are more reports about experiences in Germany in the 1820s and 1830s. Anna Jameson, for example, one of the best known British art writers, brought the art scene in the *Mittelstaaten* of the German Confederation alive for the British public. Edmund Spencer had collected many impressions on his journeys while acquiring a considerable knowledge of the history of art; Charles Boileau Elliott, Fellow of Queens College Cambridge, gained wide experience of art during his extended travels through the Nordic countries and Russia, especially St Petersburg; and while Frances Trollope and Richard Bryan Smith were less experienced, they, too, were shrewd observers who did not hesitate to judge what they had seen. All proved themselves connoisseurs of the European art scene, and all drew very precise comparisons between the various sites of European art.¹⁸

Travellers such as the five mentioned above often used literary references in preparing their journeys. In general, any detailed knowledge they had of the country to be visited was gleaned from published travel reports and oral and written reports by acquaintances, and they were, in general, happy to follow the routes suggested in

¹⁶ Geyken, *Gentlemen auf Reisen*, 73–4.

¹⁷ Ibid. 60. For the 1830s, I have chosen to concentrate on the following travel reports: Jameson, *Visits and Sketches*; [Edmund Spencer], *Sketches of Germany and the Germans, with a Glance at Poland, Hungary & Switzerland in 1834, 1835, and 1836*, 2 vols. (London, 1836); Charles Boileau Elliott, *Letters from the North of Europe: Or a Journal of Travels in Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Prussia and Saxony* (London, 1832); Richard Bryan Smith, who was artistically less experienced, *Notes made During a Tour in Denmark, Holstein, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Pomerania, The Isle of Ruegen, Prussia, Poland, Saxony, Brunswick, Hannover, the Hanseatic Territories . . . Interspersed with some Observations on the Foreign Corn Trade* (London, 1827); and Frances Trollope, *Vienna and the Austrians: With some Account of a Journey through Swabia, Bavaria, the Tyrol, and the Salzbourg*, 2 vols. (London, 1838).

¹⁸ In her study *Fatherlands*, Abigail Green investigates, among other things, to what extent travellers perceived Germany's political fragmentation, and how they treated it in their reports. She also used, among many others, the travel reports by Charles Boileau Elliott, Richard Bryan Smith, and Frances Trollope; see Green, *Fatherlands*, 22–61.

this context. Individual backgrounds and education were reflected in the contents of travel reports. Some authors accepted the evaluations made in older works, and thus perpetuated existing clichés.¹⁹ Others, however, made their own independent judgements. Against this background, it is crucial in each case to be aware of who the author of the report was, what horizon of experience he or she had, and what substantive emphasis he or she had selected.²⁰

As far as education and interests were concerned, travelling art lovers formed a largely homogeneous group who had been specially schooled in the practice of looking and comparing. The way in which they mention works of art and their locations show that these authors were writing primarily for an educated readership with an interest in art, for whom brief references were enough to establish a context. These authors frequently showed themselves contemptuous of the unschooled public, which they considered uneducated, in galleries and museums.²¹

The five travelling art lovers we will be looking at more closely here, like all their colleagues, set off on their travels with very precise expectations. They shared, in different forms, a desire to see works of art, to study collections, and to view museums and monuments, and they had prepared themselves by reading guidebooks and travel reports. The way in which they looked at things, therefore, was pre-formed.²² As they targeted the locations where art was to be found,

¹⁹ See Geyken, 'English Images and Perceptions of Germany', 47.

²⁰ See Michael Maurer (ed.), *Britannien von deiner Freiheit einen Hut voll: Deutsche Reiseberichte des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1992), 8.

²¹ See Jameson's descriptions of visitors to the Königsbau: Jameson, *Visits and Sketches*, i. 240–2. She wrote as follows about the ability to make a judgement about the paintings: 'I amuse myself in the gallery here with watching the countenances of those who look at the pictures. I see that the uneducated eye is caught by subjects in which the individual mind sympathizes, and the educated taste seeks abstract excellence. Which has the most enjoyment? The last, I think. Sensibility, imagination, and quick perception of form and colour, are not alone necessary to feel a work of art; there must be the power of association; the mind trained to habitual sympathy with the beautiful and the good; the knowledge of the meaning, and the comprehension of the object of the artist' (ibid. i. 249).

²² In her travel writing Jameson was very clear that John Russell, *A Tour in Germany and Some of the Southern Provinces of the Austrian Empire in 1820, 1821*,

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every visit expanded their artistic knowledge and horizons of experience. They therefore formed a special group and, in respect of art, could be considered specialists.

For art enthusiasts travelling from England, Bavaria and Saxony were not, as a rule, directly on the route to Italy, the mandatory goal of their journey, although Dresden was often visited on the way to the Bohemian spas, and Munich on the way to or from Salzburg. But increasing numbers of visitors made Munich and Dresden their primary goal because of the art treasures collected there.²³ In the first half of the nineteenth century travellers to Munich could see a collection of paintings expanded by holdings from Düsseldorf, which transformed it into one of the best collections of Flemish art in Europe. In Dresden they could see Raphael's *Sistine Madonna*; an outstanding collection of works by Corregio, which made it a centre of Italian art comparable to Florence; and the Green Vault (Grüne Gewölbe), the Armoury (Rüstkammer), and the Japanese Palace with its holdings.²⁴ But beyond the actual works of art, visitors were intrigued by the cultural and artistic activity on the spot, seeking contact with artists, patrons of art, collectors, and art historians. They displayed great interest in finding out about innovations in museology, the technical aspects of art, and developments on the art market. This interest was reflected in the reports they wrote. In those consulted here, Munich's art collections are described in detail, and while less tended to be written about Dresden, this is because there were fewer objects to look at there. In a qualitative assessment, Munich and Dresden were ranked equally after Vienna and thus second in Germany. In the work by Trollope, for example, Vienna merits the longest description. In terms of artistic activity, Munich stands out by comparison with all other German centres of art in the 1830s, as emerges clearly from Jameson's report.

The published versions of the reports by the five English travellers presented here reveal both the prior knowledge and the expectations of their authors, and their perceptions and evaluations of the artistic activity they discovered. Their writings were widely read on

1822, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1828) was the standard work to be read in preparation for a visit to Dresden. See Jameson, *Visits and Sketches*, ii. 86-7.

²³ Bavarian and Saxon artists and art historians, conversely, did not consider Britain an absolutely essential place to visit.

²⁴ See the list in Geyken, *Gentlemen auf Reisen*, 256-7.

the art scene; just as they had been affected by earlier works, their accounts influenced the routes and sightseeing programmes of travellers who came after them. As 'material remnants of the lived reality of travelling', these reports are important sources which allow us to assess Bavaria's and Saxony's standing within the European cultural scene at a particular point in time as revealed by the example of their capital cities. They also uncover cultural relations and, because they mix factual information with personal impressions, provide a valuable yardstick for measuring the success of the cultural policy pursued by these *Mittelstaaten*.²⁵

Munich and Dresden in the Reports of Travelling British Art Lovers

Anna Jameson's first days in Munich in 1833 were inauspicious. She was in a fragile state of health and it took her a week to acclimatize. But from her hotel, which was on Max-Joseph-Platz and provided views over the newly built National Theatre and the almost completed Königsbau of the residence, she thought about the architecture of these two buildings. Describing them with the authority of an expert, she identified the pediments of the National Theatre as unsatisfactory.²⁶ During her stay, she attentively and critically examined the newly established sites of art. She was enthusiastic about the Glyptothek and its collection,²⁷ viewed the Königsbau where, however, she

²⁵ Michael Maurer, 'Reisen interdisziplinär: Ein Forschungsbericht in kulturgeschichtlicher Perspektive', in id. (ed.), *Neue Impulse der Reiseforschung* (Berlin, 1999), 287–410, at 298–9.

²⁶ Jameson, *Visits and Sketches*, i. 206: 'The theatre is in itself a beautiful object: the portico, of the Corinthian order, is supported by eight pillars; the ascent is by a noble flight of steps, with four gigantic bronze candelabras at the corners; and nothing, at least to my unlearned eyes, could be more elegant—more purely classical and Greek, than the whole, were it not for the hideous roof upon the roof—one pediment, as it were, riding on the back of the other. Some internal arrangement of the theatre may render this deformity necessary, but it is a deformity, and one that annoys me whenever I look at it.'

²⁷ Ibid. i. 214: 'First visit to the Glyptothek [*sic!*]—just returned—my imagination, still filled with "the blaze, the splendour, and the symmetry,"—excited as I never thought it could be again excited after seeing the Vatican'; *ibid.* 214–24. Trollope considered the Glyptothek Munich's most beautiful build-

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did not approve of the approach to the staircase,²⁸ the Hofgarten (Court Garden) and its Arcades, the as yet unfinished Allerheiligenhofkirche (All Saints' Court Church),²⁹ Ludwigstraße, Maximiliansplatz and Karolinenplatz, the Duke of Leuchtenberg's tomb in St Michaels, and Ludwig the Bavarian's cenotaph in the Frauenkirche. She wrote at length and in detail about her visits to the royal galleries in the Hofgarten and at Schleissheim, and about the chance to visit the Duke of Leuchtenberg's gallery, Baron von Eichthal's collection of paintings, and the studios of the sculptors Bandel and Mayer. At the Odeon she attended a musical performance and described the concert hall as 'larger than any public room in London, and admirably constructed for music'.³⁰ The Pinakothek, still under construction, she found impressive, although she was highly critical of a fresco in the gallery which was to depict the muses introducing Ludwig I to the grove of art.³¹ Jameson was surprised to find that she was refused permission to visit Ludwig's Schönheitengalerie (Gallery of Beauties), and in this context compared the Bavarian king

ing, but its magnificence did nothing for her. See Trollope, *Vienna and the Austrians*, i. 218–22.

²⁸ See Jameson, *Visits and Sketches*, i. 272–3. In 1837 Trollope criticized the Königsbau of the residence. She found its appointments 'gaudy and unpleasing in the extreme' and was disappointed by the use of stucco cladding instead of marble but, by contrast, appreciated its old holdings. Trollope, *Vienna and the Austrians*, i. 215–17.

²⁹ Frances Trollope was able to visit the completed Allerheiligenhofkirche, which she described as 'perfectly unique', but had to admit that 'to my fancy, the old chapel of King's College, Cambridge, which I quote as the strongest contrast to it that I can remember, is more pleasing to the eye'. Trollope, *Vienna and the Austrians*, ii. 409.

³⁰ Jameson, *Visits and Sketches*, ii. 30–1.

³¹ *Ibid.* ii. 45–6: 'At one end of this gallery there is to be a large fresco, representing his majesty King Louis, introduced by the muse of Poetry to the assembled poets and painters of Germany. Now, this species of allegorical adulation appears to me flat and out of date. I well remember that long ago the famous picture of Voltaire, introduced into the Elysian fields by Henri Quatre, and making his best bow to Racine and Molière, threw me into a convulsion of laughter: and the cartoon of this royal apotheosis provoked the same irrepressible feeling of the ridiculous. I wish somebody would hint to King Louis that this is not in good taste, and that there are many, many ways in which the compliment (which he truly merits) might be better managed.'

with a 'grand Turk'.³² Spencer's itinerary in Munich was similar to Jameson's.³³ In 1837 Trollope, unlike Jameson, was able to visit the newly opened Pinakothek: 'the noble Pinakothec was open to the whole world, and it will not be easy for the whole world to find anything better worth looking at.'³⁴ On the whole, however, she was disappointed with Munich. She was aware that she was expected to show greater enthusiasm, but felt incapable of this: 'And what shall I tell you about it all? That I admire Munich, its gaudy decorations, its ambitious architecture, and its smart new residence? I cannot honestly do this; for neither the general aspect of the town, nor the peculiar style of the new palace, suit my taste.' She explained her views by pointing out that all the recently laid out streets and the palaces and houses that had just been completed or were still under construction were simply 'too new'. It would be worth visiting Munich a few years later, she suggested.³⁵

While Dresden presented visitors with far fewer attractions than Munich, the city inspired people with its silhouettes and urban spaces. Jameson wrote: 'Beautiful, stately Dresden! if not the queen, the fine lady of the German cities!'³⁶ Jameson and Spencer both used the already well-worn comparison of Dresden with Florence; both visited the city's churches, Brühl's Terrace, the Zwinger, the Opera, and the Japanese Palace with its collections. But the climax of their tours was a visit to the Green Vault and especially the gallery, which at this time was still accommodated in the residence. Art lovers were enthusiastic, especially about the magnificent collection of Italian art,³⁷ although Jameson criticized the presentation of two of its main works. To do them justice, she suggested, Raphael's *Sistine Madonna* and Corregio's *Holy Night* should each be shown in a 'sanctuary' of its

³² Ibid. ii. 54–5: 'The king of Bavaria has a gallery of beauties (the portraits of some of the most beautiful women of Germany and Italy), which he shuts up from the public eye, like any grand Turk—and neither bribery nor interest can procure admission.'

³³ See [Spencer], *Sketches of Germany*, ii. 315–27.

³⁴ Trollope, *Vienna and the Austrians*, ii. 408.

³⁵ Ibid. i. 213–14.

³⁶ Jameson, *Visits and Sketches*, ii. 86.

³⁷ Smith, *Notes made During a Tour*, 209: 'The royal gallery of paintings, in one of the buildings in the castle, deserves the early attention of the stranger, being the second, if second to any, in Europe.'

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own and illuminated from above.³⁸ The writer was also deeply impressed by a reading given in his own house by Ludwig Tieck, who she rated as the 'literary Colossus of Dresden; perhaps I should say of Germany'.³⁹ Spencer considered the following worth a special mention: the layout of the new town; the equestrian statue of Augustus II; a model of Solomon's temple, which, originating in Hamburg, had been bought from London by Augustus the Strong and was on display in Dresden; and the contents of the Armoury.⁴⁰ He objected that the area around the Zwinger was too cluttered with coffee houses, billiard halls, and so on. The impact of the Wache (Guard House), erected by Karl Friedrich Schinkel, too, he suggested, was impaired by a wine and beer house, the area to the museum being separated only by a dilapidated wooden railing that had not been painted for a long time.⁴¹ Elliott, who visited the city in October 1830, at a time of political unrest, had a much more negative view of Dresden, and reflected on the insecure situation in his report. Although Dresden under Augustus III had long been known as the 'Athens of modern times', he suggested, it could not claim this for much longer.⁴² The residence, for example, looked more like a prison than a representative building.⁴³ All the authors followed a similar itinerary in Dresden.⁴⁴

³⁸ Jameson, *Visits and Sketches*, ii. 111-12.

³⁹ *Ibid.* ii. 94-100, at 94.

⁴⁰ See [Spencer], *Sketches of Germany*, i. 242-58.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* i. 245-46: 'thus the centre of the fine spacious square, composed of the king's palace, the Catholic church, the Zwinger, &c. is occupied with what they are pleased to term an Italian village, but what, in plain English, is nothing more nor less than an assemblage of low beer-houses, billiard rooms, and coffee-houses, the rendezvous of all the idle and dissipated in Dresden. The royal guard-house, a beautiful specimen of Grecian architecture, built by M. Schinkel of Berlin, is joined to one of those little wooden nuisances, called a wine and beer-shop, and the Museum is merely separated from this said Italian village by a mean, dilapidated wooden railing, which did not appear to have been painted for the last thirty years.'

⁴² Elliott, *Letters from the North of Europe*, 446.

⁴³ *Ibid.* 448. [Spencer], *Sketches of Germany*, i. 246, compared the residence with 'a fortress'.

⁴⁴ In addition, Elliott and Smith also referred to the monument for the Russian general Jean-Victor Moreau, who in 1813 had fought in Dresden by the side of Alexander I in 1813, and died there; Elliott, *Letters from the North of Europe*, 453; Smith, *Notes made During a Tour*, 229.

The point of comparison for judging what had been seen was initially something familiar in Britain, giving readers at home the chance to contextualize what they read about. All the authors, however, also drew comparisons with European references in the area of art when they wanted to describe their impressions.⁴⁵ Jameson, for example, noted that members of the audience at the Munich Opera were wearing French fashions which had been modern two or three years previously.⁴⁶ The organization of opera performances inspired the following comment: 'They manage these things better here than in England.'⁴⁷ She described the Glyptothek as a 'Vatican in miniature',⁴⁸ while in her disapproval of ostentatious representation, Trollope drew a comparison with the Louvre.⁴⁹ Jameson described the Bavarian king, Ludwig I, as the 'Lorenzo de' Medici of Bavaria';⁵⁰ the Court Garden arcades with their shops and cafés reminded her of the Palais Royal in Paris; while the cycle of historical frescos by Cornelius distinguished the Munich arcades from all others.⁵¹ Referring to the rediscovery of the technique of fresco painting in the nineteenth century, Jameson placed the advancement of this art into its Roman context. Dresden, she went on, although 'one of the smallest, and by no means one of the richest capitals in Europe', was 'one of the most delightful residences on the continent'.⁵² Jameson judged that, with the possible exception of Florence, no other European city had an Italian collection to compete with Dresden's.⁵³ Trollope's remark that visitors to the paintings in The Hague would value the collections more highly if they had not already seen those in Vienna and Munich shows that the Munich collections had long since become a point of reference.⁵⁴

⁴⁵ Geyken, *Gentlemen auf Reisen*, 260, finds the same thing in travel reports of the eighteenth century.

⁴⁶ See Jameson, *Visits and Sketches*, i. 209.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* i. 212.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* i. 214.

⁴⁹ See Trollope, *Vienna and the Austrians*, i. 219-20.

⁵⁰ Jameson, *Visits and Sketches*, i. 239.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* i. 266.

⁵² *Ibid.* ii. 89.

⁵³ *Ibid.* ii. 113.

⁵⁴ See Trollope, *Vienna and the Austrians*, ii. 411.

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The esteem in which travel reports held both Munich and Dresden show that they were firmly established entities on the European art map, less on the basis of the quantity of their collections than of their quality. While Dresden's exceptional collection of Italian paintings made it a compulsory stop, in Munich it was the work of the Flemish masters. Beyond this, however, from the 1820s Munich increasingly presented itself as the centre of a highly diverse contemporary arts scene. New paintings, sculptures, and works of architecture were constantly being created there; artists came and went, and with them, studios and workshops. Spencer appositely captured the difference between Dresden and Munich: 'though Dresden, from its beautiful localities, is more captivating, yet this [Munich] is more striking: add to which, the one is dull and stationary, while the other is lively and attractive, and continually advancing in prosperity.'⁵⁵

When Charles Boileau Elliott was staying in Dresden in October 1830, the Director of Antiquities there seized the opportunity and asked the visitor, who was well-versed in Oriental languages, whether he could decipher the inscription on an ancient seal. Elliott declared his willingness to help, and translated the Arabic and Persian text into English and Latin.⁵⁶ This story, recounted by Elliott, is typical. The authors regularly report that their expertise was consulted, that they were shown around by local artists and scholars, and that they were invited to social gatherings, thus demonstrating their professional competence, fame, and access to the social and artistic scene. These accounts conferred additional authority on their writings, raised their own status, and gave the judgements printed in their books added significance. Jameson was conducted through the rooms of the Königsbau and the Pinakothek by their architect, Leo von Klenze; in Dresden, she was recognized by Karl August Böttiger before she had identified him herself; Spencer witnessed King Ludwig I addressing foreign guests at his court in their respective mother tongues; and Smith was able to observe the Saxon king at lunch with his court in Pillnitz.⁵⁷ The other side of the coin was that Frances Trollope felt constrained to explain why she had lacked such contacts and meet-

⁵⁵ [Spencer], *Sketches of Germany*, ii. 320.

⁵⁶ See Elliott, *Letters from the North of Europe*, 451–2.

⁵⁷ See Jameson, *Visits and Sketches*, i. 270–301; *ibid.* ii. 105–6; [Spencer], *Sketches of Germany*, ii. 322; Smith, *Notes made During a Tour*, 248–9.

ings on her first stay in Munich, by contrast with her visit to Vienna. She explains in detail that Munich society had been on summer holiday, comparing that city in summer to London during the hunting season. In neither, she pointed out, would members of the social elite be found at such a time.⁵⁸

Their many conversations and visits fed in to the authors' evaluations and assessments of the cultural scene, and gave them remarkable insights into Munich's and Dresden's artistic milieux. It was not so much the facts that were important; errors and imprecision frequently crept in. But the observations and assessments derived from them conveyed the value of the collections and role of the arts scene from the perspective of a British traveller with a European artistic horizon.

This will be illustrated further by taking the accessibility of museums as an example. Information about when and under what conditions works of art could be visited was important to readers, and Jameson discussed this in detail. She described the regulations of the Dresden gallery as 'rather inhospitable and ill-natured' in this respect. While the gallery was opened twice a week in summer, she went on, it was closed throughout the autumn and winter. In order to gain access during these months, it was necessary to pay a considerable sum of money. This gave visitors access to the gallery whenever they wanted, and for as long as they wanted, once it had been unlocked. And to establish whether this had happened, a messenger had to be dispatched every morning.⁵⁹ Museum opening times could be found in every guidebook; the information alone therefore provided no special insights. But the explanations that the author put forward for the rather unsatisfactory arrangements in Dresden are remarkable. Jameson pointed out that Saxony was in financially straitened circumstances as a result of the Napoleonic wars and its territorial losses, and suggested that there might have been financial reasons why the gallery, which was difficult to heat, was not open regularly in winter. She also suspected a further reason in the fact that the gallery was 'royal' not 'national'. Augustus III had acquired his collection in the eighteenth century for his own private amusement. Opening times were therefore set personally by each monarch

⁵⁸ See Trollope, *Vienna and the Austrians*, ii.; on Munich, i. 208-9.

⁵⁹ Jameson, *Visits and Sketches*, ii. 100-1.

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and, in this case, granting a regular opportunity to view the collections was not a matter for the nation.⁶⁰

The situation in Munich, by contrast, was quite different. Collections there, Jameson reported, were regularly open to the public, and the Glyptothek was even kept open longer for foreign visitors. In addition, public guided tours through the Königsbau of the residence were held regularly. All this showed, Jameson claimed, that the king considered the artistic ventures which he financed privately—she expressly mentioned the cuts in the budget for royal building imposed by parliament in 1831—as both royal and national undertakings.⁶¹ In the Pinakothek, which was already under construction, Jameson saw a ‘national gallery’ like the one planned for London. She identified the main objective behind the construction of this building as follows:

Such, then, is the general plan of the Pinakothek, the national gallery of Bavaria. I make no comment, except that I felt and recognised in every part the presence of a directing mind, and the absence of all narrow views, all truckling to the interests, or tastes, or prejudices, or convenience, of any particular class of persons. It is very possible that when finished it will be found by scientific critics not absolutely perfect, which, as we know, all human works are at least intended and expected to be; but it is equally clear that an honest anxiety for the glory of art, and the benefit of the public—not the caprices of the king, nor the individual vanity of the architect—has been the moving principle throughout.⁶²

Jameson’s classification was based on the availability of regular public and general access which did not, ultimately, depend on the king’s permission; she was obviously referring back to similar discussions which were being held at the time in Britain. The question of ownership probably played a less important part in her assessment because in both Munich and Dresden most of the collections belonged to the king personally, or to the royal house. Beyond this,

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* ii. 101.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* i. 241.

⁶² *Ibid.* ii. 47.

the location of the display area probably also played a subordinate role, for the author recognized both 'royal' and 'national' aspirations in the Königsbau. To be considered 'national', we can conclude from Jameson's comments, museums generally had to be exempted from untransparent interference by the monarch and reliably available to visitors at regular hours.

It is striking how differently the role of the monarch in the field of fine arts was perceived in the 1820s and 1830s. In Munich the king dominated all artistic activity; he features in all travel reports as the central figure on the art scene and as the initiator of the museums. Spencer, for example, concluded that in no other German state – not even in Austria – was more done for the arts than in Bavaria. As a museum building he went on, the Glyptothek cast 'the highest honour on the taste and munificence of his present majesty'; although the monarch of only a small country, Ludwig I had in this museum building erected 'one of the proudest monuments to the fine arts in Germany; a monument that will transmit his name to posterity, as one of the most accomplished princes of his time'.⁶³ In this passage, Spencer alludes to one of the royal motives for promoting art, namely, to enter the ranks of the great patrons of art since Antiquity as a monarchical instigator and collector.⁶⁴ In Dresden, by contrast, the monarch played at most a marginal role, if we believe the travellers' reports. As the main viewing interest here was the art objects collected by Augustus III in the eighteenth century, and a contemporary artistic scene played only a small part at this time, the question of who promoted artistic life was not pertinent here.

Dresden, unequivocally seen as the capital city of the sovereign Kingdom of Saxony, thus appears rather static; its significance was drawn from past artistic achievements. In the 1820s and 1830s the gallery was still integrated into the royal residence and entrance requirements were anything but professional. Things only changed in this respect with the building of the Semper gallery in the 1840s and 1850s. There was little talk about the cultural scene; at least, travelling

⁶³ [Spencer], *Sketches of Germany*, ii. 320–1.

⁶⁴ See Hannelore Putz, *König Ludwig I. von Bayern als Bauherr und Kunstsammler: Monarchisches Mäzenatentum zwischen kunstpolitischem Impuls und ästhetischem Vergnügen im Spannungsfeld des Frühkonstitutionalismus* (Munich, forthcoming 2013).

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art lovers did not report visiting building sites and artists' studios. Consequently, neither artists nor patrons of the arts had a high profile in Dresden. The city owed its position on the European art map more to its collections than to its rather marginal contemporary art scene. The situation in Munich was quite different. While the Bavarian capital also scored points for its collections of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century art, its recent acquisitions of nineteenth-century works and especially the city's artistic and building activities offered considerably more opportunities for experiencing art. Munich presented itself as possessing a lively and vibrant arts scene. Well-known sculptors, painters, and architects had a major influence on social life, and were there to meet and talk to travelling art lovers. The dominant figure in the world of art, however, was the king, who financed art from his private means. Only in few cases, and mostly after heated exchanges in parliament, was he able to draw on public money for this purpose. Unlike in Saxony, a conscious monarchical will to build on the existing situation and promote the country as a location of art can be discerned in Bavaria. Travelling British art lovers therefore experienced Dresden and Munich in very different ways, and conveyed their impressions home in conversations, newspaper articles, and travel reports.

Artistic Encounters between the Mittelstaaten and Britain

The specific character that Bavaria and Saxony developed in the 1820s and 1830s and which travellers reported and reflected on in many ways very soon impacted on the actual points of contact between English, Saxon, and Bavarian artists in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the case of Bavaria, an increasingly dense network of relationships emerged in the 1830s. At the end of the eighteenth century and in the first half of the nineteenth, Britain undoubtedly lost some of the lead it had enjoyed in the development of art and museums to France and Germany. It was only with the Great Exhibition of 1851 and its exhibition building which attracted international attention that this gradually began to change again. If Continental European artists and princes had, in the eighteenth century, looked rather one-sidedly at developments in Britain in addition to Italy and France, from the 1830s the arts scene was observed more

closely in the opposite direction as well.⁶⁵ This increased interest is also revealed in the fact that the British press reported ever more frequently on the artistic situation in Germany.⁶⁶

The decision of the members of the British Select Committee on Arts and their Connexion with Manufactures to consult Prussian and Bavarian experts when the exhibition concept of the National Gallery was being discussed may serve as an example. In 1835 the Select Committee drew on the expertise of the director of the Berlin gallery, Gustav Friedrich von Waagen. In the summer of 1836 Leo von Klenze was invited to London to report to the House of Commons on the Bavarian arts scene. The Munich head of the Oberste Baubehörde and Hofbauintendant reported on the teaching of art, royal and state support for art and crafts, and especially the state-of-the-art exhibition system used by the new museums in Munich. The report describes Bavaria as 'the classic country of the Arts'.⁶⁷

A special interest was taken in whether the Bavarian museums and collections were open to the public without charge or restrictions. Klenze confirmed this. In general, the Select Committee devoted a great deal of attention to accessibility. Specialists were consulted

⁶⁵ See Adrian von Buttlar, *Leo von Klenze: Leben – Werk – Vision* (Munich, 1999), 360. Ernst Schütz, *Die Gesandtschaft Großbritanniens am Immerwährenden Reichstag zu Regensburg und am kur(pfalz-)bayerischen Hof zu München 1683–1806* (Munich, 2007), 277–9, paints a colourful picture of Munich Anglophiles in the eighteenth century, distinguishing the various areas of social life.

⁶⁶ Emma Winter has demonstrated this with regard to fresco painting in Munich in the 1830s; see Emma L. Winter, 'German Fresco Painting and the New Houses of Parliament at Westminster, 1834–1851', *Historical Journal*, 47/2 (2004), 291–329, at 304–5.

⁶⁷ In the 1850s Leo von Klenze's opinion was sought again when a cultural and educational centre and national museum was being planned for South Kensington. On Klenze's appearances before Parliament see Reinhold Baumstark, 'Klenzes Museen', in Franziska Dunkel, Hans-Michael Körner, and Hannelore Putz (eds.), *König Ludwig I. von Bayern und Leo von Klenze: Symposium aus Anlaß des 75. Geburtstags von Hubert Glaser* (Munich, 2006), 1–20; Adrian von Buttlar, 'Klenze in England', in Franz Bosbach and Frank Büttner (eds.), *Künstlerische Beziehungen zwischen England und Deutschland in der viktorianischen Epoche* (Munich, 1998), 39–51 documents his hearing in the House of Commons; on this see also Anthony Burton, 'Art and Science Applied to Industry: Prince Albert's Plans for South Kensington', in Bosbach and Büttner (eds.), *Künstlerische Beziehungen*, 169–86, at 170–1.

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about conditions on the Continent. In relation to Bavaria, it was established that all classes of people had access to the museums.⁶⁸

If we are looking for further areas of contact between Bavarian and British artists, we find that the two leading Bavarian architects of the first half of the nineteenth century, Leo von Klenze and Friedrich von Gärtner, were elected Corresponding Members of the Royal Institute of British Architects, founded in 1834. Gärtner had studied in Britain as a young architect, and had established a network of connections.⁶⁹ Following European-wide recognition of Klenze, the same Institute in 1852 conferred on him its Gold Medal, which it had been awarding since 1848. The Munich architect was the fifth person, after Charles Robert Cockerell, Luigi Canina, Charles Barry, and Thomas L. Donaldsson, to receive this prize; the award was justified by reference to Klenze's role in the development of architecture in Bavaria and the significance of his writings on the theory of art.⁷⁰ In the field of painting Peter von Cornelius and Julius Schnorr von Carolsfeld, who later went to Dresden, were a great attraction. A visit to the Cornelius school's Munich frescoes had been more or less obligatory for all travelling British art lovers since the 1820s, and in 1841 Cornelius himself accepted Lord Monson's invitation to visit London.⁷¹ Later,

⁶⁸ (William Ewart): 'Are you aware that in Bavaria the peasants come from the mountains, almost from the plough, and wander through the gallery with the most perfect freedom? – (George Rennie): I have seen it in Italy; and at Paris you will see the peasantry leave their baskets of vegetables in the market, and come to the Louvre to see the pictures' (Report from the Select Committee on Arts and their Connexion with Manufactures, 21 June 1836, 62, no. 716).

⁶⁹ Royal Institute of British Architects (henceforth RIBA) Archives, General Meetings Minutes, vol. i. 1835, elected in May (see Buttlar, *Leo von Klenze*, 484). This also contains a letter from Klenze dating from the same year, in which he expresses gratitude for being elected and reports on the finding of the Temple of Nike and attempts to protect monuments in Athens (RIBA Archives, Letters to Council, I/1); on Friedrich von Gärtner see Winfried Nerdinger (ed.), *Friedrich von Gärtner: Ein Architektenleben (1791–1847)* (Munich, 1992).

⁷⁰ See Buttlar, 'Klenze in England', 45–6.

⁷¹ See Wolfgang Lottes, 'Nazarener und Präraffaeliten: Zwei Künstlerbünde in den deutsch-englischen Kunstbeziehungen des 19. Jahrhunderts', in Adolf M. Birke and Kurt Kluxen (eds.), *Viktorianisches England in deutscher Perspektive* (Munich, 1983), 109–31. The standard work on Peter von Cornelius is

this high esteem was extended to Munich history painting in general. Munich's frescos, supported in particular by Ludwig I out of his own money, were studied as a model in the discussion about frescos for the Houses of Parliament.⁷²

If we ask about the chances for encounters during education and training, it is well known that since the second half of the eighteenth century a period of study in Britain had been regarded as an important stimulus to the artistic development of landscape architects, painters, sculptors, and architects;⁷³ conversely, about seventy young Englishmen studied at the Munich Akademie der Bildenden Künste in the nineteenth century, while more established artists also travelled to the city for periods of advanced study.⁷⁴

Bavarian and British artists also had mutually fruitful discussions on the theory of art. In London, Leo von Klenze intervened in the

Frank Büttner, *Peter Cornelius: Fresken und Freskenprojekte*, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1980–99). Büttner also deals extensively with Cornelius's views on the educational and political function of fresco painting. On Cornelius's visit to London see Winter, 'German Fresco Painting and the New Houses of Parliament at Westminster, 1834–1851', 313.

⁷² Ibid. 291–329. Taking the example of fresco painting, Winter demonstrates the importance of travel accounts and newspaper articles as well as personal reports in making conditions in Munich known to the British public. She also describes the positive reception of Bavarian fresco painting, followed by its rejection as a style of art stigmatized as German and Roman.

⁷³ Friedrich Wilhelm von Erdmannsdorff, Carl Gotthard Langhans, and Johann Christian Neumark, for example, travelled to Britain during the last twenty-five years of the eighteenth century. The gardens laid out later in Wörlitz and at the country seat of Dyhernfurth near Breslau show the influence of this experience in Britain. Karl Friedrich Schinkel visited England in 1826, but was unable to arrange meetings in London with John Nash, John Soane, or Robert Smirke; on the travels of architects see Reinhard Wegner, 'Der Architekt auf Reisen: Von der Grand Tour zur technologischen Reise', in Michael Maurer (ed.), *Neue Impulse der Reiseforschung* (Berlin, 1999), 227–35. For the English travels of the landscape architects Friedrich Ludwig von Sckell and Carl August Sckell and the English reception of Friedrich Ludwig von Sckell's work on gardens, see Jan Woudstra, 'The Sckell Family in England (1770–1830)', in Iris Lauterbach (ed.), *Friedrich Ludwig von Sckell (1750–1823): Gartenkünstler und Stadtplaner* (Worms, 2002), 211–20.

⁷⁴ See *Matrikelbücher der Akademie der Bildenden Künste in München 1809–1920*, digital edition <<http://adbk.de>>, accessed 10 Aug. 2012.

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fierce controversy about the polychrome architectural style of ancient Greece, publishing his own pamphlet and thus contributing to the discussion about whether objects in Antiquity had been coloured. The work of the architects James Stuart and Nicholas Revett had a lasting impact on architectural designs, themselves influenced by examples from Antiquity, in Munich and Dresden.⁷⁵ In his works on the theory of art, Charles Robert Cockerell wrote about the restoration of the pediment sculptures from the temple of Aphaea on Aegina and the way in which they were displayed in the Munich Glyptothek.⁷⁶ August von Voit adopted basic elements of construction from Crystal Palace and reshaped Paxton's idea, thus making his own contribution to the development of iron and glass architecture.⁷⁷

Scholarly exchange and personal encounters were not limited to artists. In the fine art trade, Bavarian and British buyers faced each other as competitors in Italy (especially in Rome) and Greece, particularly during the first half of the nineteenth century. They observed each other; sometimes they bought objects from each other. Very late, in 1863, Ludwig I acquired Assyrian bas-reliefs for the Glyptothek from Austen Henry Layard, who had discovered them during his excavations in Nimrud.⁷⁸ In 1852 Owen Jones and Digby Wyatt trav-

⁷⁵ See the late German edition of James Stuart and Nicholas Revett, *Die Alterthümer von Athen: Aus dem Englischen übersetzt nach der Londoner Ausgabe von 1762 und 1787 und bereichert mit eigenen und allen Zusätzen der neuen Ausgabe von 1825*, 3 vols. (Darmstadt, 1829–33).

⁷⁶ See Hubert Glaser (ed.), *König Ludwig I. von Bayern und Leo von Klenze: Der Briefwechsel*, pt. 1: *Kronprinzenzeit König Ludwigs I.*, ed. Franziska Dunkel, Hannelore Putz, and Friedegund Freitag, 3 vols. (Munich, 2004).

⁷⁷ On the influence of Crystal Palace on the development of Munich's Glaspalast see Winfried Nerdinger (ed.), *Zwischen Glaspalast und Maximilianeum: Architektur in Bayern zur Zeit Maximilians II. (1848–1864)*, exhibition catalogue (Eurasburg, 1997); Jan R. Piggott, *Palace of the People: The Crystal Palace at Sydenham 1854–1936* (Madison, 2004).

⁷⁸ See Glaser (ed.), *König Ludwig I. von Bayern und Leo von Klenze: Der Briefwechsel*, pt. 3: *Nach dem Thronverzicht König Ludwigs I.*, ed. Hannelore Putz, Friedegund Freitag, and Franziska Dunkel, 3 vols. (Munich, 2011), at iii. doc. 1583, 15 May 1863. The correspondence between King Ludwig I of Bavaria and his art representative in Rome, Johann Martin von Wagner, is at present being edited by the Historical Seminar of the University of Munich. The letters dating from the first decades of the nineteenth century constantly refer to British competition on the art market in Rome and Greece.

elled to Munich to take casts of a number of the Glyptothek's antiquities for display in the cast museum at Sydenham's newly built Crystal Palace.⁷⁹

Ludwig I of Bavaria and Maximilian II also spent time in Britain when they were crown princes in order to gain insights into the country's arts and cultural scene. Crown Prince Ludwig was deeply impressed by the British Museum's large holdings of extraordinary works of art from Antiquity, but criticized the chiselling off of the marble bas-reliefs from the Parthenon in Athens as 'barbarism'. From this concern grew attempts to protect ancient monuments on the Acropolis and elsewhere in Greece, which Ludwig pushed forward energetically in the 1830s.⁸⁰ Ludwig also closely studied the genesis of the British Museum's collections, which were extraordinary and unthinkable for German conditions at the time.⁸¹ Sir Robert Peel, on the other hand, visited Munich in the 1830s on a fact-finding mission about the city's museums. In 1838 Prince Albert was taken on a tour through the Munich residence, and the influence of this on Buckingham Palace's State Rooms has been documented.⁸²

How little Saxony was perceived as a reference point for the contemporary art scene and developments in museology in the 1830s, by contrast, is reflected in the fact that there were many fewer contacts between British and Saxon artists and that they took place later in time. After a start had been made in overcoming the financial consequences and painful territorial losses of the Napoleonic wars, however, a growing monarchical will for cultural representation manifested itself in Saxony as well. The monument for Frederick Augustus I can be mentioned as an example. The school of sculpture which

⁷⁹ Ibid. ii. doc. 1264, 23 Nov. 1852.

⁸⁰ See Reinhold Baumstark (ed.), *Das neue Hellas: Griechen und Bayern zur Zeit Ludwigs I.* (Munich, 1999).

⁸¹ On the visit to London and the British Museum see MvWM, Wagner Archive, Ludwig to Wagner, 17 June 1814: 'The British Museum contains a larger number and more outstanding sculptures than I expected, some of them are very beautiful statues, including a Venus found at Ostia and a caryatid. I have not yet been able to see it all, but as in Paris, noticed a discobolus. The collections of . . . Sloan and Townsly and the Egyptian works collected by the French and taken from them account for by far the majority of the sculptures. There are also exquisite collections of private paintings.'

⁸² See Jonathan Marsden, *Victoria and Albert: Art and Love* (London, 2010), 21.

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was established in Dresden under the leadership of Ernst Rietschel, probably the most talented of Christian Daniel Rauch's students, attracted attention from all over Europe.⁸³ From 1843, the Saxon state started to buy more contemporary paintings. Art acquisition received an additional boost when a budget was granted for the purpose after 1858. In Saxony the state was the main patron of the arts, not primarily the monarch as in Bavaria.⁸⁴ Attention paid to the artistic scene increased markedly from the 1840s, reflecting its growing economic prosperity and political significance in the context of the German Confederation.⁸⁵ Artistic relations between Saxony and Britain intensified from the 1840s. During his years of exile, Gottfried Semper taught at the London School of Design, which was being reformed at that time by Henry Cole. As a teacher, Semper argued that the design of everyday objects should be guided by artistic principles; in this way, he suggested, industrially produced products could contribute to the moral elevation of society. In the context of his work as a teacher at the School of Design, Semper exchanged views with Owen Jones, Augustus Welby Northmore Pugin, and others, and his debates with John Ruskin and the Pre-Raphaelites prepared the way for the later Arts and Crafts movement.⁸⁶ Largely on the basis of his experiences in Britain, Semper attempted, in theoretical reflections, to reconcile art with the new and increasing demands of the economy and industry, and to develop an architectural language of forms corresponding to changing cultural values.⁸⁷ The Old Masters' Gallery

⁸³ See Gerd Spitzer, 'Staatspolitik und bildende Kunst: Das Denkmal für König Friedrich August I. und die Situation der Bildhauerei in Dresden um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts', in Winfried Müller and Martina Schattkowsky (eds.), *Zwischen Tradition und Modernität: König Johann von Sachsen 1801–1873* (Leipzig, 2004), 265–87.

⁸⁴ Green, *Fatherlands*, 119–22.

⁸⁵ See Jonas Flöter, *Beust und die Reform des Deutschen Bundes 1850–1866: Sächsisch-mittelstaatliche Koalitionspolitik im Kontext der deutschen Frage* (Cologne, 2001).

⁸⁶ See Rainald Franz and Andreas Nierhaus (eds.), *Gottfried Semper und Wien: Die Wirkung des Architekten auf 'Wissenschaft, Industrie und Kunst'* (Vienna, 2007).

⁸⁷ See John V. N. Soane, 'Gottfried Semper und seine englischen Erfahrungen 1850–1855', in Henrik Karge (ed.), *Gottfried Semper – Dresden und Europa: Die moderne Renaissance der Künste* (Berlin, 2007), 289–300.

in Dresden and the Opera House that he designed aroused great interest in Britain.⁸⁸

The examples mentioned above show that relations between the states of Saxony and Bavaria and Britain were very different in both chronology and substance. Further research is required before the network of mutual exchanges can be drawn even more tightly, and suggestions can only be made here. It has already become apparent, however, that we are not dealing with 'single encounters between individuals and groups',⁸⁹ but that there was a growing mutual interest on the part of all art lovers. The aim of this ultimately quantitative assessment must be to allow us to make qualitative statements about the 'process' of artistic exchange so that we can recognize to what extent artists and art historians mutually accepted each other's various theories, views, techniques, and artistic knowledge, or under what circumstances they deliberately rejected them.⁹⁰ The bearers of these contacts in the first half of the nineteenth century were prominent men on both sides. Leo von Klenze, Friedrich von Gärtner, Peter von Cornelius, and Gottfried Semper on the German side faced Charles Robert Cockerell, Henry Cole, and Joseph Paxton, equally influential representatives of the British arts and cultural scene. If we take the debate about the polychrome architectural style of ancient Greece as an example of the contemporary discourse on the theory of art, Leo von Klenze and especially Gottfried Semper were on a par with their British colleagues. As so often in art, the debate was a transnational one.⁹¹

⁸⁸ On Semper see Winfried Nerdinger and Werner Oechslin (eds.), *Gottfried Semper 1803–1879: Architektur und Wissenschaft* (Munich, 2003); Harry Francis Mallgrave, *Gottfried Semper: Ein Architekt des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Zurich, 2001).

⁸⁹ Rudolf Muhs, Johannes Paulmann, and Willibald Steinmetz, 'Brücken über den Kanal? Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19. Jahrhundert', in eid. (eds.), *Aneignung und Abwehr*, 7–20, at 11.

⁹⁰ Ibid. 18–19. On the Munich frescos as a model for the decoration of the Houses of Parliament see Winter, 'German Fresco Painting and the New Houses of Parliament at Westminster, 1834–1851', 291–329.

⁹¹ See Andreas Prater, 'Streit um Farbe: Die Wiederentdeckung der Polychromie in der griechischen Architektur und Plastik im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert', in Vinzenz Brinkmann and Raimund Wünsche (eds.), *Bunte Götter: Die Farbigkeit antiker Skulptur* (Munich, 2003), 256–67.

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The Artistic Profile of Bavaria and Saxony from a British Perspective

The central German states of the German Confederation played at most a marginal part in political and military decision-making at European level.⁹² Even within the German Confederation they had little political say and were unable to resist Austria's and Prussia's dominance. Nonetheless, they were keen to be perceived as independent and sovereign states within the existing political order. At the Great Exhibition of 1851, for example, which featured the German Customs Union as a unit, Prussia was eager to seize the initiative and reinforce its claim to leadership internally and externally. The *Mittelstaaten* Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, and Hanover, by contrast, placed great value on being able to act independently as Britain's economic partners. In the publication which the German Customs Union commissioned for the Great Exhibition, its products were listed in groups based on their state of origin.⁹³ But these at-

⁹² If, for example, we take the significance that Britain accorded its diplomatic missions abroad as reflecting the political value which Britain recognized each country as possessing, then the *Mittelstaaten* of the German Confederation come rather low in the ranking. The mission in Dresden was regularly second to bottom in the list of all Britain's foreign missions. See Sabine Freitag, '“The narrow limits of this kingdom”: Sachsen im Spiegel britischer Gesandtschaftsberichte aus dem Vormärz', *Dresdner Hefte*, 70 (2002), 27–37, at 27. Measured in terms of the salary paid to Britain's representatives abroad, Bavaria was twelfth (1815) and later fourteenth (1825) out of twenty foreign missions; Württemberg was fifteenth, then sixteenth. In the mid nineteenth century all of Britain's representatives in the *Mittelstaaten* of the German Confederation belonged to the third of four classes; see Raymond A. Jones, *The British Diplomatic Service 1815–1914* (Gerrards Cross, 1983), 56, 60, 65, 69.

⁹³ See Abigail Green, 'The Representation of the German States at the Great Exhibition', in Franz Bosbach, John R. Davis, and Susan Bennett (eds.), *Die Weltausstellung von 1851 und ihre Folgen* (Munich, 2002), 267–77; Abigail Green, 'Representing Germany? The Zollverein at the World Exhibitions, 1851–1862', *Journal of Modern History*, 75 (2003), 836–63; after the Exhibition a report was published in Berlin, commissioned by the governments of the German Customs Union, *Amtlicher Bericht über die Industrie-Ausstellung aller Völker zu London im Jahre 1851 von der Berichterstattungs-Kommission der Deutschen Zollvereins-Regierungen*, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1852–3). The extent to which the central German states stressed their economic independence until the 1860s

tempts to define their own priorities could not obscure the fact that in any case of doubt, they were subordinate to Prussia and Austria within the Confederation.

In the cultural area, however, things were different. In the field of art, for instance, the German Confederation was characterized by multi-centrality.⁹⁴ The capitals of Saxony and Bavaria, Dresden and Munich, were, to different degrees, known to all artists and art lovers in the whole of Europe. These two cities, along with Vienna, were firmly anchored on the European art map in the mid nineteenth century; only after the middle of the century did Berlin emerge as a competitor worth mentioning, although one which later became significant. All this is generally known. The actual significance of Munich and Dresden as locations of art in the European cultural space, however, has hardly been researched so far. It is mostly assumed simply as a given.

A quantitative and especially a qualitative evaluation of artistic encounters between Bavarian, Saxon, and British artists can now provide both an approach to this question and a powerful criterion on which to base an assessment. The status of the artists, museum experts, and art historians who lived and worked in Munich and Dresden, or were sent there, can be measured among other things by the extent to which they cultivated contacts going beyond Bavaria and Saxony, were included in scholarly discourse, and invited to take part in cooperative work. The totality of these activities in the field of art constitutes the rank accorded to the Bavarian and Saxon arts scene and its practitioners.⁹⁵ An investigation of Bavarian and Saxon cul-

is shown by Markus Mösslang, "Side by Side with Sound Commercial Principles": Deutscher Zollverein und deutsche Nation in der Wahrnehmung britischer Diplomaten', in Hans-Werner Hahn and Marko Kreuzmann (eds.), *Der deutsche Zollverein: Ökonomie und Nation im 19. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2012), 229–54, at 237.

⁹⁴ See Joachim Studberg, *Globetrotter aus dem Wuppertal: Eine Untersuchung großbürgerlicher Mentalität anhand autobiographischer Reiseaufzeichnungen aus der Zeit des Deutschen Kaiserreichs* (Pfaffenweiler, 1991), 13, who claims that the German Kaiserreich had 'no absolute and normative centre' in the field of culture (philosophy, art, science).

⁹⁵ Franco-German cultural contacts have been studied for much longer than Anglo-German ones; on this see Johannes Paulmann, 'Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien: Einführung in ein Forschungs-

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tural contacts with people active in the British artistic sphere can therefore help profile the *Mittelstaaten* in a European context. In this way we will be able to establish for the whole of the nineteenth century whether the cultural policy pursued by the *Mittelstaaten* in the fine arts achieved its aim, that is, to increase European awareness of them, or whether the fine arts became more significant in Bavaria and Saxony themselves, but had little impact on countries outside, in this case, Britain. Beyond this, developments and their different courses, as well as peculiarities will emerge in a comparison.

The British perspective on the Bavarian and Saxon artistic sphere is mostly gleaned from travel literature, written reports, and newspaper articles on the subject. These media are not investigated for their literary quality, but seen as the result of many subjective artistic experiences. They report on the Bavarian and Saxon arts scene, but they also place it within a larger European context. As the travel reports dating from the 1830s discussed here show, Britons both in informal cultural contact zones and in government circles (as the Parliamentary reports suggest) perceived the *Mittelstaaten* of the German Confederation as independent entities. Their descriptions, judgements, and assessments reveal that they identified the cultural life of Munich and Dresden as Bavarian and Saxon respectively. If this investigation is pursued throughout the whole of the nineteenth century, we will be in a position to gain a specific view, from outside, of Saxony's and Bavaria's profiles and how they changed within the political structure of the German Confederation and later the Reich. In this context, Berlin's rise, at breakneck speed, to become an influential site of arts and museums, will be highly significant; this development was encouraged in equal measure by the monarch, state, and notables. Berlin thus represented hitherto unprecedented competition for Munich and Dresden as centres of art. As the individual states were, in essence, responsible for artistic and cultural matters after 1871, it is of great significance for

konzept', in Muhs, Paulmann, and Steinmetz (eds.), *Aneignung und Abwehr*, 21–43. On Franco-Saxon cultural transfer in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries see Michael Espagne, *Von der Elbe bis an die Seine: Kulturtransfer zwischen Sachsen und Frankreich im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert* (2nd edn. Leipzig, 1999). For its relation to the industrialization debate see Steffen Sammler, *Wissenstransfer und gesellschaftliche Modernisierung: Frankreich und England in der Industrialisierungsdebatte Sachsens im 19. Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 2010).

their self-image whether and when the centres of gravity on the art map of the country shifted from the British perspective.

When looking at the British image of Germany, it is necessary to differentiate. Until the establishment of the German Reich in 1871, Britain saw the states of the German Confederation as individual entities in the field of culture.⁹⁶ Why should this suddenly have changed after 1871, with the political unification of Germany? In her study, Abigail Green has shown that the *Mittelstaaten* were very well able to maintain their own identities as states after 1871, even as their integration into the Reich proceeded.⁹⁷ While the process of military, economic, and political unification undeniably proceeded and, especially after 1871, increasingly absorbed the specific nature of the member states, in the cultural area there was always room for manoeuvre. We could ask whether, after 1871, these states were able to maintain and perhaps deliberately enhance their own profiles as seen from outside. And we could ask whether Britons could maintain a positive interest in the artistic and cultural life of individual states at the same time as they were developing a feeling of increasing unease towards the Reich as a whole.

⁹⁶ Markus Mösslang, 'Deutscher Zollverein und deutsche Nation', 253, points out that this also applied to economic perceptions of the Customs Union.

⁹⁷ Green, *Fatherlands*, 338–41.

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**'DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION': A RESEARCH PROJECT
ON THE SOCIETAL HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE IN BRITAIN (1970–90)**

JÖRG ARNOLD

Introduction

'If you seek for a monument, gaze around', ran the caption of a cartoon that was published in *The Independent* on 18 September 1987 (see illustration 1). The aphorism was borrowed (and somewhat clumsily translated into English) from the famous epitaph for Christopher Wren (1632–1723) in St Paul's Cathedral in London. It was at odds with the cartoon itself, which showed a well-dressed woman amidst a landscape of desolate wasteland. To contemporary observers, the person was easily recognizable as Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, whose immaculate appearance—the careful hairstyle, suit with handkerchief, high-heeled shoes, and handbag—contrasted sharply with the surrounding environment of overgrown weeds, heaps of rubble, and derelict industrial buildings. Yet the cartoonist, Nicholas Garland, did not merely convey the impression that someone had strayed into the area by mistake. Rather, the caption established a causal link between the Prime Minister and her surroundings. The cartoon compressed a photograph that had been taken during an official visit to Teesside the day before.¹ Not a brave new world, but dereliction and rubble was the lasting legacy of the 'conservative rev-

The following reflections have benefited enormously from a post-doctoral scholarship which I held at the German Historical Institute London in 2011–12. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Lehrstuhl für Neuere und Neueste Geschichte at the University of Freiburg, the GHIL, and the Workshop der Süddeutschen Lehrstühle. I should like to thank the GHIL for financial support; all members of staff for the cordial welcome and pleasant atmosphere in which I was privileged to work for six months; and all participants in the discussions for their valuable suggestions and criticism.

¹ The photograph has become famous as the 'wilderness picture'. For a reproduction see Trevor May, *An Economic and Social History of Britain 1760–1990* (2nd edn.; Harlow, 1996), 457.



FR 18 Sep 1987

Illustration 1. From *The Independent*, 18 Sept. 1987. Held in the British Cartoon Archive, NG3450, online at <www.cartoons.ac.uk>, accessed 14 Aug. 2012. The Latin inscription of the original cartoon reproduced here was changed into English for the published version by the newspaper's editor without the prior knowledge of the cartoonist. Reproduced by kind permission of Nicholas Garland.

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olution' that Thatcher had set into motion since she had come to office in May 1979, or so the cartoon seemed to suggest.²

Any such claim, of course, would have been vigorously contested by her acolytes. To them, the 'walk in the wilderness' epitomized the Prime Minister's courage and determination. Like the prophets of old, she was leading her people out of the malaise of the recent past into the promised land of the future. Meanwhile, Thatcher herself responded in typically self-confident and belligerent fashion to the concerned questions of her staff as to why on earth she had allowed herself to be photographed among industrial dereliction such as this. Boosted by the Conservative Party's third General Election victory a few months earlier, she replied: 'Well, quite simple, because within four years I am going to be photographed on that site full of buildings and that will just show you what we can do in Teesside and what enterprise can do!'³

Whatever the verdict on Mrs Thatcher and her policies, there was no doubt that Teesside was caught up in a process of convulsive structural change, during which about 60,000 jobs in the steel and chemical industries had been lost since the mid 1970s. The conurbation around the town of Middlesbrough was considered an especially drastic example of a much broader socio-economic transformation to which many contemporaries attached the label of 'de-industrialization'. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* the neologism was first used in 1882 when a newspaper, apparently in a spirit of pastoralism, recommended de-industrializing the population.⁴ A century later the term had not only become much more widespread, but its connotations had also changed. While 'de-industrialization' was initially used as a technical term in the context of a specific diagnosis of Britain's economic ills in the work of the economists Robert

² Dominik Geppert, *Thatchers konservative Revolution: Der Richtungswandel der britischen Tories 1975–1979* (Munich, 2002), also for the ideological foundations of Thatcherism. See also E. H. H. Green, *Thatcher* (London, 2006).

³ The Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 'Speech at Teesside Business in the Community reception', 6 June 1988, online at <www.margaretthatcher.org>, accessed 12 Aug. 2012.

⁴ *Oxford English Dictionary* (2nd edn. Oxford, 1989; online version June 2012), accessed 15 Aug. 2012.

Bacon and Walter Eltis,⁵ the term soon became a more general catchphrase that designated a worrying process of regressive development: the transformation of a great industrial power into a nation without a manufacturing base. At the end of this process was not a pastoral idyll, but a powerless, impoverished, and backward country in which, in the words of a much quoted historian, 'the illusions and dreams of 1945 would fade one by one—the Imperial and Commonwealth role, British industrial genius, and at the last, New Jerusalem itself, a dream turned to a dank reality of a segregated, subliterate, unskilled, unhealthy and institutionalised proletariat hanging on the nipple of state maternalism'.⁶

Contemporary economists disagreed about the causes of this 'illness' and about possible cures.⁷ At the same time, there was broad agreement that the label 'de-industrialization' subsumed three trends. First, there was a relative and an absolute decline in the number of workers employed in the industrial sector: absolute by comparison with the past and relative in relation to employment in the service sector. Secondly, there was the problem that the labour which had been shed could not be fully reintegrated into the economy, either in the industrial or service sector. Finally, British manufactures were not internationally competitive, resulting in a diminishing share of world trade and a serious deficit in the balance of payments.⁸

If these indicators were taken into consideration, contemporary economists and politicians agreed, then the British economy could be said to be caught up in a downward spiral. Indeed, the figures spoke for themselves. In the fifteen years between 1973 and 1988, the percentage of employees in the industrial sector as measured against overall employment declined from 42 per cent to less than 30 per cent. In the same period, the absolute number of industrial workers

⁵ Robert Bacon and Walter Eltis, *Britain's Economic Problems: Too Few Producers* (London, 1976). See also 'Budget Message to Mr Healey: Get More People into Factories', *Sunday Times*, 10 Nov. 1974; 'Restraint is the Right Course', *The Times*, 15 Apr. 1975.

⁶ Correlli Barnett, *The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation* (London, 1986), 304.

⁷ Alec Cairncross, 'What is De-Industrialisation?', in Frank Blackaby (ed.), *De-Industrialisation*, National Institute of Economic and Social Research Economic Policy Papers, 2 (London, 1978), 5–17, at 5.

⁸ *Ibid.* 5–8.

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decreased by more than one-third.⁹ In the manufacturing sector in a narrow sense, 5 million jobs were lost within the space of thirty years.¹⁰ And, perhaps most illuminating of all, by 1995 the combined turnover of the one-time core industries of steel, coal, and shipbuilding was less than that of the 10,000 Indian restaurants in the country.¹¹

The broader underlying trends were not confined to the United Kingdom, but were symptoms of a much broader 'structural rupture' (*Strukturbruch*).¹² This arguably occurred earlier in Britain than elsewhere, but had ramifications for all Western societies in the last third of the twentieth century (and not just for Western societies). Between the mid 1970s and the year 2000, the Western world bade farewell to the age of 'high modernity' which had been a common signature for almost a century.¹³ The economic foundation of industrialism lost importance, as did the 'liberal consensus' of the post-war decades, which, with hindsight, appeared as a Golden Age of economic growth, prosperity, and welfarism.

Historiographical Overview

The structural transformation of the 1970s and 1980s was extensively discussed, documented, and interpreted by contemporaries themselves, especially in the United Kingdom where the 'scientization of the social' (*Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen*) goes back well into the nineteenth century.¹⁴ In the motherland of the Industrial Revolution,

⁹ Gerold Ambrosius, 'Ursachen der Deindustrialisierung Westeuropas', in Werner Abelshausen (ed.), *Umweltgeschichte: Umweltverträgliches Wirtschaften in historischer Perspektive* (Göttingen, 1994), 191–221, at 194.

¹⁰ Stephen Bazan and Tony Thirlwall, *UK Industrialization and Deindustrialization* (3rd edn. London, 1997), 19.

¹¹ Paul Addison, *No Turning Back: The Peacetime Revolutions of Post-War Britain* (Oxford, 2010), 325.

¹² Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael, *Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970* (3rd edn. Göttingen, 2012); the quotation is taken from the first edn. (2008), 11.

¹³ Ulrich Herbert, 'Europe in High Modernity: Reflections on a Theory of the Twentieth Century', *Journal of Modern European History*, 5/1 (2007), 5–21.

¹⁴ Lutz Raphael, 'Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 22 (1996), 165–93.

pioneers of social scientific research such as Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree had produced surveys of the social conditions of the working classes which soon enjoyed canonical status. Sociologists, social psychologists, and social geographers built on classics such as these as they began to map the social and cultural consequences of the transformation process in the second half of the twentieth century, one that seemed to affect Britain more severely than other Western nations because of its deep-seated structural economic problems.¹⁵ In addition, intellectuals, cultural critics, and journalists put forward influential interpretations of the transformation.¹⁶ Finally, artists, in particular, novelists, film directors, and musicians engaged extensively with economic change and its socio-cultural consequences.¹⁷ During the 1950s and 1960s, however, many social scientists were still troubled by quite a different problem. They asked whether the spread of affluence would lead to the *embourgeoisement* of industrial workers and the erosion of collective identities and traditional ways of life. In this respect, at least, the crises and class conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s seemed to have set the record straight again.¹⁸

For the historian, such a state of affairs offers benefits as well as pitfalls.¹⁹ On the one hand, historical scholarship can build on the

¹⁵ See e.g. Ken Coates and Richard Silburn, *Poverty: The Forgotten Englishmen* (4th edn. Nottingham, 1983); John Hayes and Peter Nutman, *Understanding the Unemployed: The Psychological Effects of Unemployment* (London, 1981); Sheila Allen, Alan Waton, Kate Purcell, and Stephen Wood (eds.), *The Experience of Unemployment* (London, 1986); Geoffrey Beattie, *Survivors of Steel City: A Portrait of Sheffield* (London, 1986); John Westergaard, Iain Noble, and Alan Walker, *After Redundancy: The Experience of Economic Insecurity* (Cambridge, 1989); Ian Taylor, Karen Evans, and Penny Fraser, *A Tale of Two Cities: A Study in Manchester and Sheffield* (London, 1996).

¹⁶ See e.g. Stuart Hall, 'The Great Moving Right Show', *Marxism Today*, Jan. 1979, 14–20; Eric Hobsbawm, 'The Forward March of Labour Halted?', *Marxism Today*, Sept. 1978, 279–86.

¹⁷ On cinematic representations see Cora Kaplan, 'The Death of the Working-Class Hero', *New Formations*, 52 (2004), 94–110.

¹⁸ See Chas Critcher, 'Sociology, Cultural Studies and the Post-War Working Class', in John Clarke, Chas Critcher, and Richard Johnson, *Working-Class Culture: Studies in History and Theory* (London, 1979), 13–40, at 15.

¹⁹ On the relationship between contemporary history and the social sciences more generally see Rüdiger Graf and Kim Christian Priemel, 'Zeitgeschichte

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extensive empirical data that the social sciences have generated. It can also make use of contemporary explanations of structural change. On the other hand, the danger exists of underestimating the extent to which contemporary knowledge was produced within specific contexts and for specific purposes, and of merely 'retelling' the findings of contemporaries.²⁰

In Germany, two important essays have recently been published which, borrowing a notion from the social historian Hans Günter Hockerts, seek to conceptualize the decades 'after the boom' as a 'pre-history of contemporary problems' (*Vorgeschichte der Probleme der Gegenwart*).²¹ Both stress the nature of the 1970s and 1980s as a caesura and draw attention to the many political, social, and cultural repercussions of economic change. They argue that the structural rupture not only ushered in a new mode of production, but also brought in its wake 'revolutionary social change' (*sozialen Wandel von revolutionärer Qualität*), as Anselm Doering-Manteuffel und Lutz Raphael have put it.²² In addition, since the turn of the millennium a number of empirically dense monographs on the economic and social history of the transformation process have been published;²³ others are in the making.²⁴

in der Welt der Sozialwissenschaften: Legitimität und Originalität einer Disziplin', *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 4 (2011), 479–508.

²⁰ Raphael, 'Verwissenschaftlichung', 189.

²¹ Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael, *Nach dem Boom*; see the multiple review in *sehpunkte*, 9/5 (2009); Konrad Jarausch, 'Verkannter Strukturwandel: Die siebziger Jahre als Vorgeschichte der Probleme der Gegenwart', in id. (ed.), *Das Ende der Zuversicht? Die siebziger Jahre als Geschichte* (Göttingen, 2008), 9–26.

²² Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael, *Nach dem Boom*, 10.

²³ Götz Albert, *Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Krise der deutschen Schiffbauindustrie: 1945–1990* (Frankfurt am Main, 1998); Christoph Nonn, *Die Ruhrbergbaukrise: Entindustrialisierung und Politik 1958–1969* (Göttingen, 2000); Stephan H. Lindner, *Den Faden verloren: Die westdeutsche und die französische Textilindustrie auf dem Rückzug (1930/45–1990)* (Munich, 2001); Stefan Goch, *Eine Region im Kampf mit dem Strukturwandel: Bewältigung von Strukturwandel und Strukturpolitik im Ruhrgebiet* (Essen, 2002).

²⁴ Above all the following collaborative research projects: 'Krise der Arbeitsgesellschaft' at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, online at <http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/krise_der_arbeitsgesellschaft.html>, accessed 14 Aug. 2012; 'Fortschrittskonkurrenz und Krisenkongruenz: Wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Wandel im geteilten Europa des letzten Drittels des

By and large, this body of work follows a sectorial approach, by either looking at specific industries, or investigating particular aspects of structural change, such as the crisis of the welfare state, the problem of mass unemployment, or urban redevelopment projects. Often, developments in the UK serve as point of comparison, but authors do not always pay enough attention to the peculiarities of the British case. There is no need to postulate a British 'special path' to recognize that, in certain important respects,²⁵ the British experience differed from developments on the Continent.

Just as in Germany, in English-speaking countries, too, the 1970s and 1980s have been subjected to a first wave of historical enquiry.²⁶ In Britain, the perception of the Thatcher years as marking a radical rupture contributed to the establishment of the 'field of British contemporary history after 1945' in the first place.²⁷ Here, too, there is a noticeable tendency to lighten up the prevailing 'dark view' of the

20. Jahrhunderts' at the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung in Potsdam, online at <<http://www.zzf-pdm.de/site/534/default.aspx>> , accessed 14 Aug. 2012; and 'Nach dem Boom', a collaboration between the Seminar für Zeitgeschichte Tübingen and the Fachbereich Neuere und Neueste Geschichte at the University of Trier, online at <<http://www.nach-dem-boom.uni-tuebingen.de>>, accessed 14 Aug. 2012.

²⁵ Bernd Weisbrod, 'Der englische "Sonderweg" in der neueren Geschichte', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 16 (1990), 233–52.

²⁶ See the following recent general histories of the period: Mark Garnett, *From Anger to Apathy: The Story of Politics, Society and Popular Culture in Britain since 1975* (London, 2007); Alwyn W. Turner, *Crisis? What Crisis? Britain in the 1970s* (London, 2008); id., *Rejoice, Rejoice! Britain in the 1980s* (London, 2010); Andy Beckett, *When the Lights Went Out: What Really Happened to Britain in the Seventies* (London, 2009); Richard Vinen, *Thatcher's Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the Thatcher Era* (London, 2009); Addison, *No turning back*; Brian Harrison, *Finding a Role? The United Kingdom 1970–1990* (Oxford 2010); Andy McSmith, *No such Thing as Society: A History of Britain in the 1980s* (London, 2011); Dominic Sandbrook, *Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 1974–1979* (London, 2012).

²⁷ See Dominik Geppert, 'Großbritannien seit 1979: Politik und Gesellschaft', *Neue Politische Literatur*, 54/1 (2009), 61–86, at 62. See also the review article by Kerstin Brückweh and Martina Steber, 'Aufregende Zeiten: Ein Forschungsbericht zu Neuansätzen der britischen Zeitgeschichte des Politischen', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 50 (2010), 671–701.

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'crisis decade' of the 1970s.²⁸ 'If Britain was so sickly in the seventies, where did people get the money at the time to buy so many records and bold pairs of trousers?', asks Andy Beckett in his monograph, *When the Lights Went Out*.²⁹

Overall, the English-language historiography is still dominated by an emphasis on politics, despite a recent tendency to open up the field of enquiry towards social historical and cultural historical approaches.³⁰ The literature shows a tendency to refigure the controversies and battles of the Thatcher years rather than to historicize them, a temptation which is undoubtedly reinforced by the fact that many authors lived through the decades that they are analysing historically. The dual effects of this close connection between lived experience and historical subject matter appear to be first, to take knowledge of the societal reverberations of structural change for granted, and secondly, to focus mainly on political causes and consequences.³¹

The research project that will be presented in the following pages builds on the methodological reflections and empirical findings of the German- and English-language research on contemporary history. In contrast to the present-centred and/or sectorial approaches of much current research, however, the project seeks to develop a holistic approach to investigating the broader repercussions of structural economic change. It aims to produce a history of departures from the age of high modernity by analysing structural change through the prism of de-industrialization.

Towards a Societal History of Departures

The use of the contemporary term 'de-industrialization' as an analytical category is not without dangers, but it offers a chance to focus the

²⁸ Hartmut Kaelble, *The 1970s in Europe: A Period of Disillusionment or Promise?* (London, 2010), 7.

²⁹ Beckett, *When the Lights went Out*, 3.

³⁰ See Brückweh and Steber, 'Aufregende Zeiten'.

³¹ See e.g. Vinen, *Thatcher's Britain*, 1: 'I remember where I was when it began . . . I remember with equal clarity where I was when it ended.' See also Dominik Geppert, 'Der Thatcher-Konsens: Der Einsturz der britischen Nachkriegsordnung in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren', *Journal of Modern European History*, 9/2 (2011), 170–93, at 187.

direction of the inquiry and historicize the subject matter. To write the history of structural change as a history of de-industrialization means to concentrate on what is lost, rather than on what replaces it. At the centre stands the moment of departure, not of arrival. This perspective does not entail accepting contemporary predictions about the future which were often shrill and sometimes verging on the apocalyptic. After all, even in the 'post-industrial' world of the twenty-first century, the industrial sector retained an important place.³² But it does mean that the project is primarily interested in the vanishing of the old rather than in the emergence of the new.

To write the history of structural change as a history of de-industrialization, moreover, means to view the secular process of transformation not from the perspective of our present, as a 'pre-history of today's problems' (*Vorgeschichte gegenwärtiger Problemkonstellationen*), but to reconstruct the experiences and expectations of contemporaries themselves, that is, to recapture the transformation in its open-endedness.³³ There are pragmatic reasons for this as well as more general considerations. By putting a deliberate distance between ourselves and the period under investigation it should be possible to treat the 1970s and 1980s – two decades which, after all, are just one generation removed from the present – as a 'foreign country' and thereby throw their distinctness and otherness into sharp relief. Moreover, since the global financial crisis of 2007–9 the ground has been shifting so rapidly that any attempt to write the history of the 1970s and 1980s as a 'pre-history of today's problems' looks like a very hazardous undertaking indeed. In Germany whole industrial sectors which, until a few years ago, were considered a sign of back-

³² See Herbert's critique of the label 'post-industrial', in id., 'Europe in High Modernity', 19; Jarausch, 'Verkannter Strukturwandel', 22 places a similar emphasis.

³³ The phrase goes back to Hans Günter Hockerts, 'Zeitgeschichte in Deutschland: Begriffe, Methoden, Themenfelder', *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 113/1 (1993), 98–127, at 124; id. 'Einführung', in id. (ed.), *Koordinaten deutscher Geschichte in der Epoche des Ost-West-Konflikts* (Munich, 2004), pp. vii–xv, at viii. The phrase is taken as a starting point by Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael, *Nach dem Boom*, 7; Jarausch, 'Verkannter Strukturwandel'; and Winfried Süß and Dietmar Süß, 'Zeitgeschichte der Arbeit: Beobachtungen und Perspektiven', in Knud Andresen, Ursula Bitzegeio, and Jürgen Mittag (eds.), *Nach dem Strukturbruch? Kontinuität und Wandel von Arbeitswelten* (Bonn, 2011), 345–65, at 346.

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ward-minded traditionalism have been rediscovered as being of pre-eminent importance to the economic well-being of the nation as a whole. As the sociologist Stephan Lessenich has pointedly remarked: 'the industrial world, to which pundits had already bid their farewells, apparently has a life after death.'³⁴ Not least, the idea that a post-industrial UK might be considered 'thoroughly modern' and held up as a shining example to the industrial economies of 'old' Continental Europe, very widespread during the early 2000s,³⁵ has recently lost much of its appeal under the combined impact of economic crisis and inner-city riots.

Finally, underlying the approach is the more general concern to give a voice to the 'casualties of history', to the people uprooted by the transformation process, whose perceptions and visions are all too easily dismissed by contemporary historians as being 'trapped in a time wrap' or offering 'little more than a better yesterday'.³⁶ In doing so, the project deliberately adopts a perspective which E. P. Thompson famously expressed as follows in the introduction to his classic, *The Making of the English Working Class*:

I am seeking to rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the 'obsolete' hand-loom weaver, the 'utopian' artisan, and even the deluded follower of Joanna Southcott, from the enormous condescension of posterity. Their crafts and traditions may have been dying. Their hostility to the new industrialism may have been backward-looking. Their communitarian ideals may have been fantasies. Their insurrectionary conspiracies may have been foolhardy. But they lived through these times of acute social disturbance, and we did not.³⁷

³⁴ Stephan Lessenich, review of Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael, *Nach dem Boom*, in *sehpunkte*, 9/5 (2009), at <<http://www.sehpunkte.de/2009/05/15521.html>>, accessed 16 Aug. 2012.

³⁵ Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, *Geschichte Großbritanniens im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2010), 12. See also Dominik Geppert, 'The Crisis of the Welfare State: Thatcherism as a Model for German Christian Democracy?', in Arnd Bauerkämper and Christiane Eisenberg, *Britain as a Model of German Society? German Views* (Augsburg, 2006), 168–83, at 179.

³⁶ Addison, *No Turning Back*, 288, with reference to 'union militants'; Harrison, *Finding a Role?*, 530, with reference to 'Thatcher's widely scattered critics'.

³⁷ E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (1st edn. 1963; London, 1991), 12.

By the end of the 1980s, de-industrialization seemed to have lost much of the disturbing, not to say apocalyptic, potential which had characterized the debate in the UK between the mid 1970s and the early 1980s. This was in part due to a modest process of re-industrialization after the deep recession of the early Thatcher years, but it was mainly because structural change had brought in its wake not a general deterioration in living standards, but a sharpening of social inequality between the haves and the have-nots. While prosperity continued to rise for the majority of the population, a large minority of several million people saw their real incomes substantially reduced.³⁸ Whereas the Conservatives had spoken in their General Election Manifesto of 1983 of an economic transformation ‘from the age of the smokestack to the age of the microchip’, allegedly made all the more convulsive by the obstructionism of the trade unions,³⁹ four years later they claimed to have ushered in moral renewal and to have led the way to a prosperous, service-oriented future: ‘We have encouraged growth in these crucial areas of new enterprise which provide the foundation for the jobs of the future – self-employment, small firms, the creation of new enterprise, the expanding service sector – in particular tourism and leisure – and new technology.’⁴⁰ In the early 1990s Bill Rubinstein published an influential monograph in which he sought to demonstrate that Britain’s economic strength had always been based primarily on trade and services.⁴¹ In a more subtle version of this argument, Stephen Broadberry has attempted to show that the failure of Fordism in Britain opened up new opportunities for British manufacturing by allowing it to return to older traditions of craftsmanship.⁴²

³⁸ Addison, *No Turning Back*, 315–40; Harrison, *Finding a Role?*, 175–87.

³⁹ ‘Conservative Party General Election Manifesto 1983’, in Iain Dale (ed.), *Conservative Party General Election Manifestos, 1900–1997* (London, 2000), 283–310, at 286, 290.

⁴⁰ ‘The Next Moves Forward: Conservative Party General Election Manifesto 1987’, *ibid.* 313–51, at 327.

⁴¹ W. D. Rubinstein, *Capitalism, Culture, and Decline in Britain 1750–1990* (London, 1993).

⁴² Stephen Broadberry, ‘The Performance of Manufacturing’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain*, iii. *Structural Change and Growth* (Cambridge, 2004), 57–83, at 83.

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It did not escape the attention of contemporary observers that the social and cultural repercussions of structural change were stratified regionally and according to sector. Across Europe and North America de-industrialization developed its own geography.⁴³ Affected were above all the 'old' industries which had formed the backbone of nineteenth-century industrialism—coal, iron and steel, textiles, shipbuilding—but also, and especially in Britain, the 'new' industries of the inter-war period—mechanical engineering, car manufacturing, the aviation industry—and, alongside these, those regions that during the period of high modernity had been considered the 'heartlands' of their respective economies. In order to map the dimensions of the economic change of the last third of the twentieth century and to investigate the myriad repercussions on the lives of contemporaries as fully as possible, the project adopts a regional approach. In so doing, it hopes to do justice to the demand that the history of the structural rupture should not be written from a single 'epicentre' but must aim 'to take into consideration connections and reciprocal relations between functionally different fields'.⁴⁴

The project focuses on the North of Britain in the two decades between 1970 and 1990.⁴⁵ 'The North' is taken as both a specific locality and a social idea.⁴⁶ Indeed, it is remarkable how in contemporary debates 'the North' tended to extend ever further southwards until it comprised almost all of Britain's standard regions, with the exception of the South West, the South East, East Anglia, and the East Midlands.⁴⁷ For the purposes of the present research project, 'the

⁴³ Ron Martin and Bob Rowthorn, *The Geography of De-Industrialisation* (Basingstoke, 1986); Alan R. H. Baker and Mark Billinge, *Geographies of England: The North-South Divide, Material and Imagined* (Cambridge, 2004). See also Arthur Marwick, *British Society since 1945* (4th edn. London, 2003), 243–60.

⁴⁴ Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael, *Nach dem Boom*, 92.

⁴⁵ On the regional structure of the United Kingdom see Christopher M. Law, *British Regional Development Since World War I* (London, 1980), 13–31.

⁴⁶ See also Steven High's reflections on the invention of the North American 'rust belt' in his *Industrial Sunset: The Making of North America's Rust Belt, 1964–1984* (Toronto, 2003), 19.

⁴⁷ See Harvey Armstrong and David Riley, 'The "North-South" Controversy and Britain's Regional Problems', *Local Economy*, 2 (1987), 93–105; Ron Martin, 'Thatcherism and Britain's Industrial Landscape', in Martin and Rowthorn, *The Geography of De-Industrialisation*, 238–90.

North' is wherever structural change led to socio-economic convulsions: the coal-mining and steel districts of South Wales and the shipyards on Clydeside as much as the 'manufacturing heartlands' of the Midlands and the heavy industrial centres of Northern England. Such a broad regional approach offers distinct advantages over the prevailing sectorial approach. It guards against the dangers of losing sight of the industrial workers once the industries have shut down and the workforce has been made redundant, and of neglecting the impact on the larger communities in which they live.⁴⁸

Context: Three Time Periods

The societal history of de-industrialization cannot be written without some knowledge of the historical spaces of experience (*Erfahrungsräume*) which influenced contemporary attempts to make sense of what was happening.⁴⁹ For those living in the 1970s and 1980s, three partly overlapping time periods were crucial.

First, there was the experience of accelerated social change from the 1890s, the beginnings of which predated the personal experience of almost everyone except the very old, but whose consequences were still ubiquitous. The modern world – industrial, urban, and mobile; disenchanting, mechanized, and democratized – had come into being at the turn of the century, not exactly at the same time or in an ideal-typical form everywhere, but to such an extent that we can speak of a qualitative change by comparison with the preceding period.⁵⁰

The second period was characterized by the vulnerability of the industrialized world to crises in the 1920s and 1930s. For cohorts over the age of 50, this period formed part of their lived experience. These crises had not only destroyed the hopes of social participation and

⁴⁸ See Martin Geyer's criticism of a still dominant 'structural history without any people'. Martin H. Geyer, 'Auf der Suche nach der Gegenwart: Neue Arbeiten zur Geschichte der 1970er und 1980er Jahre', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 50 (2010), 643–69, at 648.

⁴⁹ On the concept of *Erfahrungsraum* see Reinhart Koselleck, "'Erfahrungsraum' und 'Erwartungshorizont': Zwei historische Kategorien', in id., *Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), 349–75.

⁵⁰ See Herbert, 'Europe in High Modernity', 10–11.

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inclusion associated with the end of the First World War but, in the form of mass unemployment, had also made the nightmare of social impoverishment a reality.

The third period, finally, was a thirty-year-long economic boom which, from the early 1960s at the latest, brought historically unprecedented material prosperity even for ordinary workers. Prosperity and security were accompanied by processes of cultural change and liberalization which placed a question mark over traditional patterns of orientation. Not least through the expansion of the university sector, they allowed social participation to appear desirable and within reach even for those from classes which had not traditionally taken advantage of education.⁵¹

The three periods outlined here provide the experience underlying perceptions of the crises since the mid 1970s. It is remarkable how often, in the English-language literature, we find expressions such as: 'For the first time since the 1930s . . .'. The 1970s and 1980s are treated as a recurrence of a period which, it was thought, had been overcome.⁵²

Peculiarities of British Developments

The structural economic changes of the 1970s and 1980s affected the whole of Europe (and North America). If we look closely, however, it is possible to discern national peculiarities which gave these changes a specific profile, especially in Britain as the motherland of the Industrial Revolution. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the technological lead it enjoyed had given Britain worldwide supremacy in classical industrial production. But only a few decades later, this had already given way to anxiety that Britain would not be able to hold its lead. Thus for Britain, the first of the spaces of experience

⁵¹ See Lutz Raphael, 'Transformations of Industrial Labour in Western Europe: Intergenerational Change of Life Cycles, Occupation and Mobility 1970–2000', *German History*, 30/1 (2012), 100–19, at 100.

⁵² Addison, *No Turning Back*, 326; also at 314, 336. On the re-evaluation of the 'devil's decade' of the 1930s in the 1980s, see John Baxendale and Christopher Pawling, *Narrating the Thirties. A Decade in the Making: 1930 to the Present* (Basingstoke, 1996), 140–67; Roger Bromley, *Lost Narratives: Popular Fictions, Politics and Recent History* (London, 1988).

outlined above, based on Ulrich Herbert's model of high modernity, must be extended further back in time. It is no coincidence that a recent survey of modern British history starts in 1851, the year in which Queen Victoria opened the first World Exhibition in Hyde Park.⁵³

The position Britain had achieved went along with a fear of decline, especially when it transpired that the country's lead in important areas of industrial production was indeed shrinking. Discussion of Britain's real or supposed decline became a leitmotiv of social communication in the twentieth century.⁵⁴ Of course, Britain also experienced a Golden Age of unprecedented economic growth between 1950 and 1973.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, from the point of view of the 1970s and 1980s, looking back was bitter, especially for the neo-liberals around Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher who were struggling for political and cultural hegemony. 'Against our better judgement, we competed with the Socialists in offering to perform what is in fact beyond the power of government', we read in a Conservative Research Department Discussion Paper by Keith Joseph and Angus Maude in 1975. It looked back to the Heath government, but also further back to the Conservative governments of the 1950s and 1960s, and even to those of the pre-war period. 'The trouble began probably over a century ago when our lead and our national initiative began to falter. We made things worse when, after the war, we chose the path of consensus . . . We have intensified the very evils which we believed, with the best of intentions, that we could wipe away.'⁵⁶

⁵³ Jeremy Black, *A Brief History of Britain*, iv. *A Nation Transformed 1851–2010* (London, 2010).

⁵⁴ Andrew Gamble, 'Theories and Explanations of British Decline', in Richard English and Michael Kenny, *Rethinking British Decline* (Houndmills, 2000), 1–22, at 4; Jim Tomlinson, *The Politics of Decline: Understanding Post-War Britain* (Harlow, 2001); Philippa Levine, 'Decline and Vitality: The Contradictions and Complexities of Twentieth-Century Britain', *Twentieth Century British History*, 21/3 (2010), 396–404, at 398.

⁵⁵ Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton, 'Introduction: The Uses (and Abuses) of Affluence', in eid., *An Affluent Society? Britain's 'Golden Age' Revisited* (Aldershot, 2004), 1–14.

⁵⁶ The Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 464K: 'Shadow Cabinet: Circulated Paper (Joseph, 'Notes Towards the Definition of Policy')', 4 Apr. 1975, available online at <www.margareththatcher.org>, accessed 14 Aug. 2012. The

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On the other hand, during the long boom period economic decline was relative, not absolute. It was not by chance that in 1959 the Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had fought the election under the slogan: 'You've never had it so good.'⁵⁷ This was true, yet attentive observers had not missed the fact that Britain's economic growth was clearly lagging behind that of the Continental economies. In the early 1970s, British unemployment for the first time reached a million again, and by 1975 inflation had risen to 27 per cent.⁵⁸ Working hours lost to strikes reached levels last seen in the 1920s. In 1979, in the face of the wave of strikes during the 'winter of discontent', Isaac Kramnick posed the concerned question: 'Is Britain Dying?'.⁵⁹ Of course, he was not entirely serious, but the alarmist rhetoric showed the path which the country had taken since Harold Macmillan's complacent election slogan twenty years earlier.

In the face of structural economic change, the all-party post-war consensus broke down. This had seen a mixed economy, anti-cyclical economic policy, and the welfare state as guarantees for full employment, prosperity, and social peace. While this consensus had already started to crumble in industrial relations since the 1960s, allowing contemporary observers to speak of the 'English disease', it continued to draw a great deal of legitimacy from memories of the Second World War, when the whole nation, according to a potent myth, had come together to repel German aggression in a common effort, thus laying the foundations for a New Jerusalem.⁶⁰

paper gave rise to controversial internal discussions. See Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett, *Keith Joseph* (Chesham, Bucks., 2001), 287–9.

⁵⁷ The slogan was taken from a speech that Macmillan had already given on 20 July 1957. There he had said: 'Indeed, let's be frank about it; most of our people have never had it so good. Go around the country, go to the industrial towns, go to the farms, and you will see a state of prosperity such as we have never had in a lifetime.' The speech is printed in Merle Tönnies and Claus-Ulrich Viol, *British Political Speeches: From Churchill to Blair* (Stuttgart, 2001), 32–62, at 51. See also 'Conservative Party General Election Manifesto 1959', in Dale (ed.), *Conservative Party General Election Manifestos*, 127–39.

⁵⁸ Marwick, *British Society Since 1945*, 152.

⁵⁹ Isaac Kramnick (ed.), *Is Britain Dying? Perspectives on the Current Crisis* (Ithaca, NY, 1979).

⁶⁰ See Malcolm Smith, *Britain and 1940: History, Myth and Popular Memory* (London, 2000); Baxendale and Pawling, *Narrating the Thirties*, 116–67.

Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government distanced itself clearly from this ethos of the nation as a community of solidarity in both its rhetoric and its practical policies.⁶¹ 'Who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families', the Iron Lady declared in a notorious interview in the autumn of 1987.⁶² As early as 1981, her Secretary of State for Employment, Norman Tebbit, had urged the unemployed in the crisis-ridden industrial regions of the North to get on their bikes and look for work elsewhere.⁶³

While it can be said that for the United Kingdom as a whole, the Golden Age was less in evidence than in many of the states of Continental Europe, this applied even more to the areas north of the line linking Bristol, Oxford, and Cambridge. To some extent, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the North of England, the North West, Wales, and parts of Yorkshire had been problem regions since the economic crisis of the inter-war period, marked by the decline of traditional industries, structural unemployment, and social conflict.

During the Golden Age, the discrepancy between a stagnating North and prospering South had at least been contained, though not resolved, by a targeted structural policy. Under the changed economic conditions of the period after the boom, however, it re-emerged, with the West Midlands, centre of the automotive industry, now also being sucked into the downwards spiral.⁶⁴ Especially during the deep recession of the early 1980s, the stagnating traditional industries were exposed to a storm of destruction,⁶⁵ which in Eric Hobsbawm's view had nothing creative about it. Rather, he suggested, it resembled an 'industrial holocaust'.⁶⁶

⁶¹ On the relationship between political rhetoric and government practice see Dominik Geppert, 'Thatcher-Konsens', 192.

⁶² The Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 'Interview for *Woman's Own*', 23 Sept. 1987, available online at <www.margaretthatcher.org>, accessed 14 Aug. 2012.

⁶³ May, *An Economic and Social History*, 478–9.

⁶⁴ See Peter Scott, 'Regional Development and Policy', in Floud and Johnson (eds.), *Cambridge Economic History*, iii. 333–67.

⁶⁵ Ronald L. Martin, 'The Contemporary Debate over the North–South Divide: Images and Realities of Regional Inequality in Late Twentieth-Century Britain', in Baker and Billinge (eds.), *Geographies of England*, 15–43, at 29.

⁶⁶ Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991* (London, 1994), 304.

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Research Design

The research project presented here commences by investigating the development of important traditional and 'new' industries during the structural rupture of the 1970s and 1980s, concentrating on iron and steel,⁶⁷ mining,⁶⁸ shipbuilding, and the automotive industries.⁶⁹ The reason for this is not only the economic weight that these industries still, in part, possessed, but also because they were of outstanding historical and thus identity-creating significance for the North.

Beyond this, comparing a number of classic industries with a 'new' one makes it possible to link the investigation with the findings of contemporary industrial sociology. Since the 1960s, this had been working on creating a typology of the British working class in which employment was linked with world view and life worlds. In a widely discussed article, David Lockwood distinguished three ideal types and assigned them to specific branches of industry:⁷⁰ the 'traditional proletarian' who worked in mining, shipbuilding, or on the docks, lived in an 'occupational community', and typically displayed a dichotomous world view; the 'deferential worker' who Lockwood saw as economically active in rural family businesses and who had a hierarchical view of society; and, finally, the 'privatised worker' who worked in new industries such as the automotive or chemical industries, was largely detached from the context of collective living, and for whom work was a 'necessary evil' mainly required to satisfy a need for increased consumption. A few years later, a large study of the industrial workforce of the boom town of Luton described this type as 'the affluent worker'.⁷¹

⁶⁷ See Yves Mény and Vincent Wright (eds.), *The Politics of Steel: Western Europe and the Steel Industry in the Crisis Years (1974–1984)* (Berlin, 1987).

⁶⁸ On developments up to 1982 see William Ashworth, *The History of the British Coal Industry, v. 1946–1982: The Nationalized Industry* (Oxford, 1986).

⁶⁹ Broadberry, 'The Performance of Manufacturing', 66–70.

⁷⁰ David Lockwood, 'Sources of Variation in Working-Class Images of Society', in Martin Bulmer (ed.), *Working-Class Images of Society* (Aldershot, 1994), 16–31; first published in *Sociological Review*, 14/3 (1966), 16–31.

⁷¹ John H. Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, Frank Bechhofer, and Jennifer Platt, *The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour* (Cambridge, 1968); *eid.*,

Part one of the research project takes an economic and political history approach. It asks about the economic causes of the structural change and especially political attempts to shape it. Why did all the industries studied here go through crises, some of which were life-threatening? What impact did the change in government of May 1979 have on the specific course of industrial development in the period under investigation?

The Thatcher government's confrontational industrial policy was described as counter-productive and potentially catastrophic as early as summer 1979, not only by members of the Opposition, but also by critics within the Conservative Party. Criticism was directed less at the Prime Minister herself than at her Secretary of State for Industry, the monetarist Sir Keith Joseph. During a single House of Commons debate in the summer of 1979, the Opposition described him as a 'medieval alchemist', a 'back-street bruiser', and an 'angel of death'.⁷² In contrast to these accusations, apologists for the new course claimed that after years of self-delusion they were at last facing up to harsh realities and proposing a realistic industrial policy. They were not angels of death, they said, but grave diggers for a long defunct industrial culture who were preparing the way for a competitive industry of the future.

The study will examine to what extent the Thatcher government's conviction that it only had this one chance to halt the decline of a once great nation exacerbated the crisis-ridden structural change in Britain. '[We must be] cruel to be kind, instead of killing the country with kindness', as the influential political adviser John Hoskyns put it in a memorandum on the steelworkers' strike of 1980. To stay firm and not to give in was the recurrent neo-Conservative mantra of the early 1980s. 'You turn if you want to. The lady's not for turning.'⁷³ To think the unthinkable: letting British Leyland, the state-owned car manufacturer, go bankrupt; allowing Liverpool and Merseyside to

The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour (Cambridge, 1968); eid., *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure* (Cambridge, 1969).

⁷² House of Commons, Hansard, Fifth Series, vol. 970, Commons Sitting of 17 July 1979, cols. 1328–89 (Shotton steelworks).

⁷³ The Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Speech to Conservative Party Conference, 10 Oct. 1980, fo. 11. This speech is available online at <<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104431>>, accessed 15 Aug. 2012.

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decay.⁷⁴ Appeals and mind-games such as these repeatedly turn up in government documents. The project will also look much more generally, however, at whether contemporaries overestimated the extent to which politics could influence secular processes of transformation—a trend, incidentally, that the historiography, which occasionally seems to be blinded by Margaret Thatcher’s charisma, appears to be continuing.

While part one looks at the crisis of industrialism in Britain from the perspective of economic and political history, part two takes a social and cultural history approach. What repercussions did the change have for the life path and self-image of industrial workers and their families? How can the findings of contemporary social sciences be historicized?

For many of the predominantly male workers, the structural break meant primarily, and in concrete terms, the loss of their jobs. This not only made the financial basis on which their lives and those of their families were built insecure, but also unsettled the hierarchies and patterns of identity which were constitutive for many working-class families.⁷⁵ The identity of producers who, organized in trade unions, had considerable economic and socio-political bargaining power, was radically called into question. The project will ask how attractive workers found the neo-liberal alternatives, which tried to take workers out of their collective contexts and to present them as independent and responsible consumers,⁷⁶ especially in a welfare regime that, in the case of loss of employment, guaranteed not to maintain social status, but mere subsistence.⁷⁷ In other words, unemployment as an experience has a cultural dimension as well as a social one.⁷⁸ The involuntary loss of a job, which in many cases was followed by a long period of unemployment, premature retirement from working life,

⁷⁴ The National Archives, PREM 19/576, Peter Cropper, ‘CPRS Report on Merseyside’, 19 June 1981.

⁷⁵ See Raphael, ‘Transformations of Industrial Labour’, 104, 115–18.

⁷⁶ See Avner Offer, ‘British Manual Workers: From Producers to Consumers’, *Contemporary British History*, 22/4 (2008), 537–71, at 540, 546.

⁷⁷ See Hans Günter Hockerts and Winfried Süß (eds.), *Soziale Ungleichheit im Sozialstaat: Deutschland und Großbritannien im Vergleich* (Munich, 2010).

⁷⁸ See Thomas Raithel and Thomas Schlemmer (eds.), *Die Rückkehr der Arbeitslosigkeit: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im europäischen Kontext 1973 bis 1989* (Munich, 2009).

or, at best, employment in one of the new service sector jobs, undermined not only the social status of those affected, but also the way in which they saw themselves.⁷⁹

If we look through the extensive contemporary literature on the subject, three features stand out in a historical perspective.⁸⁰ First, there was a tension between the claim to scientific objectivity on the one hand, and taking sides in the contemporary ideological and political confrontations on the other. Many authors did not conceal their disapproval of Thatcherism, but still considered that their work adhered to strict scholarly standards. Secondly, the constant references to the 1930s stand out. Essentially, investigations of the individual and collective consequences of structural mass unemployment came to the same conclusions as Marie Jahoda, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel in their famous 1932 study of Marienthal,⁸¹ namely, that unemployment offers no opportunities, but in the long term leads to an 'atrophy in expressions of life', as the Marienthal study put it.⁸² Unemployment does not liberate people but impoverishes them – materially, socially, and psychologically. Thirdly, there was a new awareness of what unemployment meant for relations between the sexes. Here, too, the result was sobering: 'His unemployment, her problem', as a pioneering study put it.⁸³ Male unemployment does

⁷⁹ See Westergaard, Noble, and Walker, *After Redundancy*; Christopher Johnson, *The Economy under Mrs Thatcher 1979–1990* (London, 1991), 245.

⁸⁰ See, among others, Hayes and Nutman, *Understanding the Unemployed*; Bryan Roberts, Ruth Finnegan, and Duncan Gallie (eds.), *New Approaches to Economic Life. Economic Restructuring: Unemployment and the Social Division of Labour* (Manchester, 1985); Allen, Waton, Purcell, and Wood (eds.), *The Experience of Unemployment*; Westergaard, Noble, and Walker, *After Redundancy*; Paul Bagguley, 'Protest, Acquiescence and the Unemployed: A Comparative Analysis of the 1930s and 1980s', *British Journal of Sociology*, 43/3 (1992), 443–61; Andrew Clark, Richard Layard, and Marcus Rubin, *UK Unemployment* (3rd. edn. Oxford, 1997).

⁸¹ Marie Jahoda, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel, *Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal: Ein soziographischer Versuch* (1st edn. 1933; Frankfurt, 1975); cf. Matthew Cole, 'Re-Thinking Unemployment: A Challenge to the Legacy of Jahoda et.al.', *Sociology*, 41/6 (2007), 1133–49.

⁸² Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and Zeisel, *Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal*, 57.

⁸³ Lorna McKee and Colin Bell, 'His Unemployment, Her Problem: The Domestic and Marital Consequences of Male Unemployment', in Allen, Waton, Purcell, and Wood (eds.), *Experience of Unemployment*, 134–49.

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not break down patriarchal role models but cements them, at least in the short term.

All three features are found in a travel report which the feminist socialist, Beatrix Campbell published in 1984 under the title *Wigan Pier Revisited: Poverty and Politics in the 80s*.⁸⁴ While the title of Campbell's book alludes to George Orwell's famous social study of 1937,⁸⁵ her commentary on a photograph taken by Val Wilmer shows how questionable traditional role models, especially as applied to the 'traditional proletarian', had become in this study.⁸⁶ The image shows a retired miner and his wife, surrounded by modest domestic comfort (see illustration 2). While the man in the foreground is dressed in a suit and tie and sits in a leather armchair, turning towards the camera with his forefinger extended, the woman standing in the background is wearing an apron. At the moment when the picture was taken, she was clearly occupied with dusting something. 'Miners have a special place in the cult of the working class. They are the archetypal proletarians', the caption informs us. 'But who is the proletarian here?', is the scathing question asked, to be followed immediately with an unmistakable answer: 'Friedrich Engels said that within the working class the men were the bourgeoisie and the women the proletariat.' If we contrast this caption with that of another image, published in December 1984 in the journal of the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC), the largest steelworkers' union, then we can see how large the gap had become between the role models within the New Left on the one hand, and the traditional industrial workforce on the other.⁸⁷ '[Bill] got something he hadn't bargained for!', reads the caption of a scurrilous photograph taken on the occasion of the retirement of the long serving Secretary General, Bill Sirs. It depicts Sirs, smiling broadly into the camera from the middle of the picture, and two women in suspenders and corset. He has

⁸⁴ Beatrix Campbell, *Wigan Pier Revisited: Poverty and Politics in the 80s* (London, 1984); see also Beryl Bainbridge, *English Journey or the Road to Milton Keynes* (London, 1984).

⁸⁵ George Orwell, *The Road to Wigan Pier* (London, 1937).

⁸⁶ Campbell, *Wigan Pier*, after p. 114.

⁸⁷ 'Bill falls for the "Scunthorpe Sting"', *ISTC Journal* (Dec. 1984). The basic text for the New Left in Britain is Dennis Dworkin, *Cultural Marxism in Post-war Britain: History, the New Left, and the Origins of Cultural Studies* (Durham, 1997), esp. 192–205 on the 'new British feminism'.




Illustration 2. The New Left revisits the 'traditional proletarian'. Taken from Beatrix Campbell, *Wigan Pier Revisited: Poverty and Politics in the 80s* (London, 1984). Reproduced by kind permission of Valerie Wilmer.

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an arm around each one, thanking them for presenting his farewell present.

While part two of this research project looks at the workers and their families who were directly affected by change, the third part focuses on the communities and the built environment within which the structural break occurred. The structural change confronted communities with considerable problems. Tax revenues dropped and social spending rose; unemployment and impoverishment posed a threat to social peace. Plant closures left behind wasteland and empty buildings which were a great challenge to town and landscape planning. The increasing pressure was accompanied by a problem of collective identity. If the steel industry in Sheffield, which called itself the City of Steel, collapsed, what was left to give the city its identity?⁸⁸ To the problems of the present was added the question of dealing with the past. What had it actually meant to live in an industrial city like Sheffield, which, fifty years earlier, George Orwell, with his characteristic openness, had described as follows: 'Sheffield, I suppose, could justly claim to be called the ugliest town in the Old World.'⁸⁹ Did the heavy industrial past, with all its noise and dirt, constitute a tradition that was worth remembering at all?

The difficult economic conditions were compounded by political conflicts between local councils, which were often dominated by the Labour Party, and the Conservative central government.⁹⁰ In my research project I will take the examples of Sheffield,⁹¹ Liverpool,⁹²

⁸⁸ See Taylor, Evans, and Fraser, *A Tale of Two Cities*.

⁸⁹ Quoted from Sylvia Pybus (ed.), *'Damned Bad Place, Sheffield': An Anthology of Writing about Sheffield Through the Ages* (Sheffield, 1994).

⁹⁰ As an introduction see Addison, *No Turning Back*, 306–12; Eric J. Evans, *Thatcher and Thatcherism* (2nd edn. London, 2004), 60–1.

⁹¹ See Patrick Seyd, 'The Political Management of Decline 1973–1993', in Clyde Binfield et al. (eds.), *The History of The City of Sheffield 1843–1993*, 3 vols. (Sheffield, 1993), i. *Politics*, 151–85; Paul Lawless, 'The Conversion of an English City: From Production to Consumption? Sheffield, U.K. 1978–1998', paper no. UR27, Centre for Regional and Economic Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University (Oct. 1998); David Price, *Sheffield Troublemakers: Rebels and Radicals in Sheffield History* (Chichester, 2008), 149–60.

⁹² John Murden, ' "City of Change and Challenge": Liverpool Since 1945', in John Belchem (ed.), *Liverpool 800: Culture, Character and History* (Liverpool, 2006), 393–485.

Bradford,⁹³ Coventry, and Barnsley to investigate how local decision-makers and publics dealt with these multiple challenges. Did they manage to develop any idea of life 'after the boom', to re-invent the city or region?⁹⁴

Cities as collective subjects can regenerate themselves, but whether this also applies to the individual districts in which communities who were especially hard hit by the changes lived is another question. In the early 1980s riots, in some cases lasting several days, broke out in London, Liverpool, Manchester, and Bristol, and later in Bradford as well.⁹⁵ Many contemporaries saw the 'summer of the fire bombs' as a direct expression of the crisis-ridden process of transformation.

If we accept this connection, then studying youth and youth cultures on the one hand, and ethnic minorities on the other, promises to deliver valuable insights about the social and cultural dimensions of economic change. How did young people deal with a situation in which the lives previously mapped out no longer counted? Did free spaces open up beyond conventional employment histories, for example, in underground youth cultures? Or was it a common behavioural response to try to escape the pain as quickly as possible by taking the next 'runaway train' out and seeking one's fortune in the relatively prosperous South?

And, perhaps even more seriously, how did the end of Fordist production change the life worlds and views of the future, the perceptions of self and others of those who had only been settled in this country for a few decades, and who were proportionately overrepresented among the ranks of skilled and semi-skilled workers who did the hard physical work which had now largely become obsolete?⁹⁶

The project's final chapter will investigate representations of change in the media and literary sources. It will ask who adopted this theme, and why. Can recurring motifs and topoi be identified? How effective were these approaches? Here the argument found in the literature that films in the tradition of social realism which evoked sym-

⁹³ Dave Russell, 'Selling Bradford: Tourism and Northern Image in the Late Twentieth Century', *Contemporary British History*, 17/2 (2003), 49–68.

⁹⁴ For suggestions see Taylor, Evans, and Fraser, *A Tale of Two Cities*.

⁹⁵ See Marwick, *British Society Since 1945*, 229–30. The basic work is Lord Scarman, *The Scarman Report: The Brixton Disorders 10–12 April 1981* (London, 1981).

⁹⁶ Harrison, *Finding a Role?*, 187–208.

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pathy, such as *Brassed Off* (1996), *The Full Monty* (1997), and *Billy Elliot* (2000), had a lasting impact on the middle-class view of structural change and contributed significantly to the victory of New Labour will be subjected to critical examination.⁹⁷

Conclusion

The structural change of the 1970s and 1980s was closely documented, discussed, and interpreted by contemporaries. Since then, historical research has also addressed the 'crisis of capitalism'⁹⁸ during these two decades. The studies already published and those still in the making as a rule concentrate on individual industries or partial areas of the transformation process. The project presented here, by contrast, takes a holistic approach. Using the example of the British North, it investigates the complexity of structural change as a societal history of departures from the age of high modernity.

⁹⁷ Ibid. 168.

⁹⁸ Charles S. Maier, '“Malaise”: The Crisis of Capitalism in the 1970s', in Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent (eds.), *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), 25–48.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

THE HIDDEN TRANSCRIPT: THE DEFORMATION OF THE SELF IN GERMANY'S DICTATORIAL REGIMES

BERND WEISBROD

MARY FULBROOK, *Dissonant Lives: Generations and Violence Through the German Dictatorships* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), xii + 515 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 928720 8. £35.00

This is an ambitious book. It comes on top of a number of outstanding contributions by Mary Fulbrook to the history of the GDR, the other German dictatorship, in which she claims a political reading of private lives and the 'normalization' of rule in a regime which had to rely on the support of reluctant citizens.¹ In many ways, her new book reinforces that interpretation, yet is much broader in range, more daring in analytical scope, and unsettling for a number of well-established readings of modern German history. It sidesteps the systemic comparison of the German dictatorships by looking at private experience and changing subjectivities, and takes leave of the well-laboured notion of political and intellectual generations by asking about generational opportunity structure and life course choices in 'sore-thumb generations' or 'cohort clusters' (p. 7). In doing so, it challenges the usual assumptions about the German *Volksgemeinschaft*. This is also, as will be argued here, the reason for a scathing review of her book by one of the protagonists of this debate, whose historical imagination seems to be limited by the numbers game of Nazi organizations.²

¹ Mary Fulbrook, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949–1989* (Oxford, 1995); ead., *The People's State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker* (New Haven, 2005); ead. (ed.), *Power and Society in the GDR, 1961–1979: The 'Normalisation of Rule?'* (Oxford, 2009).

² Reviewed by Arnim Nolzen in *H-Soz-u-Kult*, 21 June 2012, <<http://hsoz-kult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2012-2-194>>.

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Numbers do play a part in Fulbrook's wide-ranging study. But what matters most to her argument is the experience and meaning of private exposure to life chances and choices in a century disrupted by violence and political upheaval. She is interested in the way in which real people, high and low, male and female, young and old, negotiated this exposure in all sorts of ego-documents, contemporary diaries and letters, and *ex post* questionnaires and interviews, but she also takes into account, at least to some degree, how this process was reflected in official sources. Yet this is neither a book about 'oral history' – many private stories reappear in the text and can only be put together with the help of the index – nor about the top-down effects of dictatorial rule, such as the dilemmas of political mobilization in symbolic rituals of belonging. It is about the historically contingent construction of the 'social self' as far as it is accessible to modern historians, about the ambivalent experience of disrupted and remade life chances in war and political turmoil, and ultimately about the deconstruction of moral and political 'identity', the secret hobbyhorse of those who seem to mistake performing by the rules in dictatorships for the confession of a closed community of believers.

Interestingly, historians have always been reluctant to accept this notion for GDR society which, of course, also had to develop ways of accommodating the private needs of its citizens, especially when voiced in terms of labour demands, despite all the ruthless practices of political suppression and police surveillance.³ It is one of the great merits of Fulbrook's new book that, on the basis of overwhelming evidence, this ambivalence of belonging is also granted to those who were wrapped up in the Nazi mobilization and still felt in two minds about the *Volksgemeinschaft*. More is involved, therefore, in the concept of 'dissonant lives' than meets the eye, and little is gained if this argument is discarded simply because it was used in post-war exoneration and self-victimization. It is, in fact, much more helpful in explaining the radical escalation of the first German dictatorship and the long life of the second one than any notion of ideological cohesion or community spirit, even in a racially defined or politically homogenized society.

The argument about generation as a 'hidden factor in historical experience' (p. v) is set out in detail in the first chapter, where gener-

³ Andrew I. Port, *Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

ational 'sense' is defined neither as a matter of political or intellectual claim for leadership nor as a conscious taking of sides in a cultural conflict, but simply as a private way of navigating a typical condition of twentieth-century German history, that is, to be young at times of complete social and political reorientation. This 'cultural and structural availability for mobilization' alone, Fulbrook argues, makes the two war youth generations into 'sore-thumb generations' and this is also why these generations are compared in the two dictatorial setups and not in that of West Germany. It is, perhaps, not surprising that the stronger half of the book (chs. 6 to 11) deals with the prominence and fixation of the 29ers, as Fulbrook prefers to call the war youth generation, in the GDR whereas the first half (chs. 2 to 5) tries to establish the basic pattern of 'age-related challenges' from the late nineteenth century to 1945. Here, the lines are drawn out less consistently, certainly with regard to the firmly established reading of the political generation of 'heroic realism', which may offer an explanation for the high priests of Nazism but not necessarily for the broad church of believers.

Instead, three aspects which carry the full weight of the argument are highlighted: a) generational experience is ambivalent and always challenged by individual choices and political chances; b) there is no foregone conclusion in the way in which political and economic crises impact on the life stories of a 'divided generation', left or right; and c) the mobilization of the war youth generation for the Nazi experiment set the pattern for 'dissonant lives' which re-emerged in the second German dictatorship as lives which had to be lived in 'two worlds', the world of public performance and the world of private knowledge. The generational analysis, therefore, aims to detect 'patterns of accommodation to dictatorial regimes of opposing political colours, and the shifts across major moments of historical rupture' (p. 5).

When looking at ego-documents as evidence, working with rules of collage and narrative plausibility to flesh out the argument is almost unavoidable, especially when such a long story line has to be sustained. Different sorts of private evidence are, therefore, artfully crafted together—letters, interviews, questionnaires, and so on—without giving prominence to the individual life story as such but to the way in which the construction of the 'social self' can be detected in the multiple layers of self-questioning and self-delusion in

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breadth, not in depth. This may be considered problematic for in-depth stories of changing subjectivities over time, but it makes sense for clustering evidence in historical patterns of self-perception. Some personal stories, therefore, reappear at different points in the book, where they are regrouped with other sources and, unfortunately, lose some of their individual clout. A good example of this methodology and argument a) is provided by the life story of Hans Paasche as told in chapters 2 and 3. A practitioner of colonial violence, Paasche rather unexpectedly embraced pacifism under the influence of the youth movement. In line with contemporary assumptions, this could only be regarded as a mental condition, especially in a privileged member of the officer class. But he persisted, and eventually fell victim to political murder. This intimate and well-documented story is closely interwoven with a number of life stories, collected in an essay competition by some Harvard professors in 1939–40, which show the full range of experience before and after 1933. This approach allows Fulbrook to conclude that ‘generational experience’ was not a foregone conclusion:

We should, therefore, not simply read backwards from the carriers of the Nazi regime, appealing to some ‘generational experience’ which allegedly mobilized significant numbers to the right-wing cause. Rather, it was the specific historical constellation of 1933 which determined that those who had been mobilized for radical causes and who now took a disproportionate role in the historical record were on the right rather than on the left (p. 81).

Clearly, this is not about generational homogenization, but the importance of personal choices and political opportunity structure in life stories punctured by violence.

The Paasche case can be said to set the tone of the whole narrative: personal stories, although patterned, are far from consequential. The same is true of the ‘class of 1935’ (ch. 4, II) as seen through the lens of the letters exchanged by the girl graduates of Augusta High School in Charlottenburg. Despite the common excitement about the new political beginning coinciding with their own start in adult life, they show the full range of options available for self-experience, depending on political affiliation, personal friendships, and racial denomi-

nation. This evidence keeps popping up throughout the book to give added value to these different options and to show the consequences of personal choices in a system which, in general, left little option but to learn how to play by the new rules. What matters to Fulbrook is the high degree of ambiguity and self-delusion in the process of mobilization. 'Enactment' of these rules should not be mistaken for 'commitment', she argues, as long as it was sufficient for most of the people to behave 'as though they believed in the cause', with a substantial windfall for 'those who rode the Nazi tide', and devastating results for those oppressed by Nazi politics (p. 99). In many of the ego-documents ideology hardly plays; rather, enacting the Nazi script seems to have suspended judgement on whatever was claimed as the appropriate belief system, however internalized, played out, or simply 'mimed'. Under conditions of violence, personal ties could easily be dissolved and decent behaviour suspended. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to count all these cases as recruits to the *Volks-gemeinschaft*: 'Outward conformity was for many people clearly compatible with a sense of inner distance' (p. 115).

This interpretation is endorsed by a close reading of the 'class of 1935', which makes use of the collection of Old Girls' letters in public and private family archives. Hans Paasche's daughter was one of them. The generational bond may have helped them to play by the rules and take on board racial prejudice in their daily lives but, strikingly, as would be expected from ambitious girls with a middle-class education, they also displayed a considerable amount of soul-searching and a muted sense of obligation. Not so in one particular case, where the marriage bond tied one of the girls to Udo K., a Silesian SA fighter and government official who ended up as *Landrat* in annexed Upper Silesia, also in charge of the Auschwitz region. His personal story is a favourite plot, already lined up by Fulbrook for another book project, as a typical case of unavoidable involvement with Nazi violence in pursuit of a 'normal' career, eventually ending up in the *Wehrmacht*.⁴ Here it serves as a prop for the 'availability for mobilization' of those who were also 'psychologically available' because of their early start in adult life through male activism. Yet, here again, with ever increasing pressures to conform, it was far from clear whether such outward behaviour was always free from 'duplicity',

⁴ Mary Fulbrook, *A Small Town Near Auschwitz: Ordinary Nazis and the Holocaust* (Oxford, forthcoming). See p. 156, n. 161.

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especially in cases where private standards could only be upheld by leading a 'double life' (p. 142). As Fulbrook points out, it is almost impossible to establish precisely what performing to the public role model actually reveals about inner engagement. For example, young people seem to have been less ready to confess to being 'ashamed to be German' because of excessive violence during the *Anschluss* or *Kristallnacht*. Yet enacting the Nazi script often came with some sense of unease and 'dissonance', despite the very real longing for national belonging and personal advancement (p. 165).

Detailed cases like these are, of course, hard to come by. But Fulbrook manages to bring together enough evidence to give her argument cohesion and to break it down into individual and convincing stories. This is not just about adding colour to the general story; it is about painting a complex and adequate picture for a history 'from within', in which the 'social self' is negotiated between outer behavioural patterns and the 'inner self'. This is neither an 'oral history' nor a 'collective biography'; it is, she claims, a 'completely new perspective on history' (p. 477). Fulbrook, of course, is aware that 'changing subjectivities' cannot simply be read straight from sources such as, for example, letters home from the front during the war. In fact, such private documents, she argues, often merely reflect an established code of conduct and a fairly deep-seated 'nazification of mentalities'. When following up the story of Udo K. in Upper Silesia again (pp. 184-5), it appears that the very real 'two worlds' which had opened up physically between Jews and non-Jews in the wake of *Einsatzgruppen* killings and ghettoization did, in fact, eclipse any 'humanist education' which his wife had acquired at Augusta High School. Kattowitz sources give some texture to this argument, which is expanded in other letters home from the collection of the Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte in Stuttgart. The question here is not who did what and why, but what it did to people's perceptions of their own selves when it happened. The war which had placed the community over the individual submerged private hopes and aspirations and enforced a belief in some sort of common destiny, as Fulbrook argues: 'Commitment to a wider sense of community and purpose was arguably the only way to deal with the deprivations of the self' (p. 189). Private sources like letters are, therefore, replete with 'dissonant rationalizations' which somehow bring the actual evidence of brutality and danger into line with the public script of

national duty and personal character, but not necessarily with the holy grail of the Nazi activists, that is, redemption by killing the Jews. Even in the innermost circle of SS killers, Heinrich Himmler found a way, in his famous Posen speeches, to acknowledge the ambivalence in their ruthlessness (p. 218). But, in general, Fulbrook is not concerned with the individual motivation or social psychology of perpetrators. Rather, she is interested in the sense of subjectivity in 'normal' lives when almost everybody seemed to be 'enacting' a script over which they had little command.

It has to be said that when it comes to the horrors of war, or the ultimate human catastrophe of the Holocaust, unanimous voices are not to be expected anyway, as Nick Stargardt has shown.⁵ These horrendous facts are hardly reflected in what could be said privately, never mind publicly. In the relevant chapters of the book, the general narrative is only punctuated by a few personal stories—a family correspondence involving the euthanasia of a daughter, some reflections on fighting on without belief in the Führer, or the experience of shock in bombed-out cities—as if private voices were muted and 'enforced silence' the only possible answer to the degree of self-delusion which had made all this horror possible. More could certainly be said about this shock transfer in the post-war generation, another of Fulbrook's projects,⁶ but for the second part of her book all she needs to highlight is the sense of loss in the mobilized young, who felt betrayed not just by the regime, but also by their very own selves.

It is a mainstay of the argument on which the whole book turns that this pattern of self-delusion in public acts of mimicry not only provided the legacy for the mobilization of the second war youth generation in the GDR, but was also the same pattern of dissonance which likened the GDR *Aufbaugeneration* to the equally delusive self-mobilization of the first war youth generation in the Third Reich. Both were structurally available for mobilization, both had to some degree found their emotional and professional chances of identification in the new regime, and both had to pay for this with a measure of delusion and insecurity in their very private selves. As a structural interpretation this can be nicely put to the test in the analysis of the cohort of '29 in the GDR's *Who is Who?* (ch. 6). In contrast to the rela-

⁵ Nicholas Stargardt, *Witnesses of War: Children's Lives under the Nazis* (London: 2005).

⁶ 'Reverberations of the Second World War'; see p. 485, n. 10.

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tive silence of the 'not-quite' generation of those born in 1949,⁷ the prominence of the 29ers is indeed remarkable. It was the East German generation of social climbers who filled the vacant positions in the career structure of the new state, which provided openings, especially for newly qualified teachers and functionaries, and expected full loyalty in return. A brief comparison with the 'sceptical generation' in the West only suggests that it was not just the pre-1945 experience which shaped the post-war generations, but the generational dynamics of the post-war opportunity structure, East and West (pp. 257, 292).

It may be doubted whether the newly labelled 45ers in the West were, indeed, equally ready to mobilize for democracy at the time, or even 'available for conversion' in the way much of the GDR *Aufbaugeneration* fell for the new regime. They found their private aspirations and political ambitions blocked by the generational inertia of a political system which kept ex-Nazi functionaries on board, as shown by the second life of Udo K., who even avoided denazification (pp. 277–8). This is certainly one of the reasons for the 68er revolt. In the East, on the contrary, the generational inertia of a political system dominated by the *Aufbaugeneration* blocked the way for the post-war generations which, according to Lutz Niethammer's 'oral history' team, eventually contributed to the collapse of the regime.⁸ What Fulbrook adds to this well-known story is the importance of ambivalence, even in the life stories of those who could claim 'conversion' and personal success. In fact, she claims, the sense of 'normlessness' which was left behind in 1945 spoke of the destruction of any sense of community, or any continuity of the *Volksgemeinschaft* for that matter—'to the extent that there ever had been' (p. 265)—so that the newly established socialist community needed even more convincing.

There were, she argues, basically three ways of renegotiating the 'presented self' in the new socialist regime: 'claimed conversion', 'claimed consistency', or, most likely, the excuse of a 'life with little agency' (pp. 280–1). It is, therefore, more than unfair to level the

⁷ Dorothee Wierling, *Geboren im Jahr Eins. Der Jahrgang 1949 in der DDR: Versuch einer Kollektivbiographie* (Berlin, 2002).

⁸ Lutz Niethammer, Alexander von Plato, and Dorothee Wierling, *Die volkseigene Erfahrung. Eine Archäologie des Lebens in der Industrieprovinz der DDR: 30 biographische Eröffnungen* (Berlin, 1991).

charge of tacit approval at this analysis of post-war transformations, as Armin Nolzen does in his review, since Fulbrook is fully aware of the political self-delusion involved in this apology:

As far as an individual's sense of self was concerned, there clearly was a degree of dissonance between inner views and regime constraints at the time, providing a degree of plausibility, even a sense of authenticity, to this later defence. In terms of denazification, however, this sort of testimony was clutching at straws! (p. 283).

It is to the great credit of Fulbrook that her far reaching analysis goes beyond deconstructing this obviously flawed justification. For her, it is the dissociation of the self which not only provided a 'degree of plausibility' in denazification but, in fact, the basis of the whole *Volksgemeinschaft* delusion in the first place, which later reappeared in the second German dictatorship as the spectacle of a socialist community under police observation. Like the Nazi regime and for the same reasons, it could never really rely on the formation of an authentic personality streamlined by a scripted community spirit. The re-making and un-making of identities thus did not just serve the purposes of denazification, but was a basic condition of dictatorial regimes, both before and after 1945, and it showed most clearly in the young of both war youth generations because they were asked and given a chance to make the leap.

The post-war shock of non-identification was thus transformed into a sense of shame, as can be made out in a number of school-leaving essays from Schleswig-Holstein. Or, as in the case of Christa Wolf, it was transformed into a longing for the new anti-fascist utopia, particularly in those who were young enough and, anyway, forced to remake their lives under the new regime. The New Teacher programme served as an ideal script for the new engaging 'socialist personality', but here again, even for the 'winners' in this social revolution, an 'atmosphere of mutual suspicion' (p. 315) was unavoidable in a system which always distrusted its own efforts at mobilization. Given the exodus of about 3 million people before 1961, ever more organizational 'gestures of belonging' were required and, for that very reason, were hardly convincing, even for the party faithful. Official reports about widespread resentment against resettlement on

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the border, remilitarization, the publicly proclaimed friendship with wartime enemies, and the hero-worship of anti-fascist fighters in the camps all seem to confirm this, although more could be said about how such bureaucratic over-exposure actually contributed to the pervasive sense of a fake reality (pp. 319–24).

The generational dynamics in the East thus had more to do with the structural opportunities for young social climbers in key areas of administration and politics than with any war experience, which should have made their counterparts in the West equally 'culturally available' for mobilization (p. 333). But character (de)formation under the conditions of the new dictatorship only replayed the scenario which had lured the first war youth generation into the same pretence of a simulated community of believers in the first place. To detect this ambivalence between private objectives and official expectations Fulbrook makes use of interviews which she conducted only a few years ago. They are, of course, tainted. What could be said after reunification had made these life stories almost obsolete. Yet again, she is very good at deconstructing the self-delusion in what people have to say in order to adapt to the new requirements, and in what they cannot hide from themselves in their own pasts. Their 'normal' lives even produced the illusion of some real agency and allowed for a more or less reluctant adaptation and routinization (p. 343). The official paranoia, for example, with regard to youth culture, hardly makes it into such accounts of 'normal lives'. But it is likely that a more stringent set of oral history rules might have revealed the same sort of ambivalence about multiple realities if applied to a closely defined set of interviews. Instead, Fulbrook again and again tries to give the whole background story – the youth campaigns, Cold War culture, generational differences in the response to the *Wende*, and so on – in order to make the personal stories in her interviews stick. She also refutes recent efforts to see the different regime stages in terms of a succession of model generations for lack of any other distinctive generational formation like the 29ers, which, she insists, was 'the relatively most homogenous generational group of the entire century' (p. 397).⁹

It is clear that most of her post-unification stories have to do with renegotiating insecure or lost identities of the 29ers. They bring back

⁹ See Annegret Schüle, Thomas Ahbe, and Rainer Gries (eds.), *Die DDR aus generationsgeschichtlicher Perspektive: Eine Inventur* (Leipzig, 2006).

the major point which runs through the whole argument about generations, that is, that defining past selves has a lot to do with future expectations, especially when previous selves have to be redefined in terms of present opportunity structures. This is why, understandably, in the case of the 29ers, *Ostalgie* comes into play when taking stock of 'normal' lives under less than normal conditions (p. 463). This *ex post* romanticism reinforces the major story line, since projections of the past also made up much of the fantasies about the *Volks-gemeinschaft*. But sometimes this fundamental bias is almost buried in the plethora of life stories and general arguments about the character of SED rule in which the threads of the argument tend to get lost, especially when the defence of Fulbrook's 'normalization' thesis takes centre stage, as in the final chapters of the book.¹⁰

Despite this criticism it is no small feat for Fulbrook to have stepped back from the well-trodden paths of interpretation and started from the assumption that for both war youth generations, the lived-in world was characterized by the 'ambivalence' of 'the two worlds' (young) people had to live in when (self-)mobilized for dictatorial regimes. As she states at the beginning of her book: 'The apparent antinomy between repression and enthusiasm – giving rise to repeated debates about the balance of consensus, conformity, and coercion in Nazi Germany – is dissolved once we realize the extent to which people were able to dissociate their inner reservations from outward accommodation to both the perceived and the undeniably real and unavoidable demands of the regime' (p. 19).

There is one caveat, however, at the end of the book which seems to give prime place to ideological persuasion in an argument which otherwise highlights behavioural and attitudinal patterns in the generational opportunity structure of dictatorial regimes. When comparing the two sets of accommodation, both embraced by and forced on the young in the two German dictatorships, she argues, older East Germans, even after two decades, 'had apparently "still" not internalized the new dominant rules of the game to quite the same degree that, in the 1930s, Germans had "learned" the racist practices and

¹⁰ For the multiple uses of these interviews by Mary Fulbrook see also her essay, 'Living Through the GDR: History, Life Stories and Generations in East Germany', in Caroline Pearce and Nick Hodgkin (eds.), *The GDR Remembered: Representations of the East German State Since 1989* (New York, 2010); see p. 360, n. 7 and p. 441, n. 2.

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beliefs in “German superiority” that were so rapidly acquired in the Nazi period’. For all the belief in the powers of socialist persuasion, Fulbrook argues, ‘it seemed increasingly unlikely that most East Germans would ever become quite as enthusiastic for communism as many had been for Hitler’ (p. 373).

This may be just a function of the relative longevity of the SED regime, or of the violent surge for war in the case of the Third Reich. It may also allow for a more nuanced interpretation of the strength of ideological socializations in the two war youth generations, however adaptable they might have been in the situation of fully re-scripted life chances. But, on the whole, this does not distract from the true merit of this book. From her vast experience with the coping mechanisms needed to survive in the GDR with some sort of self-respect Fulbrook also adds to our understanding of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, not just as an ideological propaganda performance or a symbolic sham-les of mass belonging, but as an enticing double act which allowed people to live in ‘two worlds’, a simulated social self and an insecure inner self. In the end, this subjective experience, which Fulbrook culls from hundreds of private stories, is the hidden transcript which destroyed not just the ‘public sphere’ but also the idea of an authentic self in both German dictatorships.

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DAVID ROLLASON, CONRAD LEYSER, and HANNAH WILLIAMS (eds.), *England and the Continent in the Tenth Century: Studies in Honour of Wilhelm Levison (1876–1947)*, *Studies in the Early Middle Ages*, 37 (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers NV, 2010), xxvi + 573 pp. ISBN 978 2 503 53208 0. €115.00

This edited volume comprises twenty-five papers delivered in Durham in 2007 at a conference held to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the death of Wilhelm Levison (1876–1947). In keeping with Levison's academic lifework, most notably his celebrated lecture series *England and the Continent in the Eighth Century*, the international authors contributing to this book set out to investigate the political, ecclesiastical, legal, economic, and cultural relationships between Anglo-Saxon England and the Continent in the tenth century. As editor Conrad Leyser points out in his introduction, the aim of the 2007 conference and its proceedings was 'to set down in writing the oral "lore" of Levison—a living tradition for the postwar generation of medievalists, but by no means self-evident to their twenty-first-century successors' (p. 1). Leyser goes on to establish that the explicit intention of this volume is to combine contemporary currents in Continental and especially English history with more 'traditional' approaches to the period under consideration, thereby perpetuating Levison's seminal work in what is now the second decade of the twenty-first century.

The book is structured into five sections, each of which contains between three and eight essays pertaining to a specific aspect of the cross-Channel relationship during the tenth century. The first, and by far the largest, section is dedicated to examining the different 'Routeways, Contacts, and Attitudes' which connected England and the Continent at the end of the early Middle Ages. In their opening essay, Stéphane LeBecq and Alban Gautier investigate the economic and naval aspects of these routeways by looking at the existence of merchants' relationships between England, Scandinavia, and mainland Europe (predominantly late/post-Carolingian Francia). They argue that in the period under consideration trading activities were renew-

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ed, with the city and harbour of London representing a vital focal point. John Insley presents a detailed study of Continental Germanic personal names which resurfaced in tenth-century England, drawing attention to the need to consider distributional and chronological factors very carefully before reaching conclusions concerning the dialectal provenance of such naming phenomena. He nevertheless concludes that the majority of moneyers' names occurring in tenth-century England betray a West Frankish typology.

Andreas Bihrer's contribution on Anglo-Saxons in the tenth-century Reich eventually shifts the geographical focus away from England, mainly by highlighting the crucial role played by English exiles, abbots, wives, and messengers on the Continent in establishing what he calls a 'mid-distance relationship' between England and the Reich. Steven Vanderputten's study of Flemish monasticism and its contacts with tenth and early eleventh-century England, in particular, with the archbishopric of Canterbury, persuasively reassesses former trends in scholarship by placing the surviving sources in their original regional context. He considers the Flemish monasteries as attempting to establish, and consolidate, functional networks on an international scale. An even closer look at the written sources and their composition is provided by Richard Gameson, who meticulously traces the work of an itinerant English illuminator towards the end of the tenth century, considering both monastic and secular backgrounds. He convincingly suggests the possibility that the itinerant master was, in fact, a layman rather than a cleric. In similar fashion, albeit taking a rather different methodological approach, Michael Wood develops an insightful personal and professional profile for a Carolingian scholar, working and teaching at King Æthelstan's court. This essay is particularly valuable in adding specific and tangible evidence to a period of which, as Wood points out, we often only have fragmentary knowledge.

Francesca Tinti presents a more general view of the relationships between England and the Roman papacy during the tenth century, based primarily on a series of surviving papal letters. According to Tinti, relationships between the Curia and England in the period under consideration by and large remained rather affectionate. Concluding the first section is Marco Mostert's intriguing case study of relations between Fleury and England during the period under consideration, which he bases on both discursive arguments and the surviving manuscript evidence. Despite its inventorial nature, Mostert's

essay is one of the strongest contributions to the volume, employing an inductive approach which allows for compelling arguments based on a selection of pertinent examples.

The second section of the volume is entitled 'Kingship, Royal Models, and Dynastic Strategies', and offers a somewhat more concise focus than the preceding section. Its five essays interrelate very well and offer a broad perspective from both sides of the English Channel. Veronica Ortenberg begins by asking why the involvement of the English King Æthelstan would have mattered in tenth-century Continental affairs, especially considering intermarriage and dynastic ties. She regards Æthelstan as having been, 'culturally and ideologically, an English Carolingian, if not even an English Charlemagne' (p. 235). Just how important such cross-Channel affairs and shared Anglo-Frankish ideologies were in securing the standing and prestige of Anglo-Saxon royal families on the Continent is further underlined by Sarah Foot's compelling investigation of West Saxon dynastic strategies and heritage politics. Foot demonstrates that intermarriage was among the most essential means by which Æthelstan sought, and indeed managed, to make a name for himself beyond the Channel.

The study of monastic reform and royal ideology offered by Simon MacLean dovetails neatly with this topic, as he also chooses examples associated with the female members of Æthelstan's lineage and their relationship with important families and institutions on the Continent to underpin his analysis. He argues that there was a strong interdependence between the influential monastic institutions and their secular patrons, both male and female. A more direct comparison between royal circles in England and on the European mainland is provided by David A. Warner in his study of Anglo-Saxon and Ottonian coronations and the specific ideology which underlay them. He concludes his argument by advocating a more comparative perspective on coronation rituals for future research. This comparative approach is maintained in the next and final contribution to this section, in which Janet L. Nelson offers a more general, yet highly convincing, view of visions and practices of tenth-century kingship on both sides of the Channel.

The third section comprises three papers dealing with the dynamics of 'Law and the Working of Government'. Thomas Zotz opens the section with an essay on kingship and royal palaces in the Ottonian

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realm, which he considers in direct comparison with the situation in England around the same time. Zotz concludes that, in terms of the practice of government, little difference existed between the two realms. David Pratt's discussion of written law and the communication of authority in tenth-century England once again draws attention to royal circles in the reign of King Æthelstan, emphasizing the importance of written legal contracts for maintaining the king's peace. Charles West closes the section with a study of legal culture in tenth-century Lotharingia, thus adding a valuable Continental perspective to the topic, whilst also discussing a selection of manuscripts. He arrives at the conclusion that, on a larger scale, Lotharingia and England in the tenth century represented loosely connected yet mutually related societies.

The fourth section offers an investigation of 'The Church: Organization and Culture'. The first of five papers is Wendy Davies's enquiry into the organization of the Spanish church in the tenth century, and the ways in which it differed from its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. Whilst demonstrating how England in many respects represented a 'case apart', Davies also provides persuasive evidence of a number of striking similarities between the English system and the ecclesiastical organization of medieval Spain. Stefan Brink provides a view of Scandinavian forms of pastoral care, with a strong focus on Sweden's early ecclesiastical organization. Sarah Hamilton's essay on the early English pontificals then moves on to compare Anglo-Saxon and Continental evidence on her chosen subject. Jesse D. Billet's contribution looks at a somewhat later period, that is, late Anglo-Saxon England, and concentrates on the secular clergy and its members' provision of the divine office. Based on a substantial number of manuscripts, Billet's essay concludes that amongst the more important innovations achieved by the monastic reform movement was the liturgical adoption of the Benedictine *cursus*. The last essay in this section is, again, a more specialized case study by Brigitte Meijns, who considers relic relations as a potential key to Anglo-Flemish relations during the late ninth and early tenth centuries.

The final section of the volume is entitled 'The Vision of the Past'. It brings together different studies of how people during the period under consideration conceived of, as well as used, their past in historical and historiographical discourse. Thomas F. X. Noble opens the section with a discussion of a number of tenth-century historians

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and their respective interest in, and treatment of, the past. Julia Crick's paper is concerned with the role of forgeries in reconstructions of a distinctively 'English' past during the tenth century. Concluding the section, and the book, is Yann Coz's insightful investigation of how Roman history was perceived and utilized in Anglo-Saxon England.

In conclusion, the volume's broad topical horizon, combining various aspects of the complex relationship between England and its neighbours beyond the Channel, is laudable indeed. Moreover, the editors and contributors have maintained a careful balance between specialized case studies and more general overviews throughout. This is a particularly judicious approach, considering this volume's ultimately successful attempt to provide an interdisciplinary discussion aimed at a period which, as Conrad Leyser aptly puts it in his introduction, 'must still play Cinderella to her sisters, the ninth and eleventh centuries' (p. 10). Perhaps, however, more attention could have been paid to broadening the chronological horizon just a little further to include later developments of the early to mid eleventh century. Some of the contributors actually do adopt this approach and the benefit is evident: it facilitates a broader comparative perspective on the period under consideration and helps to bring out with greater precision specific differences and similarities with later centuries, especially with regard to the Norman/Anglo-Norman period. In addition, the interdisciplinary approach could arguably have been taken even further to include a wider range of, for example, philological, archaeological, or theological papers. Overall, however, these are relatively minor criticisms, and it is important to acknowledge that the volume makes an immensely valuable contribution to a scholarly tradition that still owes much to, whilst also developing in various important directions from, the remarkable work of Wilhelm Levison.

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CRAIG KOSLOFSKY, *Evening's Empire: A History of the Night in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), xvi + 431 pp. ISBN 978 0 521 89643 6 (hardback) £55.00 US\$90.00 ISBN 978 0 521 72106 6 (paperback) £18.99 US\$29.99

The night, too, has a history, one that can cast a different light on many of the things that happen during the day. Craig Koslofsky's *Evening's Empire* attempts nothing less than a description of the European early modern period in terms of a process of 'nocturnalization'. What does this mean? The author defines this concept as 'the ongoing expansion of the legitimate social and symbolic uses of the night' as found in spiritual and political expression, public space, and the use of daily time among poets, princes, courtiers, burghers, and common people (pp. 1–2). Koslofsky's investigation is devoted less to the night as such than to the opposition between day and night, which is of historical interest because during the early modern period it began to lose its congruence with the opposition between light and dark. The subject of this stimulating and informative book is the multilayered, symbolic, and ever more dynamic relationship between day and night which arose out of the increasing illumination of the darkness of night by street lighting and fireworks at court. Thus the night is presented not only as a *subject* but also a *category* of analysis, which makes it possible to bring together approaches drawn from the history of everyday life and cultural history: physical illumination on the one hand and on the other the symbolic revaluation of the night wherever religious-moral illumination, and thus a new social order, was to be created.

Early modern astronomers had discovered that the cosmos was filled with darkness, not light. It was not least this insight that brought home to contemporaries that light could not exist without darkness. The result (and precondition) of nocturnalization was an awareness of the constitutive complementarity of light and dark. This also means that in the early modern period the night lost some of its traditional menace while holding out new dangers. This should not be understood dialectically. When the Enlightenment undertook to illuminate the whole world, it also produced new darknesses, but unintentionally and only in a metaphorical sense. In the early modern period, by contrast, the complementarity of light and dark opened up space for complex positive references to the night in blueprints for social and cultural order.

Koslofsky starts with religion (chapters two and three). For the pious, the night was not only a place of physical menace but increasingly also a time of temptation and contestation. It was easiest for the devil at night. This is why demonologists located not only the witches' Sabbath but also Hell itself at night—both the place of transcendental punishment and the repentant conscience of the individual: the knowledge of sin in one's own heart.

In the early modern period, therefore, the night continued to be a time of terror and fear, and in the context of the history of salvation, its menacing aspects were, if anything, enhanced. Unlike in the Middle Ages, however, the increased dangers were accompanied by new chances for salvation. The night provided a field of activity not only for the devil, but also for his master. At a time of interdenominational violence, the darkness of night could be deployed as a rhetorical instrument for demonizing the enemy. It could also, however, provide a refuge in which religion could be pursued without danger; a foundation for Nicodemism in the positive sense, as practised by the Anabaptists, for example. Going beyond this material dimension, it also led to God in a spiritual sense. In mystical contexts, darkness was no longer reduced to the absence of light, advancing instead to become its complementary counterpart. Theologians knew that there was no path to the light of divine justice without the darkness of sin. Only the night of the self, the denial of sensuality and reason, led to knowledge of God and oneself; only the knowledge of the ineffable nature of a God concealed in the dark made it possible to say anything about Him; it was only at night that the soul found the freedom to seek for God and unite with Him.

In a word, darkness did not drive out the light; it was understood not merely as the negation of light, but as the condition that made it possible. In the early modern period the things of the world were recognized through their opposites. This epistemological principle was also expressed in religion. The God of early modern Christianity acted in concealment; He led people into the darkness of sin so that He could lead them out again, into the light of His salvation. That is, in God opposites came together. Mystics, in particular, pushed this thought as far as it could go, but they were not the only ones to share it. Thus Koslofsky concludes that in contrast to the late medieval mystical estimation of the night, 'the early modern night opened up greater heights *and* lower depths for the Christian soul, epitomizing

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the formation of the early modern Christian subject' (p. 86). In the second half of the seventeenth century when, in addition to an apocalyptic darkening of the world, natural philosophers made more attempts to illuminate the divine word, these also produced the insight that no light could shine without darkness.

In chapter four Koslofsky moves from the places of religious practice and reflection to the political sphere, that is, initially, the court. The monarch underlined his claim to spiritual and political sovereignty by reinforcing its traditional confessional sources with the 'natural' authority of the Sun King. What was new was not the symbolic language of the sun as such, but the increased intensity of the ruler's radiance through a deliberate contrast with darkness. This was achieved by illuminating the night with fireworks and a court theatre which in this way discovered the stage technique of perspective and could be drawn upon for the metaphorical characterization of human, earthly existence. The bourgeois and the pious found new nourishment for their criticism of the court in this shifting of the everyday life of the court into the night. At court itself, however, the Sun King represented, legitimized, and created his dominion by overcoming darkness. He invoked the darkness of denominational disputes, and led his royal household into the night in order to allow the light of his divine right to shine all the brighter. Not only because of the sovereign's dissimulation, deception, and awe-inspiring incontestability: the Sun King was always also a prince of darkness.

The introduction of street lighting in many European cities during the last forty years of the seventeenth century is the subject of the fifth chapter. It describes both the physical installation of lighting and its changing function. The purpose of street lighting was not only to maintain law and order, but also to adorn the cities and to represent aristocratic rule locally. This form of nocturnalization also had religious antecedents. In the eyes of Christian utopians, the physical illumination of the night also freed it from moral darkness. A respectable and profitable night life could be created by driving out the students, apprentices, servants, prostitutes, frequenters of inns, and soldiers who traditionally populated the urban night.

There was no lack of resistance to the programme of street lighting (chapter six), not only from the local town authorities who were not prepared to finance the stage on which aristocrats could represent themselves, but especially from the traditional cultures of the

night. Again and again, newly installed lanterns were smashed, the attempt to prevent crime at night thus engendering a new form of criminality. Against the background of this resistance, the installation of street lighting became an act of 'colonizing' the urban night. It created a new public sphere at night, for example, by making it possible for not only men, but also 'women of quality' (but not middle-class women) to visit coffee houses late. In this way, street lighting sharpened the contrast between the lives of respectable young people, and those who endangered order. In the long term, however, it not only secured the power of the authorities, but led to their destabilization. Coffee house gatherings generated criticism of those who had made night time meetings there possible in the first place.

The colonization of the *rural* night was pursued by church and state, and directed less at promoting trade and consumption (chapter seven). Its intention was not to extend daytime activities into the night, but primarily to banish traditional activities (such as extramarital sex, for example) from the night. Young people in the country also resisted this, and they were considerably more successful than their city counterparts because they had the tacit support of the village elders. These did not see traditional night time activities such as the charivari or village marriage customs as disrupting order, but rather as creating it. Only the Catholic reform brought new night time activities to rural areas, for example, the practice of forty hours devotion. Such forms of lay piety did not fall victim to the suspicion of the clergy until the end of the seventeenth century. Given the differential success of the drive to suppress night time youth culture, the two-track colonization of the night ultimately produced a new opposition between town and country. From now on, the country stood for 'the absence of nocturnalization' (p. 230).

Enlightenment voices associated this absence with a belief in ghosts, witchcraft, and Hell (chapter eight). Attempts to bring light into this darkness were similarly unsuccessful for a long time, and not only because of the rural population's deeply ingrained beliefs. Given the challenges of natural philosophy, theologians had themselves raised the bad spirits again and conferred new meanings upon them. By the second half of the seventeenth century, spirits and witches had mutated from instruments of the devil into 'empirical' proof of the immortality of the soul and the existence of a God who used the devil for his own purposes. Thus here, too, we find a specif-

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ically early modern theological recourse to the night. At Protestant courts in particular, it was tied to the representation of a rule which, in its belief in the majesty of God and its anxiety about its own dethroning, trusted in the opposition between light and dark. Given this background, Hell itself was granted a long life. Even those who exposed a belief in Hell as 'superstition' were unable to dispense with it entirely, using it for the purposes of social disciplining by analogy with the manipulative and deceptive game played with darkness in the court theatre. Thus Koslofsky places the Enlightened discourses which contested the existence of ghosts, witches, and Hell in localities where nights were furthest opened up: the illuminated cities. These discourses declared darkness the opposite of reason, and thus located it in all 'non-civilized' peoples and cultures (but, it should be added, always also found it in the depths of the Enlightened self).

The light metaphors used by the Enlightenment, Koslofsky concludes, followed on from those of Christianity, but no longer shared the religious high regard for darkness (p. 281). The author of the book underlines continuities here; this reviewer, on the other hand, prefers to emphasize change. In Enlightenment thinking, the contrast between light and dark became a binary opposition, which it had not been in the early modern period. The darkness of night, through which Enlightenment reason had constituted itself, was thus transformed into something not only predominantly negative, but also purely metaphorical. The development of Enlightenment light metaphors, therefore, cannot be adequately understood as a secularization of Christian illumination. Here the limits of the term 'nocturnalization' become apparent. Koslofsky's account suggests that there were, in essence, two early modern responses to the night: first, physical illumination driving out the night; and secondly, the religious and political instrumentalization of its darkness. The two processes, the book suggests, were not congruent, and nor did they follow on from each other seamlessly. The fact that the term 'nocturnalization' suggests that they did, however, is due to its authoritarian and thus ultimately modern perspective, in which the Enlightenment is presented as both the completion and the overcoming of the process under discussion. The problems which the concept raises are most obvious where nocturnalization was not only not achieved, but not even attempted: that is, in the rural areas where, according to

Koslofsky, we can observe at best a failed de-nocturnalization. However catchy the term, it orients the religious and courtly treatment of the night by the end point of an Enlightenment which, at the same time, accompanied, continued, and criticized this treatment. The paradigm of nocturnalization not only prevents the inclusion in the investigation of phenomena such as dreams, for example, which are genuinely and a priori associated with the night; it also suggests that the historical development being described was one-dimensional and linear in a way that this highly readable book itself refutes in its demonstration of tension-filled and often paradoxically complex responses to the early modern night, of the dislocations in the practical everyday and symbolic relationship of day and night, light and dark.

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JERROLD SEIGEL, *Modernity and Bourgeois Life: Society, Politics, and Culture in England, France and Germany since 1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), xii + 626 pp. ISBN 978 1 107 01810 5. £55.00 (US \$95.00) (hardback). ISBN 978 1 107 66678 8. £19.99 (US \$29.99) (paperback)

This is a timely and challenging book. It deals with a problem that first structured, then complicated the historiography of the nineteenth century: the assumption that the 'bourgeoisie' was responsible for the evolution of economic, political, and cultural 'modernity'. Once an immensely popular field, the historiography of the nineteenth-century European middle classes has lost much of its lustre in recent decades. Just as it displaced the history of the working classes in the 1980s, it has had to give way to studies that focus on what are now considered social *loci* of political power and economic influence: aristocracy and monarchy.

This state of affairs is admittedly somewhat curious. An immense amount of effort directed at reconstructing the social history of the middle classes, motivated by the assumption that this could explain the political development of European countries, has resulted in the conclusion that their direct political importance was relatively limited. Yet middle-class studies took their predictions from significant representatives of nineteenth-century public opinion, who considered the middle classes a social phenomenon of growing importance that did shape the present and future of European countries.

One response to this state of affairs has been to rephrase the question: to consider talk of middle-class dominance either as an aspiration for the future or as a collective social illusion, and therefore to ask why people convinced themselves that the middle classes were not just crucial, but permanently on the rise. In this vein, David Cannadine and Dror Wahrman have produced fascinating narratives that describe the uses and abuses of simplified descriptions of society as a function of political struggles for (in-)equality.

Seigel's approach is very different. The question he formulates is not why the middle class loomed larger in political and social observation than in reality, but what made the future seem bourgeois, and why the bourgeoisie appeared particularly modern. Seigel offers a way around the dilemma that there is no particularly strong proof that all modern practices had a bourgeois social origin by arguing

that this is not the relevant criterion. He argues that what was important was something else: middle-class peculiarities were intrinsically modern because they all resulted from integration into a 'network of means' which he defines as 'a chain or web of people and instruments that links distant energies and resources to each other, allowing individuals and groups to draw them together, create synergies between them, and employ the capacity they generate for some particular purpose or goal' (pp. 7-8). Seigel identifies three networks of means relevant to the topic: '1. markets, 2. the state and other administrative structures; and 3. webs of information and communication' (p. 8). The market was, of course, the arena in which the bourgeoisie was first observed and in which bourgeois capitalists operated. The other two arenas produced the other parts that made up the *Bürgertum*: administrators and professionals. Thus, nineteenth-century observers were correct in pointing out that something was happening that was at once bourgeois, forward-looking, and innovative.

All three networks of means depended on a medium of exchange that facilitated communication between individuals unknown to each other across great distances. The medium was most clearly visible in the marketplace: (paper) money. For the second sphere, Seigel describes it as legitimacy; in the third sphere, the currency of exchange was 'communicative competence' (p. 14).

The first part of Seigel's book is devoted to tracing the evolution of the three networks of means in the three spheres in each of the countries named in the title (England, France, and Germany). Three chapters are devoted to the period before 1850, three further chapters to the years up to (roughly) 1900. Seigel argues that all three countries witnessed the replacement of local relationships based on prior acquaintance and rank by modern networks of means open to anyone able to obtain the currency required. He seeks to document that the decisive transitions occurred everywhere only after 1850 (thus siding with interpretations that place the modernization of the British economy in the 1870s), but that the three countries did differ in the relationship between the three networks. Market integration came first in England, but politics and the cultural sphere continued to rest on old-style relations longer than in France or Germany. Political integration was the key in France, where the state created a national market and a national public sphere. Germany was the latecomer with regard both to market integration

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and the political sphere, but precocious in terms of cultural integration.

Part two discusses ways in which the currencies of interaction became standardized after 1850: national bank notes replaced metal coins of different values and types; time became a quantity that was easily and uniformly measured; relationships between men and women were less focused on marriage and reproduction, and there were fewer constraints on the expression of sexuality. The final chapter in this section focuses on 'Jews as bourgeois and network people'.

The book's last part leaves behind a systematic consideration of networks of means and a comparative focus on England, France, and Germany in order to look instead at the arts in the 'culture of means' that shaped the (late) nineteenth century: museums, music and musicians, education as a means of integration and class distinction, and, finally, the depiction of bourgeois life in modern art, with French artists' impressions of the USA and Gustav Klimt's paintings of Austrian scenes and people looming quite large. The conclusion seeks to demonstrate the salience and relevance of the book's approach by casting the internet as the present-day equivalent of the networks of means that revolutionized the nineteenth century.

Seigel's text is clearly based on a lifetime of reading and thinking about the problems it treats. His approach is comprehensive, and he refers to the literature on the bourgeoisie's social profile and intellectual world view as effortlessly as to specialized studies of the social makeup of German provincial towns or the artistic production of individual members of the European avant-garde. The book is refreshingly free of a marked preference for traditional or postmodern approaches, general studies, or particular cases. Seigel places considerable importance on artistic interpretations of the nineteenth century in novels, paintings, and historiography without, however, losing sight of their context or perspectives. The theory he expounds is fascinating and likely to move the debate out of the dead end in which it has remained for some time, although it is, at some levels, similar to the Bielefeld School's emphasis on *Bürgerlichkeit*, that is, a bourgeois culture, not a bourgeois position in the economy or a middle-class income, as the key nineteenth-century class distinction.

A few critical observations are, of course, inescapable in response to such a wide-ranging book. One can quibble about a few details. For example, the *Kleinbürgertum*, which Seigel places after the 1850s

(pp. 248–9), was introduced into German social and political discourse via radical interpretations of the 1830 revolution in France about twenty years earlier. As with other grand interpretations of the nineteenth century, it is possible to wonder whether Seigel's book could have done without some of the narratives of well-known facts or interpretations to make room for the systematic exposition of the 'networks of means' he postulates. The general observations about the economic and political itineraries of England, France, and Germany summarized very briefly above are unlikely to be disputed, but take up space that could have been used more profitably for a more systematic exposition of what the various networks of means accomplished, how they were structured, and how (or why) they related to the bourgeoisie. Perhaps for reasons of space, the treatment of the three networks is very uneven, and the book's topics become less focused as the text progresses. While the account is fairly systematic with regard to the economy (particularly concerning money), and broad, though more impressionistic, with regard to the arts (which serve as the key example of networks of information and communication), it is extremely parsimonious in following up the fascinating ideas about ways of documenting 'legitimacy' set out in the introduction and, indeed, in its treatment of politics.

My second query relates to the way in which Seigel appears to frame his story, at least in the first two parts of the book. There it seems that the networks of means operate primarily within national boundaries. They serve to enhance national integration and thus contribute to the mobilization of energies and potentials within and for states. Framing the argument in this way strikes me as potentially problematic, especially as it is not always entirely clear whether Seigel's networks are an empirical reality or a theoretical and in some ways normative description. This is apparent, for instance, in the discussion of railways' impact on market integration or communication, which implicitly assumes that the integrative effect was national, not regional or transnational, even though very few railway lines stopped at borders. It is worth pointing out that Paris was linked to Cologne by rail much sooner than to the rest of France, and that the chronology of political conflict in the Rhineland was thus perhaps not accidentally more closely influenced by Paris than by Berlin in the early nineteenth century. Perhaps the absence of a national focus (and thus of pronounced national cultural distinctions) was a feature

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of bourgeois modernity enhanced by transnational networks of means. If so, this could go far towards explaining its crisis or its end in the twentieth century.

The problem also appears in Seigel's treatment of the British Isles. That he has chosen to look at England is clear, for example, in the treatment of the evolution of national paper money, where the examples given apply neither to Scotland nor to Ireland. But networks governed by legitimacy or communicative competence surely failed to exclude Scotland, Ireland, or the Empire, so that the network boundaries appear to be blurred rather than clear. However, the book's final chapters, which place the bourgeoisie in a more global context, implicitly make this point, thus complementing the nation-state focus of the earlier ones in an interesting way.

In a field characterized by many simplistic assumptions about the relationship between classes, nations, states, and economic development, a framework that avoids every questionable unit of analysis is obviously not possible. By providing alternative ways of thinking about the relationship between social class and cultural change, Seigel's magisterial account of the relationship between modernity and bourgeoisie is one of the most interesting books on the subject for decades, and therefore likely to spark debate, provoke responses, and serve as a starting point for research agendas for a considerable time.

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FRANK LORENZ MÜLLER, *Our Fritz: Emperor Frederick III and the Political Culture of Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), 340 pp. ISBN 978 0 674 04838 6. £33.95

Our memory of German emperor Frederick III today is almost completely limited to the tragedy of his illness and ensuing brief rule of only ninety-nine days in 1888. Closely linked to the fate of this beacon of the liberal minded is one of the main questions of counter-factual history: how would Germany have developed if Frederick had ruled for longer? Would he, as many argued, have transformed Germany into a parliamentary monarchy and steered a course in foreign politics avoiding confrontation with Germany's neighbours? The implications are obvious: they come down to the question of whether German history in the twentieth century would have taken a completely different, much more positive, course if Frederick III's personal fate had been more fortunate.

Frank Lorenz Müller, in what is the first scholarly biography of the Second Reich's second emperor, does not dismiss these considerations as unhistorical. Rather, he deploys the intriguing if-then problem intelligently to structure his narrative into much more than a biographical account. He transposes the subjunctive into the question of how Frederick William, as the future emperor was known as a crown prince, could develop as an individual in the Prussian dynastic context in which he grew up. Secondly, Müller asks what leeway the crown prince had, and a longer ruling emperor would have had. Müller thus opens up what he refers to as the political culture of the Reich, making relevant the long period when Frederick had little direct political significance.

After all, Frederick's years in waiting were spent just one step away from the throne during the decisive period when Prussia was transformed from an ailing semi-great power into the dominant force on the European Continent in its new capacity as a German nation-state. The crown prince was in his early thirties when his father, William I, ascended the throne and, encouraged and pushed by Otto von Bismarck, abandoned his liberal credentials, sidelining parliament in favour of an unchecked expansion of the military. Müller shows that the conflict between father and son broke out as early as this, describing it as a situation in which the son's prospects depended on his father's life.

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The crown prince made public the strong reservations he held about the conservative course taken by his father, and deliberately stopped attending the council of ministers. Yet his opposition did not go beyond these rather symbolic acts. He almost never questioned his loyalty to his father, although their relationship was often troubled. Frederick William explicitly approved of reforming and enlarging the army, and he later never questioned the military's relevance and position. This pattern was repeated at a number of critical moments in Prussian-German history, when Frederick William found himself close to the centre of decision-making but with few means of really exerting power. He clearly held liberal views, at least in his diary, but was neither able nor willing to give his convictions political expression. His lack of talent for politics might have played a part in this. Yet Müller demonstrates that Frederick William actually shared many of the key assumptions underlying the Hohenzollerns' *raison d'être*: the unquestioned role of a strong monarch backed by a strong army and a belief in the Hohenzollerns' superiority over all other German states because of their alleged historical mission and achievements.

Müller lays out his interpretation in thematic chapters. He starts by describing the defining personal relationships between Frederick William and his father William I, his wife Victoria (known as 'Vicky' and daughter of Queen Victoria), and his opponent Otto von Bismarck, although Müller questions this characterization. The image of Vicky obsessed contemporaries and later commentators alike. Müller does not choose the easy option of denouncing the dark myth of the later Empress Frederick as motivated solely by xenophobia and conservative narrow-mindedness. While stressing Vicky's talents and intelligence, he points out that she almost obsessively took every opportunity to let the Prussians and Germans know how inferior she considered everything in her new home by comparison with Britain. Against the background of growing Anglophobia in Germany, this insensitivity increasingly also harmed her husband's public image. He appeared to be a weakling in his wife's hands and, given the close connections which Vicky maintained with her native Britain, also a potential security risk. The latter contributed to the fact that in later years Frederick William was sidelined politically, losing out against his own son.

The crown prince's relationship with Bismarck, Müller points out, was more complex than is commonly assumed. Both believed, or at

least accepted, that a continuation of Bismarck's chancellorship would work under the new emperor. Tellingly, the question of whether the chancellor would stay on was one of the few points on which Frederick William disagreed with his wife who, of course, fiercely opposed this notion. On the one hand, the crown prince clearly understood that Bismarck's almost unchecked executive power and public standing threatened to overshadow the Hohenzollern dynasty; on the other, he had to admit that Bismarck's political experience made him 'more necessary' than the crown prince himself. This was much more than just the question of a personal relationship. Müller provides clear evidence that Frederick William's acceptance of Bismarck meant that the crown prince would not introduce a parliamentary system, the great hope of liberal-minded contemporaries and counter-factual historians alike.

In a chapter entitled 'Liberalism and Empire' Müller looks at how substantial these liberal hopes were. He provides ample evidence that Frederick William shared the liberal, often left liberal (*freisinnig* in the German terminology) convictions of his time and generation. Publicly, the most marked expression of this may be found in the clear stance he took against the growth of anti-Semitism in the 1870s. He did not, however, question the essentials of Hohenzollern rule. The crown prince made it very clear that he considered it a bad idea to appoint party leaders as ministers, which would establish the link between democratically elected politicians and the government so desperately lacking in Germany. He also held strong views about the necessity of strong monarchical rule and wanted to see the restricted influence of the Reichstag curtailed even further. Both the chancellor and the German princes were to be strictly subordinated to the office of German emperor.

In opposition to his father, Frederick William enthusiastically endorsed the main ideas of developing Reich nationalism, at least after 1870. This culminated in hyperbolic but concrete plans to evoke the medieval empire and place the Hohenzollern dynasty in an artificial line of continuity. In this, he was even more detached from modernity than his more sober, Prussian-minded father. The crown prince saw himself as a future Frederick IV in succession to the medieval emperor Frederick III rather than the Prussian king Frederick II. While this plan was eventually deflected by Bismarck, the crown prince certainly played a large part in the whole concep-

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tion of the new German Kaisertum. He initiated a number of specific projects to commemorate Hohenzollern glory which were later taken up by his son. In stark contrast to his son, however, Frederick William evoked strong loyalties in southern Germany based on his command of Bavarian troops during the French campaign of 1870. There he was seen as the embodiment of Germanness rather than as a Prussian prince and later king, thus demonstrating the potential of the new office of German Kaiser.

It is a strength of Müller's study that he points to the strong but often still neglected resources of monarchical power upon which Frederick William could draw. This gave him popular appeal, summed up in the almost mystical figure of 'Our Fritz', a public persona shaped largely on the battlefields of Bohemia (1866) and Alsace (1870) and further enhanced by many anecdotes about how easily the crown prince related to his subjects from all strata of society. All this added up to Frederick William as a 'paragon of bourgeois virtue' and made him, as Müller puts it, a true 'super-Bürger' (p. 121). Personal character traits and talent certainly played a crucial part here, but the transfer of monarchical knowledge from Victorian England, where such patterns had been established successfully, and references to the powerful myth of Queen Louise, Frederick William's grandmother, also played an important role. Bourgeois devotion certainly helped the monarchy, but it also reflected growing Hohenzollern dependence on the support of the *Bürgertum*—plus the new phenomenon of the media.

The public success and high-flying plans of Frederick William, who had given up hope of ever exerting political influence long before he fell victim to cancer, eventually came to nothing with his tragic end in 1888. The ninety-nine days to some extent encapsulated the many frustrations of preceding decades. Müller highlights the petty role played by those at the centre of power, in particular, the new strong man of the Hohenzollern dynasty, William II. Frederick III and his wife, trying to seize the opportunity, were limited to taking negative action against conservative politicians with almost no opportunity to put through their own schemes. Müller shows that Bismarck retained full control of political affairs throughout Frederick III's short reign.

Müller provides new details of the last, dramatic phase of Frederick III's life and their political implications. So far, we have mainly

been aware of these from the perspective of Bismarck or, through the works of John Röhl, William II. Yet even more than the many new insights gleaned from the meticulous reading of a vast array of sources, their interpretation in context makes for the high quality of this book. During Frederick III's last days, committed supporters offered to donate their healthy larynxes as transplants to save their political hero. Here, as in many other instances, Müller links biographical detail with a more complex discussion of the transformation of the Hohenzollern monarchy from Prussian to German, from mid-nineteenth-century detachment to the intense public interchange of unleashed modernity. While some familiarity with nineteenth-century German history is assumed, Müller presents complex matters in an admirably accessible and elegant style. Had 'Our Fritz' lived longer, he would, according to Müller, almost certainly not have been a great reformer working towards a more liberal Germany. Yet there is much to suggest that he might have been a more effective monarch than his son, perhaps addressing the many internal cleavages with greater ease and tact.

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ANNE FRIEDRICHS, *Das Empire als Aufgabe des Historikers. Historiographie in imperialen Nationalstaaten: Großbritannien und Frankreich 1919–1968* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2011), 370 pp. ISBN 978 3 593 39481 7. €39.90

It is more than an act of professional self-flattery to argue that historians have played a crucial role in state-building. Among the scholars who have recently provided compelling confirmation of this proposition are Lutz Raphael, Peter Schöttler, who has written of history as a *Legitimationswissenschaft*, and Matthias Middell, who supervised the dissertation of Anne Friedrichs, which is under review here. Friedrichs has extended the proposition to the colonial empires of Great Britain and France during the twentieth century. Studying the impact of colonial empire on French and British historiography, she seeks to explore the ways in which historians constructed 'ordering narratives' (p. 17) or 'master narratives for their societies' (p. 21). To this end the author focuses on the 'communicative nodal points in the historiographical field' (p. 20), that is, historical handbooks and leading professional journals in the two countries (particularly the book reviews in these journals). She calculates that this literature not only represented current historical thinking, but was also the most likely to influence the practice of colonialism via the training of British and French colonial officials. This approach then guides the historiographical survey through its three phases: the 'challenges' to colonial empire between 1919 and 1945, the attempt to establish colonial 'partnerships' between 1945 and 1956, and the putative end of empires thereafter.

The result is an extended survey of this historical literature, together with biographical information about some of the principal authors, most of whom were academics and retired colonial officials, and an account of institutional changes that bore on the historiography of colonialism, in the first instance, new professorships, institutes, and journals. Friedrichs shows that despite the blows inflicted by the First World War, French and British historians alike remained confident in the colonial project. While the French wrote of assimilating colonial peoples and insisted anew on a civilizing mission as the rationale for empire, their British counterparts wrote approvingly of the renewal and liberalization of empire, particularly the growing autonomy of the dominions (if not India) as it found form in the

British Commonwealth. The British view modulated but little in the aftermath of the Second World War, as historians began to treat the history of the British empire in the light of the worldwide promotion of freedom. French historians, on the other hand, found discussion of overseas empire painful after 1945 and preferred to say little about the *Union française*. Then, in the 1960s, the historiographical focus turned in both countries to the states that had emerged from colonial empire, although historians in neither country had done much to champion decolonization.

If the results of this study are a little meagre, the fault is not entirely the author's. The survey is devoted in the main to describing chapters in handbooks. To judge from the sources that she has chosen to use, colonialism was not a controversial subject among professional historians in Britain or France, particularly at the elite universities. Debates over the fundamental causes and historical significance of imperialism did not make it into the leading journals or historical surveys, where the views of Lenin, Luxemburg, Hilferding, or, for that matter, J. A. Hobson, had no supporters. More echoes of a socialist critique of imperialism found their way into the French literature after the Second World War, because Marxist historians there enjoyed more access to the standard works than Friedrichs surveys. Despite the intentions initially signalled in *Past and Present*, British Marxists were not much interested in the history of empire. The only debate of significance that surfaces in Friedrichs' survey is the controversy over Gallagher's and Robinson's ideas about free-trade imperialism, which primarily occupied younger British scholars at the red-brick universities. It must remain a matter of conjecture, however, whether this debate, which emphasized the economic roots of imperial expansion, touched on deeper issues in a 'general theory of imperialism'.

As if to concede that the historiography of colonial empire did not generate a lot of heat, the author wanders off in several directions in search of additional issues. Extended portions of the study treat the parliamentary politics of colonial empire, the historiography of international relations and Vichy France, and the development of world history, economic history, the *Annales* school, and area studies. It is not always clear, however, how these broader subjects bore on the historiography of colonial empire. Braudel gets credit for introducing a 'global historical approach' (p. 287) by virtue of his including the

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Ottoman Turks in his work on the Mediterranean. The resulting diffusion of the subject matter is compounded by frequent repetitions, so the argument is difficult to follow in places. In the end, the principal value of the study resides in its description of the standard historical literature on colonial empire in the two countries and its survey of the institutional landscape in which this literature was composed.

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J. A. S. GRENVILLE, *The Jews and Germans of Hamburg: The Destruction of a Civilization 1790–1945* (London: Routledge, 2012), xiv + 334 pp. ISBN 978 0 415 66585 8. £100.00 (hardback). ISBN 978 0 415 66586 5. £24.99 (paperback)

In order to understand John Grenville's message one has to be acquainted with the street map of Hamburg. On p. 257 we find the following description: 'A grocer at the end of the Rothenbaumchaussee heaped a cart filled with vegetables and pushed it to the [Jewish] hospital while it was still in the Johnsallee. Unfortunately he was spotted as he passed the former Jewish community premises at the Rothenbaumchaussee 38, which has been taken over by the Gestapo.' For those who know these surroundings the picture is clear. The grocer was spotted as he was only 10 metres away from the Johnsallee and about 100 metres from the small building left as the Jewish Hospital after the big building in St Pauli had been 'Aryanized' (pp. 123, 153). Rothenbaum, a neighbourhood which had been densely populated by Jews since the turn of the century, passed through the process of 'Aryanization' from 1933 and most Jews either emigrated or, starting in October 1941, were deported to the East. This little episode also tells the reader about the fate of the few who tried to help. Another example: 'October 1941 . . . Between the Sternschanze and the Dammtor stations a young woman, Gisela Solmitz, was travelling on the *U-Bahn* that day. Casually looking out, she caught a glimpse of an unusual sight as the train passed the small triangular Moorweide Park . . . A thousand people . . . were all standing about holding bundles' (p. 1). These people were Jews about to be deported, and the train (an *S-Bahn*, by the way, not an *U-Bahn*) was travelling 5 metres above street level and only 30 to 40 metres from the scene, which took place next to the university, one block away from the Rothenbaumchaussee. Each and every passenger could have had a close look at the last step before the 'final solution'.

Grenville thus sketches a 'topography of terror' in order to explain the 'lapse into barbarism' in Hamburg. Grenville (Hans Guhrauer before leaving Germany for England on a *Kindertransport*) was motivated by his friend Werner Jochmann to research the fate of the Jews of Hamburg. He presents the reader with a history of everyday life, paying special attention to the 'subtle shades of grey' between black and white (p. xi). He hurls questions at his reader in a didactic style,

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some of them rhetorical and others real. His research relies to a large extent on archival documents like the diary of Gisela's mother, Luise Solnitz, referred to above. But a cautious historian must be on the alert. Should we accept this kind of documentation at face value? If, for instance, Max Plaut, the leader of the Hamburg Jews during the war, concludes in his memoirs that he knew as early as September 1940 that concentration camps 'meant death in the worst way' because by then he had learned of the 'euthanasia' killing by poison of 200 Jewish victims (p. 214)—do we believe him? If we do, how should we interpret the correspondence between Plaut and an 'Aryan' whose wife was 'sent to the East' in June 1943? Plaut told the poor husband that the camp to which the woman had been sent was 'a work camp', just before the husband received news from Auschwitz that his wife had died there (pp. 245–6). What did Plaut really know and why did he react in this way? The text itself cannot supply the reader with answers.

The title of the book addresses the source of all evil. While in their own eyes the Jews were 100 per cent Germans—'Be glad you are a German' was the title of an essay written by pupils of the Jewish Talmud Tora school (p. ix)—the non-Jewish population regarded them as 'others', and not only after 1933. As Grenville concentrates on the history of the destruction of a civilization, as suggested by the book's subtitle, the first two chapters, dealing with the years 1790 to 1933 serve only as an introduction to German-Jewish civilization in Hamburg between these years, without going into detail or extensively consulting the relevant historical literature. Some of the leading figures whose offspring will play a major role at the time of catastrophe appear in this introduction, just to show how far integration had gone before 1933: the Wohlwill and Warburg dynasties, Kaiser Wilhelm's friend Albert Ballin, the man in charge of Hamburg's finance, Leo Lippmann, and so on. Anti-Semitism, Grenville reminds us, was not the primary motive behind support for Hitler (or the reason for the Nazi party's success up to 1933) among the established Hamburg bourgeoisie; on the other hand, it did not turn this bourgeoisie away from Nazism either. And from the moment that Hitler came to power in Berlin, it was only about a month before the Nazis took over Hamburg too. Gauleiter Karl Kaufmann, City Mayor Carl Krogmann, and Police Chief Bruno Streckenbach became Hamburg's leading figures. True, by November 1933 support for Hitler was less

than the German average of 90 per cent, but still more than 80 per cent (p. 68).

Grenville believes that the process of squeezing the Jews out of Hamburg had more to do with economic considerations than a specifically radical anti-Semitic attitude. One of the earliest examples: the Karstadt department store chain was so afraid of disfavour from the new regime that its board decided to dismiss all Jewish employees as early as 1 April 1933. Firms owned by non-Jews learned very quickly to use the fact that their competition was 'Jewish' in order effectively to fight it and, if possible, take it over, as in the case of Queisser, producer of Lovana, against Beiersdorf, producer of Nivea (p. 85). Indeed, the merchant elite did not have to wait long to find out how advantageous cooperation with the new regime could be. With the help of the regime even a strong institution with excellent international connections like the Warburg bank could be taken over by 'Aryans' after only half a decade of Nazi rule (p. 161). No wonder that the administration had no problems getting rid of the Jewish head of the financial department, Leo Lippmann, or that the university quickly expelled such prominent figures as Ernst Cassirer and William Stern. Mayor Krogmann, who after 1945 re-invented himself as a protector of his city against the 'real' Nazis and, indeed, went unpunished, was an important instrument of this process of Nazification, Aryanization, and exclusion of the Jews. Warburg's definition of Hamburg's 'Jewish policy' before *Kristallnacht* as a 'cold pogrom' (p. 129), for which he held Krogmann especially responsible, is very much to the point.

Hamburg, Germany's 'gate to the world' was, of course, a 'respectable' city. It did not like the widespread vandalism of *Kristallnacht* (p. 173). Gauleiter Kaufmann openly agreed that such pogroms 'make no sense' (p. 186). Even its SS was relatively restrained compared with that in other cities or the concentration camps. The chief of the Gestapo in Hamburg even 'gave orders not to maltreat the Jews during the process of deporting them' (p. 240). The fact that Hamburg's welfare institutions supported Jews well into the war, however, is attributed not to good will but to the conviction that people dying in the streets was a sight that might upset the general population (p. 154). But there is no doubt that the majority of the population approved of the persecution of the Jews and knew what was going on. Not only the people on their way to work on 10 November

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1938 or those who travelled by *S-Bahn* to the Dammtor station knew in real time what was happening to the Jews. The readers of the *Hamburger Tageblatt* learned as early as February 1942 that the 'Jewish pest has been exterminated' (p. 230).

Time and again Grenville refers to the difference between the majority of *Mitläufer* and the minority of courageous opponents of the system, such as school teacher Fräulein Eberhard, who lost her job because she proposed banning the *Stürmer* from her school (p. 100), Frau Flügge, who remained in contact with Jewish pupils during the war (p. 219), Frau du Bois-Reymond, who in 1938 was brave enough to openly express regret as Warburg left his bank (p. 167), and those who hid Jews during the November pogrom. On the other hand, Grenville's story supplies ample information to support Goetz Aly's thesis expressed in *Hitlers Volksstaat: Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus* (2005), which posits the perpetrators as ordinary and corrupt villains, Gestapo men and others who robbed and looted the Jews of Hamburg in every possible way, and average Hamburg citizens who profited from the auctions of Jewish property (p. 250).

The diary of Luise Solmitz, found in the archives of the Institute for Contemporary History in Hamburg, runs through the whole book. It shows how a woman who was basically a German nationalist – in 1931 she still believed that the Jews had stabbed Germany in the back during the First World War (p. 56) – herself became a victim of the Nazi regime. As time passed, Solmitz learned that her Christian husband was considered a 'racial Jew' in the eyes of the regime. Their daughter, therefore, who was 13 years old when Hitler came to power, became an outcast, had to leave the Bund Deutscher Mädel (p. 98), and was betrayed by her best friends (p. 136). A remark in her diary, right after *Kristallnacht*, in which she uses the term 'final solution' to describe the general mood in the public sphere is very important (p. 177). Solmitz's story is representative of a group that gains much exposure in the book, 'non Aryan' Christians and *Mischlinge* who were considered Jewish by the racial system, but not by themselves (p. 123). But the reader should be reminded that this was not representative of the larger group of 'full' Jews.

Most depressing, of course, is the chapter about Hamburg's Jews during the war and especially at the time of the deportations. Raul Hilberg and Hannah Arendt raised the question of collaboration between the Jewish leadership and the Nazis, one that has since irritat-

ed many historians. Grenville takes a closer look at this issue. He focuses on four Jewish personalities: Max Plaut, Leo Lippmann, Joseph Carlebach, and Max Warburg. Warburg was able to leave before the war. The other three remained in Hamburg, serving their community. On 6 December 1941 Rabbi Carlebach, with 800 fellow Jews, was deported to Riga where he was murdered. Lippmann remained until he was to be deported in June 1943; he committed suicide instead (p. 253). Plaut was in charge of community matters until, in 1943, he was able to emigrate on a special transport to Palestine.

The degree of cooperation shown by each of the four was very different. No doubt Plaut was the more typical case of 'cooperative' Jewish leadership. Grenville's explanation concentrates on what he calls the 'sense of duty' of the Jewish leaders in Hamburg and elsewhere (p. 198, 209). Since the leaders had to follow the authorities' orders for the sake of their communities, he rightly argues, contacts with the representatives of Nazi rule were unavoidable. These contacts required great courage on the part of the Jewish functionaries. The story of Dr Spier, principal of the Talmud Tora school, who went into the lion's den, that is, to the Chief of the Gestapo in charge of the Jewish community, Claus Göttsche, in order to free a teacher from prison (p. 107), serves as a good example. Lippmann's success in getting half the expenses of the transfer of the Jewish cemetery from Grindel to Ohlsdorf paid was also an example of cooperation beneficial to the Jewish community under siege (p. 153). The question becomes more complicated when it comes to the close relations between the same Göttsche and Max Plaut. But here again, under the extreme conditions of the war, what would have been the alternative? Plaut's main concern was to get as many Jews as possible out of Germany with the connivance of the local Gestapo (p. 151). Half of Hamburg's 20,000 Jews were saved. Of the 3,163 deported to the East in 1941, only about 2 per cent survived. The question of whether Plaut should have gone so far as to agree to a deportation of the Jews to the district of Lublin in autumn 1939, allegedly in order to create 'a more tolerable future' for them (p. 208) is, of course, difficult to answer. And Grenville himself, when describing Plaut's role in the transports from October 1941, cannot be sure whether he was doing his best for the Jews who were about to be deported or 'had also become an arm of the Gestapo' (p. 239).

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A most frustrating chapter in the history of the Third Reich is the one dealing with the punishment of the Nazi criminals. Most of the perpetrators in Hamburg got off without punishment. Some of them evaded being put on trial by committing suicide, like Gestapo chief Göttsche. Others fled to distant parts of the world, or got off with a light punishment, if at all. Krogmann remained unharmed. The first Gestapo commander of Hamburg, Streckenbach, died unpunished in 1977. On the other hand, it was no rarity for the wrong men to be punished. The man in charge of the education system, Wilhelm Oberdörffer, who was helpful to the Jews, was removed from his position by British military rule because he had been a member of the Nazi party (p. 110).

This book is both informative and moving; it is an impressive piece of research, sometimes close to a detective story, contributing to our understanding of the dynamics of the Third Reich.¹

¹ It is a pity that the work done in Hamburg by Yfaat Weiss on Jewish education in Nazi Germany (1991) and the book written (in Hebrew) by Elieser Domke about the Hamburg Jews in the years 1928 to 1933 (1995) were not consulted.

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IAN KERSHAW, *The End: Hitler's Germany, 1944–45* (London: Allan Lane, 2011), 592 pp. ISBN 9 780713 997 163. £30.00

The topic of Kershaw's book is, no doubt, of the utmost historical significance. For one, there is the stark discrepancy between the end of the First World War and that of the Second World War: armistice and revolution in November 1918 with the German army still occupying large tracts of enemy territory, and unconditional surrender in May 1945, after the whole of the Reich had been conquered by the victorious powers. More disturbing still is the statistical evidence for the extent of destruction produced by the senseless struggle up to the bitter end during the final phase of the war. After the Western allies had established a firm foothold in Normandy as a result of their invasion on 6 June 1944 with overwhelming forces and resources, Germany's defeat was only a matter of time. Yet the agony of the Nazi regime dragged on for another ten months, accompanied by ever growing misery for the German people. There were more civilian casualties than during the preceding four years of the war, mainly because of area bombing and the chaotic flight of millions from the Eastern territories; as many soldiers lost their lives (2.6 million) as during the whole war up to July 1944 (2.7 million). Towards the end of the war, between three and four hundred thousand soldiers were killed in action every month, mostly on the Eastern Front. The question WHY is so obvious that one wonders why no German historian so far has felt the need to tackle this problem comprehensively. The interest of the ordinary reader is, apparently, rarely at the forefront of German academic historians' minds. In the development of history as a modern discipline in Germany, the idea that historiography is nevertheless the art of storytelling has been eclipsed. Since British historians have never forgotten this lesson, they now have the edge over their German colleagues in explaining German contemporary history to the German reader. Ian Kershaw's present book demonstrates once again that this approach is perfectly compatible with the highest standards of research.

Kershaw is fully aware of the many books on specific, often regional, aspects of the military struggle. But there was no plausible explanation linking the military disaster with both the power structure of the Nazi regime and the reaction of the German people under stress. Above all, no interpretation presented in a narrative style was

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available that could have explained to the reader of a later generation how and why it was possible for the Nazi regime to turn its murderous war machine against its own people at the very moment when the war was lost. For Hitler and many of his generals, preventing a break-down in military discipline was the most important lesson to be learned from the end of the war in 1918. This obsession with the experiences of only twenty-five years ago was widespread, even in Britain. John Maynard Keynes felt that 'Ministers should not suppose that the chief thing that matters was to avoid the mistakes made last time'. This time German troops, utterly exhausted and demoralized, were seized by a widespread fatalism. Nor was there a conspiratorial network of organized resistance left after the plot of 20 July 1944 had failed. What motivated the officer corps towards the end of the war was a misguided sense of duty and a desperate desire to defend their homeland, especially against the Red Army in the East. Although Kershaw is aware of the ordinary German's narrow-minded resilience in the face of incredible hardship, he does not believe that the much hyped idea of the *Volksgemeinschaft* explains the survival of the regime against all odds. Nor does Hitler's personal charisma furnish a satisfactory answer; by the end of the war most Germans had lost faith in their *Führer*. For Kershaw, however, the regime's extraordinary power structure, culminating in Hitler's authority and his final word, as it were, which remained unchallenged until his suicide at the end of April 1945, provides a convincing answer to an otherwise incomprehensible phenomenon.

The title of the concluding chapter says it all: 'Anatomy of Self-Destruction.' Here Kershaw offers a final analysis of his findings. He is quite right to dismiss the Allied demand for unconditional surrender as an explanation for the continuation of the war, or, for that matter, as a crucial handicap to the German resistance movement. After all, Italy accepted the same terms without suffering unduly. It is important to stress this point because after the war unconditional surrender served the German officer corps as a useful alibi, a timely excuse, in that it seemed to blame the Western Allies for extending the war unnecessarily. Not loyalty to Hitler and his government motivated the Germans to carry on, but sheer fear of the ever more brutal henchmen of the Nazi regime, which at the end of its life showed no mercy, thus displaying its true character to its own people. That the role of terror can hardly be overestimated is one of

Kershaw's most crucial explanations. The *levée en masse* (*Volkssturm*) introduced in the final months of the war resulted in the total militarization of society and the widespread application of martial law; summary justice, or rather injustice, was a daily experience. The Nazi Party ruled supreme in organizing a last stand wherever an enemy attack was to be expected. Kershaw singles out four leading characters whose grasp on power and administrative efficiency kept the regime on the road to disaster longer than necessary: Martin Bormann, Heinrich Himmler, Josef Goebbels, and Albert Speer representing the Nazi Party, the police (especially the Gestapo), the propaganda machine, and the war economy. Apart from party stalwarts who knew what was in store for them, there were two other groups which helped to prolong the agony by their misguided sense of duty: the civil service, right down to the last postman, which made sure that the machinery of state kept functioning right up to the last hour, that is, until the handover of power to the new masters; and the officer corps, many of whom felt bound by their oath of loyalty to Hitler regardless of whether they trusted him or not, as though the *Führer* represented the monarch of earlier times.

Ian Kershaw established his reputation with his outstanding biography of Hitler, in the same way as his fellow countryman John Röhl has done with his three volumes on Wilhelm II. Kershaw's concluding remarks therefore touch upon Hitler's role in prolonging the war. In the end, his authority was so undisputed that he could even appoint his own successor, Admiral Karl Dönitz. The four leaders mentioned above were neither united by a common goal, nor in command of a power base strong enough to prevent Hitler from leading Germany to disaster. The *Führer* was no doubt driven by his obsession with avoiding a sudden collapse as in 1918; no 'stab in the back' this time. This is Kershaw's final verdict and I would not disagree with it. But perhaps there is room for further speculation as to why so many Germans followed their leader to the bitter end. They belonged to a generation of Germans who still read Felix Dahn's *Ein Kampf um Rom*, which ends with the heroic downfall of the Ostrogoths at Vesuvius. Nazi propaganda had encouraged a mythical view of history which honoured those who would dare to make a last stand and go down with flying colours. It is to Kershaw's credit, however, that he refrains from all explanations which might link the final disaster with the idea of a German national character influenced

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by the morbid *Nibelungen* saga. Historians have to content themselves with the evidence available to them. In this case, the sources do not allow Kershaw to claim that Nazi ideology motivated ordinary soldiers to fight on. He demonstrates, however, that they acted as much out of fear of an increasingly repressive regime as of the enemy.

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