

Citation style

Strachan, Hew: review of: Manfred Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie, 1914-1918, Köln ; Weimar ; Wien: Böhlau, 2013, in: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 126 (2018), 2, p. 451-454, DOI: 10.15463/rec.586287894

First published: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 126 (2018), 2



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sonen- und Ortsverzeichnis gibt. Ebenso hätte man auch die Untertitel in das Inhaltsverzeichnis aufnehmen und durch Verweise eine Verbindung zwischen dem Text und den zahlreichen Farb- und Schwarzweißabbildungen herstellen können. Doch das sind Wünsche, die der Verlag bei einer zweiten Auflage leicht erfüllen kann.

Die doppelte Thematik – der lange Weg zur Demokratie und die damit verbundene Erinnerungskultur – machen aus diesem überaus reichhaltigen Buch einen wichtigen, weit über den Jahresanlass hinausgehenden Beitrag. Man möchte in zukunftsweisender Abwandlung der pessimistisch-makabren Grillparzerschen Gedichtzeile über Radetzky „In deinem Lager ist Österreich“ sagen: In diesem Buch ist das „Haus der Geschichte Österreich“.

Wien

Stefan Malfer

Manfried RAUCHENSTEINER, *Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie 1914–1918*. Böhlau, Wien–Köln–Weimar 2013. 1222 S. ISBN 978-3-205-78283-4.

In 1993 Manfred Rauchensteiner published „Der Tod des Doppeladlers: Österreich-Ungarn und der Erste Weltkrieg“. Extraordinarily, it was the first full one-volume scholarly account of the Austro-Hungarian experience of the war and the collapse of the Habsburg empire to be written in German. There were understandable historiographical reasons for this. The most obvious was linguistic. If the officers of the k. und k. Armee could not master the ten or more languages spoken at regimental level (even Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf himself only claimed knowledge of seven), no historian was likely to do much better. That was a significant consideration for two reasons. The obvious one was that a history of the empire written from the German and possibly Magyar sources only would be history from the top down: a command history. It would not explain satisfactorily the shifts from imperialism to nationalism, from dualism to trialism, from federalism to full-blown independence, which the war wrought on political and public opinion. Secondly, and more pragmatically, it would not do full justice to the richness of the materials which the empire had bequeathed the historian of the First World War. No other belligerent possesses an archive as intact or as diverse as that held in Vienna. In Berlin, London and Paris, the Second World War led either directly or indirectly to the destruction or displacement of national archives, and post-war policies were not as kind to the legacy of 1914–18 as we would be today.

There was a further problem, perhaps best characterised as the inheritance of Conrad von Hötzendorf himself. When, after the defeat, the former chief of the general staff sat down to write his memoirs, „Aus meiner Dienstzeit“, he declared that they would cover the years 1906–1918, but by the time of his death in 1925 – although he had written five fat volumes – he had only just reached the outbreak of the war. The detail, the surprising frankness and the full quotation of documents nonetheless set a standard which few other participants were likely to match – and they did not. The story which Conrad might have told had he lived was taken up by the official history, „Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914–1918“. In a genre which rarely receives plaudits, this gets fewer than most. Its authors, however, continued to shape the history of the war in post-1945 Austria through individuals like Rudolf Kiszling and Oskar Regele, and so kept alive a familiar narrative – one which could still see Conrad as a misunderstood strategic genius, let down by those around him, especially the Germans, and which burnished the memory of the k. und k. Armee, as well as the empire and dynasty it served.

The title which Rauchensteiner chose in 1993, „Der Tod des Doppeladlers“, was seen by some as redolent of that inheritance, and given its author's career, passed in Vienna and culminating in the directorship of the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Vienna, that would not have been surprising. Much of the significant work on the Habsburg empire in the First World War written in the four decades since 1945 had been produced by scholars who were not

domiciled in the United States or Britain, even when their roots lay in the old empire: F. R. Bridge, Istvan Deák, R. J. W. Evans, Robert Kann, John Leslie, Arthur May, Gunther Rothenberg, Garry Shanafelt, Norman Stone, Robert Wegs and Z. A. B. Zeman. Rauchensteiner had read them all – as well of course as the work of the post-1945 generation of Austrian historians like Fritz Fellner or Richard Plaschka who were less in thrall to the Conrad legacy than the operational military historians of the 1930s.

„Der Tod des Doppeladlers“ was itself a big book: 719 closely printed pages. Twenty years later, in 2013, Rauchensteiner produced a revised version under a new title, „Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie“, which extended the text significantly – by more than a third – to 1222 pages. In the following year his publishers, Böhlau, issued, first, a full if somewhat literal English translation, „The First World War and the end of the Habsburg monarchy“, in a format identical to the German edition, and in 2015 – with the aid of Josef Broukal – a heavily abridged version, „Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie in aller Kürze“ (a mere 276 pages, and heavily illustrated).

Manfred Rauchensteiner is now the master of the field, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The years since 2013, marked as they have been by the centenary of the events with which he has been dealing, have seen the appearance of important works, but they have not toppled Rauchensteiner from his pedestal. In 2016 the Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften at last published the long awaited, final and eleventh volume, „Die Habsburgermonarchie und der Erste Weltkrieg“, in its series „Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918“, and Lothar Höbelt, Wolfram Dornik and others have also made important contributions. Outside Austria, Alexander Watson published his stunning book, „Ring of steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918“, in 2014, and Holger Herwig is preparing a revised edition of „The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918“ (first published in 1997). However, none of these books can match the scale of Rauchensteiner’s – not just for size or for his handling of Austria-Hungary itself, but also for his deep, decades-long engagement with the Vienna archives.

Outwardly, those who purchase the new book who have already read „Der Tod des Doppeladlers“ may feel they are getting more of the same (in both senses). They may also notice elements of duplication which sharper editorial control might have eliminated. The structure of the chapters is similar and in most cases unchanged; they are simply longer. However, even those which carry the same titles are much richer. Rauchensteiner’s exploitation of the Kriegsarchiv in particular, and his extensive and revealing quotations from primary sources, give a depth and freshness to his text, taking it out of the straightforward narrative which provides the book’s overall shape.

„Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie“ also has five new chapters, some of them using but reorganising material which appeared in the earlier book. The overall effect is to say much more about the home front, the economy and the war’s social effects. There is a completely fresh chapter on war finance, a new chapter called „Lager“, which addresses foreigners at home, internees and prisoners of war, and – in an expanded conclusion – an additional chapter called „Ein Reich resigniert“.

This takes the book in directions set by the currents of scholarly research on the war over the last twenty years, away from the front to the home, and away from elites to the people. But Rauchensteiner himself rightly stresses the new things he has to say about older topics. It is here – on government, the monarchy and the armed forces – that Rauchensteiner is most arresting. It is here too that all his quotations, with their flashes of insight, their extraordinary absurdities, and their sense of deep despair, reveal the inner thoughts of the leading figures of the Habsburg empire in its dying days.

Rauchensteiner argues that pre-war Austria-Hungary was not a militarised society. The army – because it was a common imperial institution – embodied the empire as few other

parts of the state could, but military life was not as socialised as it was in Germany. The uniforms looked pretty and the bands sounded impressive, but the substance was less than the show. The pre-war army called up a lower percentage of its citizens than France or Germany, and it was the smallest of the continental armies after mobilisation in 1914. In particular the nationality question prevented the army from being a unified political force. And yet there was paradox even here. The army was the principal agent for the maintenance of domestic order, and as a result – Rauchensteiner argues – after December 1912 it was the use of force that was being socialised. The legislation that authorised the creation of the *Kriegsüberwachungsamt*, which enabled the army's take-over of so many areas of domestic life once war was declared, had pre-war origins.

The story of the army's initial defeats in Serbia and Galicia has been told many times before, but Rauchensteiner's account puts those setbacks in an entirely new context – and one which, even more than the problems of mobilisation and deployment, says a great deal about the army's true effectiveness. On the Galician front two divisional commanders killed themselves, and two out of the four army commanders had been relieved by the end of September. The moral collapse in the army's senior command is perhaps the true measure of its unpreparedness. In all, by the end of December 1914, four of six army commanders, six out of seventeen corps commanders, about ten divisional generals and twenty-four brigade commanders had been sacked.

Conrad oversaw this purge, but he proved to be a poor judge of character and he lacked a pool of replacements to go to, a failing for which Rauchensteiner also blames Franz Ferdinand, who was the inspector general of the armed forces before the war. The Austro-Hungarian army was not the only one to quail when confronted with the reality of mass industrialised war in 1914, but the others responded better to the crisis. At its core was the issue of royal authority. Franz Josef was uneasy about the purge of the generals, and at the army's apex stood his relative, Archduke Friedrich, whose wealth – according to Rauchensteiner – made him a war profiteer, and whose actual duties according to his lord chamberlain took up about an hour a day. Conrad treated Friedrich with disdain and Friedrich himself was fearful of meeting his German counterparts. Franz Josef's heir, Karl, thought Friedrich a fool, and when he became emperor demoted Friedrich to be his deputy.

Between 1914 and 1916, Karl himself exercised a number of military commands, including that of a corps, an army (although it was never operational) and an army group, but without acquiring any real military expertise. In November 1916 he took over the supreme command, while at the same time endeavouring to undermine Germany's military leadership of the coalition and to broker a peace rather than wage a war. From 1916 onwards the survival of the monarchy depended as never before on the continuation of the fighting, but the monarch himself was a reluctant warrior.

The effect of the First World War was to tie the Habsburgs ever more tightly to the army if they were to survive. This central position of the dynasty has become an increasingly important theme in Rauchensteiner's handling of the war. Although the title of the first edition of his history – „Der Tod des Doppeladlers“ – made the Habsburg link clear, it still named Austria-Hungary in parenthesis. Rauchensteiner's new title suppresses any reference to the dual state and opts for the Habsburg monarchy in isolation. For Rauchensteiner, neither emperor can escape his responsibility for the war and its outcome. His Franz Josef is less an old man, tired by the burdens of office, than a full participant in the decision to go to war against Serbia in July 1914, who was then complicit in its widening to Russia. Karl failed to put things right on his accession, principally thanks to immaturity, over-eagerness and lack of political nous, but he inherited a situation that was less of his making than that his predecessor's.

There are of course comparative points here. The Habsburgs were not the only imperial dynasty to be laid low by the First World War; the command failings of the Austro-Hungarian

army in the opening weeks of the war were replicated in other armies, including those of Germany and France; and so on. This is not an area into which Rauchensteiner ventures. He has made good use of sources in English for his study of the specifics of dual monarchy, but he is less confident on the wider literature of the war. The discussion in this respect can look dated, a point reinforced by a cursory inspection of the bibliography. This will not undermine the value or importance of his achievement, but it does mean that the exploitation of its broader significance for the history of the First World War will be left to others.

Oxford

Hew Strachan

Ernst Walter Zeeden (1916–2011) als Historiker der Reformation, Konfessionsbildung und „deutschen Kultur“. Relektüren eines geschichtswissenschaftlichen Vordenkers, hg. von Markus GERSTMEIER–Anton SCHINDLING. (Katholisches Leben und Kirchenreform im Zeitalter der Glaubensspaltung 76.) Aschendorff, Münster 2016. 250 S., s/w-Abb. ISBN 978-3-402-11095-9.

Dieses Buch, von den Herausgebern als „funeralistisch“ (S. 7) etikettiert, ist ein Plädoyer für die Relektüre der Arbeiten Zeedens und möchte ausdrücklich die seltener zitierten Arbeiten in Erinnerung rufen, etwa den Band „Deutsche Kultur in der frühen Neuzeit“, 1968 im Rahmen des „Handbuchs der Kulturgeschichte“ erschienen: Dieses Werk verdiente besondere Beachtung, hatte doch gerade Zeedens Freiburger Lehrer, Gerhard Ritter (1888–1967), vehement gegen diese Form der Geschichtsschreibung Stellung bezogen.

Das ausführliche Vorwort von Markus Gerstmeier und Anton Schindling betont geschichtswissenschaftliche Relevanz und Aktualität, welche die Beschäftigung mit dem vielfältigen Œuvre des Tübinger Ordinarius lohnten. Die beiden akzentuieren u. a. die Bedeutung von Zeedens Biographie für die Entwicklung seiner Thesen: Zeeden, in einem protestantischen Berliner Milieu aufgewachsen, verbrachte prägende Abschnitte seines Lebens in Leipzig, Heidelberg, München, Freiburg im Breisgau, wo er zum Katholizismus konvertierte, und Tübingen. Ohne die Begegnung mit dem süddeutschen Katholizismus – so Gerstmeier und Schindling – wäre die „Konzeptualisierung und Ausformulierung der ‚Konfessionsbildung‘ nicht denkbar gewesen“ (S. 39). Daran schließen sich von denselben Autoren Erläuterungen zu einem Teil der dem Band beigegebenen Abbildungen an, die in Bezug zu Zeedens Arbeiten bzw. Leben stehen. Es folgt ein knapper Beitrag von Wilhelm Borth, der 2014, also zu jenem Zeitpunkt, als das Symposium, dessen Beiträge hier publiziert werden, Vorsitzender des „Fördervereins Geschichte an der Universität Tübingen e. V.“ war.

Franz Brendle widmet sich Zeedens Forschungen zu Luther, Zwingli und Calvin, wobei der zweitgenannte stets hinter Luther und Calvin zurückblieb. Der Verfasser plädiert für eine neue Auseinandersetzung mit den einschlägigen Arbeiten, in welchen Zeeden die Reformatoren parallel darstellte: Jene Arbeiten könnten das Konzept der Konfessionsbildung angestoßen haben. Mit der Konfessionsbildungsthese selbst, also demjenigen Paradigma, welches untrennbar mit Zeedens Namen verbunden ist, beschäftigt sich Johannes Burkhardt. Die traditionelle Geschichtsschreibung, fußend auf Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886), ging von einem Nacheinander aus: auf die Reformation folgte die Gegenreformation. Zeeden hob nun die Parallelität der Entwicklung hervor, indem er den Beginn der katholischen Reform deutlich früher ansetzte; Calvins Reformation wurde als eine zweite Reformation verstanden. Ferner betonte Zeeden, dass alle Konfessionen vergleichbare Mittel anwendeten, etwa in Hinblick auf Religionsausübung und Organisationsformen. Der Autor selbst untermauerte seine These mit der Studie „Katholische Überlieferungen in lutherischen Kirchenordnungen des 16. Jahrhunderts“ (1959) – von Burkhardt als eine „seiner [Zeedens] erstaunlichsten Abhandlungen“ (S. 75) apostrophiert. Michael Maurer widmet sich der „Revitalisierung der Kulturgeschichte durch Ernst Walter Zeeden“, welche besonders durch ihre Quellenkenntnis besticht, zog